The British historian Paul Kennedy, in his influential work “The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914,” meticulously detailed how two historically friendly nations—Germany and Britain—progressed towards a devastating mutual hostility culminating in World War I. Kennedy underscored the profound structural forces that fueled this rivalry: economic competition, geographical imperatives, and ideological clashes. Germany’s meteoric economic rise disrupted the established balance of power, emboldening Berlin to extend its strategic ambitions. This expansion, particularly in naval power, threatened British interests, leading to a perception of the two nations as ideological adversaries. Germany was seen as a burgeoning authoritarian state with expansionist desires, while Britain was caricatured as a greedy, exploitative power.
Despite these tensions, it was not the structural pressures alone that ignited the war. The outbreak of World War I was precipitated by the contingent decisions of key individuals and a stark lack of imaginative foresight on both sides. While war seemed likely given the circumstances, it was not an inevitable outcome. Had Germany’s leaders, post-Bismarck, not been so aggressive in altering the naval balance of power and had they been more considerate of international norms and their neighbors’ concerns, the trajectory might have differed. Germany’s alliance with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, known for repressing national aspirations, further complicated its claims of seeking a more just world order.
On the other side, Britain exhibited a similar tunnel vision. Notably, Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1913, acknowledged that Britain’s dominant global stance appeared less justifiable to others. British officials and media consistently disparaged Germany, misinterpreting its actions as inherently aggressive, while failing to grasp Germany’s security concerns on a continent surrounded by potential foes. This mutual distrust exacerbated the situation, as British hostility only intensified German fears and ambitions. Few individuals possessed the insight or willingness to seek a substantial improvement in Anglo-German relations, a deficiency Kennedy lamented.
This historical analysis bears striking resemblances to contemporary U.S.-China relations, where economic rivalry, geopolitical anxieties, and deep-seated mistrust are driving the two powers towards a potentially catastrophic confrontation. Similar to the pre-World War I era, structural factors are significant, but human decisions will ultimately determine the outcome. The rivalry between China and the United States, like that between Germany and Britain, is deeply rooted in economic competition and geopolitical fears. However, it is crucial to recognize that these structural forces do not predetermine conflict. Wise leadership and sound judgment can manage tensions and avert disaster.
The Roots of Rivalry
The antagonism between China and the United States can be traced back to the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Beijing and Washington had formed a pragmatic alliance against the Soviet Union. However, the collapse of the Soviet state shifted focus to the differences between China and the United States. The United States increasingly criticized China’s repressive government, while China resented the United States’ global dominance and perceived interference in its internal affairs.
Despite these sharpening views, the immediate post-Cold War period did not see a significant decline in U.S.-Chinese relations. Successive U.S. administrations facilitated China’s modernization and economic growth, seeing it as beneficial for American interests. China, in turn, embraced American consumer habits and market practices, creating an enormous market for U.S. goods and capital. This period mirrored the initial British acceptance of German unification and economic expansion in the late 19th century.
However, geopolitically, China was wary of the United States. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States’ military success in the 1991 Gulf War highlighted the unipolar nature of the world, where the U.S. could exert its power almost unchecked. Meanwhile, the U.S. was appalled by China’s use of force against its own citizens, exemplified by the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. This growing distrust paralleled the deteriorating relations between Germany and Britain in the late 19th century, where economic ties expanded even as political and ideological tensions grew.
The Economic Shift
The dynamic between China and the United States fundamentally changed due to China’s unprecedented economic success. In 1995, China’s GDP was about ten percent of the U.S. GDP; by 2021, it had grown to approximately 75 percent. Similarly, China’s share of global manufacturing output surged from less than five percent to nearly 30 percent, surpassing the United States, which now produces only 17 percent. These figures illustrate China’s significant rise in economic power, reminiscent of Germany’s rapid industrial growth at the turn of the 20th century.
China’s economic rise was accompanied by a growing assertiveness on the geopolitical stage. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which China opposed, heightened Beijing’s fears about American unilateralism and its disregard for international norms. This prompted China to double its military budget between 2000 and 2005 and then again by 2009, investing heavily in modernizing its military, particularly its naval and missile capabilities. By the mid-2010s, China’s navy had surpassed the U.S. Navy in the number of ships, signalling its strategic ambitions.
Some analysts argue that China would have expanded its military capabilities regardless of U.S. actions, as rising powers typically do. However, the specific timing of China’s military build up was clearly influenced by its fear of U.S. containment. Similar to Germany’s fears of being encircled economically and strategically in the early 1900s, China viewed U.S. actions as efforts to hinder its rise.
