China is rapidly growing its nuclear weapons program. Under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, Beijing aims to have 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, a significant rise from about 200 in 2019, according to estimates from the Pentagon. This expansion of China’s nuclear capacity, alongside its broader efforts to modernize its military, has raised serious concerns in Washington. In 2023, a Congressional commission recommended that U.S. policymakers rethink America’s nuclear strategy in light of China’s aggressive buildup. Admiral John Aquilino, the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said in March that this escalation poses the most significant threat the U.S. has faced since World War II. As the U.S. faces these escalating threats and the increasing risk of nuclear conflict, it’s crucial for policymakers to understand the reasons behind China’s accelerated nuclear development. The sudden shift from Beijing’s traditionally smaller nuclear arsenal has left many analysts questioning the motives. Some suggest that China’s build-up is a reaction to U.S. technological advancements, while others believe Beijing has adopted a more confrontational stance in its nuclear policy.
An in-depth analysis of China’s strategic planning indicates that its leadership is expanding its nuclear capabilities for reasons beyond simple military strength. Chinese policymakers appear to believe that a robust nuclear arsenal provides them with greater geopolitical leverage to counter perceived threats from the U.S. Beijing’s criticism of what it sees as unjust American nuclear policies and questionable U.S. security interests seems to underpin its readiness to pursue unilateral steps to protect its security. For the U.S. to manage its relationship with China effectively, it’s vital to comprehend how Beijing’s perceptions shape its nuclear policy. Misunderstanding these dynamics could lead to strategic errors and potentially catastrophic outcomes.
In the perspective of Beijing, escalating tensions with Washington stem from the shifting power dynamics between China and the United States, driven primarily by China’s rapid economic growth rather than any alteration in its behavior. The belief is that Washington perceives China’s rise as a threat and has adopted increasingly antagonistic attitudes towards Beijing, implementing containment strategies to uphold U.S. dominance in geopolitics. Given this scenario, Beijing seeks to convince Washington to acknowledge China’s emergence as a significant global player and to dissuade U.S. policymakers from attempting to contain, disrupt, or destabilize China. Beijing perceives this persuasion as achievable only through bolstering its own power.
This rationale has led China to perceive a growing threat from the United States as the power gap between the two nations diminishes. Xi Jinping, a staunch proponent of the idea that the U.S. opposes China’s ascent, attaches significant geopolitical importance to nuclear weapons as tools to demonstrate Chinese strength. While his predecessors adhered to China’s traditionally modest nuclear stance, focusing on qualitative enhancements over quantitative expansions due to resource limitations, Xi has elevated the missile force to a full military service, directed expedited nuclear modernization efforts, and enhanced both the sophistication and size of China’s nuclear arsenal.
Xi’s emphasis on nuclear armament reflects a fundamental divergence in perspective from his American counterparts. Rather than viewing nuclear weapons solely as instruments to achieve specific military objectives, such as deterring enemy actions, Beijing regards them as symbols of military might with significant influence on an adversary’s perception of power dynamics. This belief forms the basis of what Chinese officials term the “strategic counterbalance” mission of their nuclear forces, aimed at compelling the United States to adopt a more accommodating stance towards China.
Xi’s faith in strategic counterbalancing through nuclear weapons has been longstanding. Soon after assuming power in 2012, he praised Russia’s prioritization of nuclear capabilities despite economic challenges, aligning with his belief that a nation’s nuclear strength shapes its adversary’s approach to bilateral relations. Amid concerns of a U.S.-led global anti-China campaign in early 2021, Xi urged the military to expedite China’s nuclear expansion, reinforcing the idea that a robust nuclear arsenal enhances China’s leverage, particularly amidst escalating tensions with the United States.
The notion that nuclear weapons possess extensive coercive power, transcending military realms, is more intuitive than empirically substantiated. Historical precedent, such as the Cold War era, demonstrates that even formidable nuclear arsenals did not deter adversaries from resorting to economic subversion and political warfare. However, under Xi’s centralized power structure, critical evaluation of his assumptions is stifled, leading to the unquestioning execution of his vision for China as a formidable nuclear power. This lack of critical discourse, compounded by official secrecy surrounding planning mechanisms, impedes the Chinese expert community’s ability to assess nuclear development and engage in policy debates. Moreover, the evolving military doctrine, marked by conflicting elements and ambiguous objectives, underscores that nuclear policymaking in China is driven more by political mandates than by military necessity or rigorous analysis. This ambiguity hampers China’s capacity to articulate its nuclear policy publicly or establish clear positions regarding negotiations on nuclear limitations with the United States.
One of the major hurdles to engaging China in nuclear discussions is Beijing’s growing mistrust of cooperative security measures as a way to protect against what it sees as existential threats from the United States. Chinese President Xi Jinping has highlighted the importance of maintaining control over national security, indicating that Beijing sees the strategic advantage as key to safeguarding its interests. This erosion of trust is prompting China to pursue a stronger balance of power and diminishing its interest in arms control talks.
China’s distrust partly comes from its perception of U.S. hypocrisy in the nuclear domain. Chinese experts note that the United States does not acknowledge China’s right to implement the same nuclear strategies that Washington uses. The U.S. retains the option for a preemptive nuclear strike but has expressed concern that China might abandon its commitment to a no-first-use policy, a pledge Beijing claims it will not violate.
U.S. policymakers justify these double standards by suggesting that American security goals are more legitimate than China’s. They argue that maintaining the status quo in the Asia-Pacific, including the Taiwan Strait and the East China and South China Seas, aligns with international norms, contrasting this with China’s attempts to change territorial boundaries through force. Thus, U.S. officials consider it both morally justified and strategically vital to keep various nuclear options available to protect U.S. interests and allies.
