Targeting Ali Khamenei: Jus ad Bellum, IHL, and Command Responsibility

By Muhammad Imran, Staff Member, SAHSOL-LUMS and Rana Abad, SP CCD & Ph. D (Scholar) and Maria Batool, Visiting Teacher, In Private Law College

The hypothetical question of targeting Ali Khamenei must be assessed through two main branches of international law: jus ad bellum and international humanitarian law (IHL), alongside the related but distinct doctrine of command responsibility in international criminal law. These legal regimes operate independently of one another. A use of force may be lawful under IHL but still unlawful under jus ad bellum, or vice versa. Command responsibility, meanwhile, concerns post-conflict criminal accountability rather than the legality of targeting during hostilities. There has been no verified killing of Ali Khamenei as of May 2026, so the analysis remains entirely hypothetical.

Jus ad bellum governs the legality of a state’s resort to force and is primarily grounded in the United Nations Charter, especially Article 2(4), which prohibits the use of force against another state, and Article 51, which provides the exception of self-defense. Under this framework, any strike against Khamenei would first need to be justified as an act of self-defense. The attacking state would need to demonstrate that Iran had carried out or was imminently preparing an armed attack, and that targeting senior leadership was necessary and proportionate to stopping the threat. The legality of such reasoning closely resembles the arguments advanced by the United States following the 2020 killing of Qasem Soleimani in Iraq, where the United States claimed the strike was necessary to prevent imminent attacks. Critics, however, challenged whether the requirement of imminence had been satisfied, and much of the legal debate focused on jus ad bellum rather than IHL.

International humanitarian law (IHL), by contrast, applies once an armed conflict exists and governs the conduct of hostilities. Its central principles include distinction, proportionality, and necessity. Under the principle of distinction, combatants and individuals with a continuous combat function may be lawfully targeted, whereas civilians are protected unless they directly participate in hostilities. This raises the key question of whether Ali Khamenei could be considered a lawful military objective. His position is legally complex because he is simultaneously a religious leader, head of state, and commander-in-chief of Iran’s armed forces. Supporters of targeting would argue that his constitutional authority over the military constitutes effective command and operational control, making him analogous to other wartime leaders who have been treated as lawful military objectives. Opponents would argue that his role is primarily political and religious rather than operational, and that extending lawful targeting to supreme political leaders’ risks eroding the civilian protections at the core of IHL.

Historical practice provides useful comparisons. During the Second World War, Allied forces targeted senior Axis military commanders, including Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese admiral responsible for planning the attack on Pearl Harbor. Because Yamamoto was an active military commander engaged in operations, his targeting is widely regarded as lawful under IHL. Similarly, the 2020 killing of Qasem Soleimani is often cited as a modern example of lawful targeting of a senior military commander, although its legality under jus ad bellum remains contested. By contrast, the targeting of political leaders has been far more controversial. The 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya raised questions about whether Muammar Gaddafi was being targeted as a political leader under the guise of self-defense, while NATO’s 1999 strikes during the Kosovo conflict also raised concerns about whether political command structures could be treated as legitimate military objectives.

The distinction between jus ad bellum and IHL is essential. These regimes operate simultaneously but independently. A war may be unlawful under jus ad bellum but still governed by IHL, meaning that all parties must comply with the rules of armed conflict regardless of who initiated the war. Conversely, even a lawful act of self-defense may violate IHL if it involves indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks. Jus ad bellum determines whether force may be used at all, while IHL regulates how that force is used once hostilities exist.

The doctrine of command responsibility adds another layer but serves a different function. It developed significantly after the Second World War, particularly through the Nuremberg trials and the trial of Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita, and is now codified in Article 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Under this doctrine, military commanders and certain civilian superiors may be held criminally responsible if they knew or should have known about war crimes committed by subordinates and failed to prevent or punish them. It has been applied in cases before tribunals such as those for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. However, command responsibility does not itself authorize the use of lethal force. It is a mechanism of post-facto criminal liability rather than a rule governing lawful targeting during armed conflict.

Ultimately, the hypothetical legality of targeting Ali Khamenei would depend on the interaction of both jus ad bellum and IHL. Under jus ad bellum, the key question would be whether the use of force could be justified under Article 51 as self-defense, requiring necessity and proportionality in response to an armed attack or imminent threat. Under IHL, the question would be whether Khamenei’s role amounts to that of a lawful military objective, either through direct participation in hostilities or through a continuous combat function linked to effective military command. Historical examples such as Yamamoto and Soleimani show that senior military leaders may be lawfully targeted, but the case of supreme political leaders remains far more controversial because it blurs the line between military necessity and political assassination.

In conclusion, the hypothetical targeting of Ali Khamenei involves complex and layered legal questions. Under jus ad bellum, the legality of any strike would depend on whether it can be justified as lawful self-defense under the United Nations Charter, with strict requirements of necessity and proportionality. Under IHL, the central issue would be whether his role as commander-in-chief constitutes sufficient military involvement to make him a lawful target. While historical precedents demonstrate that senior military commanders may be targeted in armed conflict, extending that logic to supreme political leaders remains legally and politically contentious. Command responsibility, although important in assigning criminal accountability for war crimes, does not itself justify targeting or killing. Ultimately, the legality of such a strike would depend on both the justification for the use of force and the classification of the individual under the law of armed conflict.