Hubris and Fear
Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II exemplified a combination of hubris and fear. Germans believed in their nation’s inevitable rise and viewed Britain as an existential threat. German media and leaders projected a future where Germany would surpass other nations economically, technologically, and militarily. They lauded their governance model, which combined democracy and authoritarianism, as superior. Germany’s leaders saw British interference as the primary obstacle to their ambitions and interpreted British rearmament and trade policies as aggressive moves.
This mindset led to nationalist fervor and a dark view of Britain’s intentions. German leaders failed to recognize how their own aggressive rhetoric and actions provoked other nations. By 1914, Germany felt encircled and believed Britain was determined to thwart its progress, leading to a fatalistic acceptance of conflict.
China today exhibits similar signs of hubris and fear. Chinese leaders, particularly those in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), took pride in navigating the 2008 global financial crisis more effectively than Western counterparts. They perceived the recession as a symbol of the shifting global economic balance from the United States to China. Chinese officials frequently emphasized their nation’s inevitable rise and projected confidence in their governance model.
Regionally, China has become more assertive, particularly regarding its neighbors and internal affairs. It has suppressed movements for self-determination in Tibet and Xinjiang, undermined Hong Kong’s autonomy, and intensified preparations for a potential takeover of Taiwan. This growing assertiveness has been accompanied by a rise in Chinese nationalism and an increasing perception of the United States as a major threat.
Escalating Tensions
The rise of nationalism in China and the United States has exacerbated tensions. In 2016, Donald Trump’s presidential campaign capitalized on anti-China sentiment, portraying China as a malign force. Once in office, Trump initiated a military buildup targeting China and launched a trade war to reinforce U.S. commercial dominance. His successor, Joe Biden, maintained many of Trump’s hardline policies, reflecting a bipartisan consensus that views China as a significant threat to U.S. interests. The Biden administration has also imposed further trade restrictions to hinder China’s access to advanced technology.
Beijing has responded with a mix of ambition and insecurity. Chinese leaders have accused the United States of trying to maintain an unjust global order, similar to Germany’s accusations against Britain a century ago. A 2022 white paper by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the U.S. seeks to perpetuate its hegemony at the expense of other nations, disrupting the actual world order.
The United States, meanwhile, has sought to combine deterrence with limited cooperation. The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy in 2022 acknowledged China’s capacity to reshape the international order but stressed the importance of working with China where interests align. However, this approach is undermined by mutual recriminations, strategic mistrust, and limited communication.
The Conditions for Conflict
Three primary conditions led to war between Germany and Britain: the belief that Britain would not allow Germany to rise, the fear of weakening future positions, and a lack of strategic communication. Germany’s leaders were convinced that Britain aimed to prevent their country’s ascent, yet they struggled to articulate their vision for the future world order. Both sides feared that delaying conflict would weaken their positions, leading some leaders to prefer fighting a war sooner rather than later. Finally, poor strategic communication and misinterpretations of each other’s actions heightened the risk of war.
These conditions are now present in the U.S.-China relationship. Chinese President Xi Jinping and the CCP leadership are convinced that the United States seeks to obstruct China’s rise. China’s statements about its international ambitions are vague, adding to the uncertainty. Internally, Chinese leaders are concerned about economic slowdowns and maintaining domestic stability. In the United States, political divisions hinder effective long-term governance, contributing to strategic miscommunication and increasing the risk of conflict.
China’s military preparations for a potential invasion of Taiwan further mirror Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, which involved invading Belgium and triggered British intervention. The parallels are striking and concerning, as they suggest a high potential for strategic miscalculation and escalation into a broader conflict.
Avoiding Disaster
While the similarities between the pre-World War I Anglo-German rivalry and the current U.S.-China relationship are unsettling, conflict is not inevitable. To prevent a war, the United States must convince China that the international system can accommodate its rise peacefully. Similarly, China needs to recognize that aggressive expansionist policies will inevitably provoke a defensive response from the U.S. and its allies, potentially leading to disastrous consequences for all involved.
Building Trust and Communication
First and foremost, enhancing strategic communication is crucial. One of the major pitfalls that led to World War I was the lack of effective communication and mutual understanding between Germany and Britain. Regular high-level dialogue between the U.S. and China, focusing on mutual concerns and potential points of conflict, can help mitigate misunderstandings. Establishing direct communication channels between military leaders, akin to the U.S.-Soviet “hotline” during the Cold War, could prevent accidental escalations and manage crises more effectively.