Beijing views these double standards as symptomatic of what Chinese officials call U.S. “hegemonic arrogance.” The United States’ claim of a right to defend Taiwan—a territory Beijing considers a core national interest—is deemed illegitimate by China, especially when Washington frames it as a security issue. American strategists often emphasize Taiwan’s importance, suggesting that keeping Taiwan separate from China is crucial for maintaining a favorable military balance in the Asia-Pacific, protecting U.S. allies, and enhancing U.S. credibility. Such arguments deepen Beijing’s concern that American aims could undermine China’s territorial sovereignty and reinforce the belief that China must confront what it perceives as U.S. hegemony.
China seeks to challenge this perceived imbalance by amplifying its power, including through nuclear expansion. Chinese experts point to the Soviet Union’s success in influencing U.S. nuclear strategy during the Cold War, arguing that Moscow’s substantial nuclear build-up in the 1960s and 1970s forced Washington to move away from its policy of massive retaliation towards a more flexible response strategy. They also highlight that the U.S. never adjusted its policies for smaller adversaries like China, maintaining aggressive strike plans against them. Now, with significantly more resources than during the Cold War, Beijing aims to correct what it sees as historical inequities.
This skepticism reflects a deeper issue in U.S.-China relations: beyond the specific security disputes, China increasingly demands equal standards and rules. Chinese officials have stressed that fairness is a crucial condition for engaging in security and arms control discussions. This suggests that China will continue to build its unilateral capabilities instead of pursuing cooperative security measures, aiming to establish a nuclear relationship with the United States that it perceives as more just and equitable.
The United States’ current strategy for addressing China’s nuclear program is falling short. American analysts often suggest military-technical solutions, like improving nuclear transparency or capping new strategic weapons, to reduce the arms race. However, these recommendations don’t tackle the root causes driving China’s nuclear expansion and have done little to interest Xi Jinping. To stabilize the growing U.S.-China nuclear arms race, Beijing and Washington need to engage in direct discussions to address the security issues underlying their mutual animosity.
A direct dialogue aligns with both nations’ broader goals. The U.S.-led “rules-based international order” is built on a shared understanding of legitimate interests and the methods used to pursue them. In contrast, Chinese officials, in recent government statements and policy documents, have emphasized considering other nations’ legitimate security interests and ensuring “undiminished security for all countries.” This common ground offers an opportunity for a comprehensive discussion on what defines legitimate security interests and acceptable methods to pursue them. A parallel process occurred with the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which helped reduce tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western bloc during the Cold War.
An initial step could be an agreement between China and the United States not to alter the territorial status quo in the Asia-Pacific through military force. Such an accord, or reciprocal unilateral commitments, would strengthen China’s claim of peaceful growth, establish fair rules of conduct, foster a shared outlook on regional stability, and lessen the incentives for military buildup among all parties.
Of course, China’s reluctance to engage in serious talks on both nuclear and broader security matters poses a significant challenge. There’s no certainty that Beijing would immediately embrace a U.S.-led dialogue. Even if talks were to commence—potentially driven by international pressure—skillful diplomacy would be crucial to navigate what would likely be difficult discussions. Still, a focus on dialogue that seeks to understand each other’s views on legitimate security interests and approaches could address China’s fundamental concerns and pave the way for stabilizing the U.S.-China security relationship. By prioritizing such discussions, the U.S. could demonstrate goodwill and help Beijing realize that only through cooperative measures can a policy of deterrence be softened.
The United States’ current strategy for addressing China’s nuclear program appears to be missing the mark. Recommendations from American experts for easing the arms race often suggest military-focused solutions, such as increasing nuclear transparency or placing restrictions on new strategic weapons. However, these ideas don’t address the underlying reasons behind China’s nuclear expansion, which explains why they have not captured Xi Jinping’s attention. To stabilize the growing U.S.-China nuclear arms race, it’s critical for Beijing and Washington to engage in direct talks about the core security issues that fuel their hostility toward each other.
A dialogue of this kind would benefit both the U.S. and China. Washington’s advocacy for a rules-based international order relies on shared understandings of what is deemed legitimate and the appropriate ways to achieve those goals. At the same time, China’s high-level government statements and recent policy documents have consistently stressed the importance of considering other nations’ security interests and ensuring “undiminished security for all countries.” This convergence in outlook creates a chance to discuss and define what constitutes legitimate security interests and what methods are acceptable to maintain them. It would resemble the process that led to the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which helped reduce Cold War tensions between the Soviet Union and the West.
A possible first step could be a commitment by China and the United States to avoid altering the territorial status quo in the Asia-Pacific through military action. An agreement like this, or even reciprocal declarations with the same goal, would bolster the legitimacy of China’s claims to peaceful rise, establish fair and equitable rules of conduct, foster a shared vision for regional stability, and reduce the incentives for military buildup.
It’s important to recognize that China’s reluctance to engage in meaningful discussions on nuclear and broader security issues makes it uncertain whether Beijing would readily embrace a U.S. invitation to talks. Even if a dialogue were to begin—possibly due to international appeal and pressure—guiding both sides through what would likely be difficult conversations would require careful diplomacy. Despite this, a dialogue-based approach focused on understanding each other’s views on legitimate security interests and approaches could address China’s core concerns and potentially stabilize the U.S.-China security relationship. By prioritizing these discussions, the U.S. could demonstrate goodwill and help Beijing understand that only through cooperative measures can a policy of deterrence be softened.
The author is a PhD scholar in English Literature, a Lawyer, and an International Relations analyst.
