Strategy without execution plan

A few days ago, I was watching news on the national TV when a federal minister addressing a public meeting about some development works in his constituency stated openly that “nothing can proceed in Pakistan without a push (dhak-ka). He, though stated so in a lighter tone / mode, however, this is something which actually is embedded in our DNA and therefore, it is a fact which cannot be denied.

I took this example to comment on a recently published Strategy Paper, “Post-2027 Financial System in Pakistan”, probably prepared by the Finance Division of the Government of Pakistan. This Paper seemingly is the result of a continuous push by the IMF for the Government of Pakistan to prepare a detailed plan for the transitioning of the Country’s financial system to a “Riba Free” financial system, as mandated by the Constitution of Pakistan backed by the Judgment of the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan.

The Strategy Paper is undoubted a historic milestone. The paper signals an essential ideological shift from a conventional financial system to an Islamic financial system. It provides a comprehensive, multi-pronged vision to overhaul Pakistan’s financial system. It talks about the financial architecture on which the new system will be built upon, comprising sovereign finance infrastructure, public finance structure, private investment side & the banking systems, the legal regime required to recognize the Islamic finance system and External Debt Restructuring as well. However, there is a feeling that since the Paper is the result of the IMF push, therefore, it has been prepared merely to comply with IMF demands, since it lacks the “execution plan” for the subject transition.

In the world of high-stakes economics, a well-intentioned strategy without a granular execution plan is little more than a wish list. While the document elegantly designs the “what” and the “why,” it drastically falls short on the “how,” the “when,” and the “how much.” Hence, despite the depth of its scope, the strategy paper functions as a conceptual narrative rather than an executable plan. For example, it suffers from some critical planning deficiencies, like:

1. Vague Timeline Anchors

The Paper though highlights that the transition will require amendment of a number of the existing laws, however, it neither gives any practical plan for amendment of the said laws nor mentions that what is presently being done in this regard.

In addition, the paper relies heavily on qualitative timelines rather than hard deadlines. For instance, the paper states that the government will “soon be seeking formal approval” for an Asset Registry Company (ARC), a fully Federal Government owned entity to be housed in the Finance Division. (This company will be established for the development of an Assets Register of all non-current assets owned by the Federal Government and its entities, maintaining the record of non-current assets of Federal Government and the unlisted entities owned by the Federal Government, thereby creating a pool of assets to support Sukuk issuance). Nevertheless, in financial planning language, “soon” is an unmeasurable metric. There is neither an explicit calendar deadline for when the ARC must be legally chartered, nor there is any hint as to whether the process has been initiated, or at what stage it is at the present.

2. Absence of Volumetric Targets

While Section 4.2 highlights a successful PKR 109 billion hybrid Sukuk issuance, it fails to establish subsequent volume targets. The paper does not specify a mandatory, quarter-by-quarter percentage increase for Shariah-compliant national debt leading up to the December 2027 hard stop.

Similarly, Section 4.3 notes a desire to secure fresh foreign financing via Shariah-compliant modes but relies on the caveat of finding a “reasonable option”. Without defining what constitutes an acceptable option for Sharia compliant modes for foreign financing, the policy remains unenforceable.

3. “Cliff-Edge” Milestones

Most structural milestones are broadly bound to un-phased blocks like “CY26” or “CY27”. For example, the paper notes that the review of remaining laws will finish in “CY26” and be legislated during “CY27”. Splitting a nation’s entire legal financial framework cannot be left to a single-year block; it lacks discrete checkpoints, such as, Draft completion and Shariah board sign-off; Cabinet review and regulatory alignment; Parliamentary submission and enactment, etc.

4. “Addressing the Long Pending Issues:

The Country’s legal framework has not so far been able to address certain critical issues, including the failure to recognize the aspect of “beneficial ownership” of the jointly owned assets under islamic banking; failure to address double cost / taxes on transfer of jointly owned assets in terms of islamic banking; and the failure to recognize the “Charity” under the islamic banking system.

The Solution: The Implementation Matrix

To rescue this strategy from remaining a purely academic exercise, the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank of Pakistan must immediately issue a supplementary **Implementation Matrix**. This framework must inject data-driven rigor into the transition. If the state intends to honor its post-2027 commitment seamlessly, it must move past high-level rhetoric. The strategy paper must be paired with an unapologetically rigid, quantifiable, and time-bound implementation matrix. Only then can Pakistan convert its economic wish into an operational reality.