To facilitate trust, both nations could also engage in joint initiatives in areas of common interest, such as climate change, global health, and counter-terrorism. By working together on global challenges, they can build a cooperative framework that might spill over into other areas of bilateral relations.
Redefining National Narratives
A significant part of avoiding conflict involves reshaping national narratives that drive public opinion and policy. In the United States, political leaders and media must avoid demonizing China and recognize the complexity of its rise. Instead of viewing China’s growth solely as a threat, the U.S. could frame it as an opportunity for cooperation in various sectors, from technology to trade.
China, on the other hand, should temper its nationalistic rhetoric that portrays the United States as an unyielding hegemon determined to stifle its progress. Chinese leadership needs to communicate more clearly about their intentions and demonstrate how their rise can be beneficial globally, not just for China. Transparency in China’s strategic goals and a commitment to international norms would go a long way in alleviating U.S. concerns.
Economic Interdependence as a Stabilizer
Economic interdependence has historically been a double-edged sword. While it can exacerbate tensions, as seen in pre-WWI Europe, it can also act as a powerful deterrent to conflict. Both the U.S. and China should recognize the mutual benefits of their economic relationship and strive to maintain open lines of trade and investment.
The U.S. could reconsider some of its more aggressive trade policies, instead opting for negotiated settlements that address specific grievances while preserving overall economic ties. China, in turn, should work to create a more level playing field for foreign businesses, addressing issues such as intellectual property theft and market access.
Expanding multilateral trade agreements and regional economic partnerships that include both the U.S. and China could also provide a framework for managing competition and fostering cooperation. These agreements would not only bind the two economies closer together but also include other nations that can serve as stabilizing influences.
Military Restraint and Confidence-Building Measures
Given the rapid military buildup on both sides, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, it is essential to implement confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of accidental conflict. Both nations could agree to certain arms control measures, such as limits on the deployment of certain types of missiles or naval forces in sensitive areas.
Joint military exercises focused on non-combat operations, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, could build trust between the armed forces of both countries. Establishing protocols for naval encounters in the South China Sea, similar to the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, could help manage tensions and prevent unintended clashes.
Regional Stability and Alliances
The U.S. and China both have significant interests in the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. For the U.S., maintaining strong alliances with countries like Japan, South Korea, and Australia is crucial. However, these alliances should not be perceived as a containment strategy against China but rather as part of a broader strategy for regional stability.
China, meanwhile, should engage more constructively with its neighbors, addressing their security concerns and working towards peaceful resolutions of territorial disputes. Confidence-building measures in the South China Sea, where multiple nations have competing claims, could be particularly beneficial.
The establishment of regional security dialogues that include both the U.S. and China, along with other key regional players, could provide a platform for addressing security concerns and preventing misunderstandings. The ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit are potential venues for such dialogues.
Domestic Politics and Leadership
Finally, the domestic political landscape in both countries plays a significant role in shaping foreign policy. In the United States, the partisan divide often leads to conflicting signals being sent to Beijing. A more consistent, bipartisan approach to China policy, focused on long-term strategic interests rather than short-term political gains, would provide greater stability in U.S.-China relations.
In China, the centralization of power under President Xi Jinping has led to more assertive foreign policies. Encouraging more diverse viewpoints within China’s political system and promoting a more open debate about the nation’s foreign policy goals could lead to more balanced and less confrontational policies.
Both nations must also address the internal pressures that drive external aggression. For China, this includes managing economic inequalities and regional disparities, while for the U.S., it involves tackling domestic polarization and economic challenges. A more stable and prosperous domestic situation in both countries could reduce the impulse to use foreign policy as a means of distraction or consolidation of power.
Conclusion
The lessons from the Anglo-German rivalry in the lead-up to World War I are stark reminders of how great power competition can spiral into catastrophic conflict. The structural similarities between the Anglo-German rivalry and the current U.S.-China relationship are evident, but history does not have to repeat itself. By enhancing communication, reshaping national narratives, leveraging economic interdependence, implementing military confidence-building measures, ensuring regional stability, and addressing domestic political dynamics, the U.S. and China can manage their rivalry and avoid the path to war.
The future of U.S.-China relations will depend not only on managing competition but also on finding areas of common interest where both nations can cooperate for mutual benefit and global stability. This requires visionary leadership, diplomatic skill, and a commitment to building a world where great power competition does not lead to conflict but rather to a more stable and prosperous international order.
The author is a PhD scholar in English Literature, a Lawyer, and an International Relations analyst.
