Many politicians, diplomats, and international observers frequently argue for the emergence or imminent arrival of a multipolar world. However, this assessment differs significantly from the contemporary global reality, which is far from being genuinely multipolar. This assessment is rooted in a straightforward definition of polarity in international relations, which hinges on the number of major powers in the global system. To truly qualify as multipolar, there must be three or more formidable powers.
Currently, the international landscape is characterized by the dominance of just two nations possessing the economic strength, military prowess, and global influence required to be considered distinct poles: The United States and China. The prospect of other major powers emerging remains remote and uncertain, if attainable at all in the foreseeable future. It’s crucial to emphasize that the existence of rising middle powers and nonaligned countries with substantial populations and growing economies does not automatically transform the world into a multipolar one.
The absence of additional poles in the international system becomes apparent when examining the leading contenders. In 2021, India, a rapidly growing nation, ranked as the third-largest defense spender, a significant indicator of a nation’s power. However, recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicates that India’s military budget is only a quarter of China’s. India’s primary focus remains on its own development, with a smaller foreign service and a comparatively smaller navy in the Indo-Pacific region compared to China, which has launched five times more naval tonnage over the past five years. While India may have the potential to become a significant global player in the future, that day appears to be distant.
Economic wealth is another crucial indicator of a nation’s power. Japan boasts the world’s third-largest economy, but its GDP is less than one-quarter of China’s, according to the latest figures from the International Monetary Fund. Germany, India, Britain, and France, the next four largest economies globally, also fall far short in comparison.
Russia, with its vast landmass, abundant resources, and substantial nuclear arsenal, could conceivably be considered a contender for great-power status. The nation does wield influence beyond its borders, as seen in its involvement in a major European conflict and its role in encouraging Finland and Sweden to join NATO. However, Russia’s economy is smaller than Italy’s, and its military budget is at most one-quarter of China’s, falling short of qualifying as a third major pole in the international system. At best, Russia may play a supportive role to China.
Advocates of multipolarity often point to the rise of the global south and the diminishing influence of the West. However, the presence of established and emerging middle powers like India, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia, while significant, does not render the international system multipolar. These nations collectively lack the economic, military, and other forms of influence needed to establish themselves as independent poles. In essence, they do not have the capacity to rival the United States and China.
Although the United States’ share of the global economy has decreased, it still holds a dominant position, especially when combined with China’s influence. These two major powers together account for half of the world’s total defense expenditure, and their combined GDP is roughly equivalent to the sum of the next 33 largest economies.
The expansion of the BRICS forum, as witnessed at its summit in Johannesburg, is often interpreted as a step towards a multipolar world order. However, these blocs, including BRICS, face inherent challenges due to their diversity and are susceptible to fragmentation. Within the BRICS grouping, there are nations with widely differing interests and policy alignments. Notably, in terms of security policy, a pivotal indicator of alignment, the two largest members, China and India, frequently find themselves in disagreement. China’s ascension has even prompted India to seek closer ties with the United States.
The notion that the world has shifted into a state of multipolarity is, however, a misconception. While the global landscape is evolving with various nations gaining prominence and influence, true multipolarity, characterized by multiple great powers on par with the United States and China, remains elusive. The contemporary international system continues to be dominated by the overwhelming influence of these two giants, with the emergence of additional poles in the distant future appearing uncertain, if attainable at all.
So, if the world isn’t genuinely multipolar, what explains the popularity of the multipolarity argument? Beyond its tendency to overlook established facts and principles in international relations, there are three prominent explanations for its prevalence.
First and foremost, for many proponents of the multipolarity concept, it carries a normative dimension. It serves as a way of expressing, or perhaps hoping for, a shift away from Western dominance and advocates for a more decentralized distribution of power. To these individuals, multipolarity represents a means to address the shortcomings of multilateralism and restore equilibrium to the global system. Certain European leaders, for instance, view multipolarity as a preferable alternative to bipolarity, as they believe it better aligns with a world governed by rules, encourages global partnerships with diverse actors, and helps prevent the emergence of new power blocs. Essentially, the belief in a multipolarity that doesn’t currently exist is intertwined with broader aspirations and visions for the future of the global order.
Secondly, the appeal of the multipolarity concept can be attributed to reluctance among policymakers, commentators, and academics to accept the harsh realities of an escalating, all-encompassing, and polarizing rivalry between the United States and China. In this context, belief in multipolarity can be seen as a form of intellectual avoidance—a desire to evade the prospect of another Cold War and its profound implications for global stability.
Thirdly, discussions about multipolarity often serve as a strategic maneuver. Beijing and Moscow, in particular, view multipolarity as a means to constrain U.S. power and enhance their own global standing. This strategic utilization of multipolarity has been evident in China’s diplomatic initiatives throughout 2023, and Putin, during the Russia-Africa summit in July, declared a commitment to promoting a multipolar world among the attending leaders. Likewise, when leaders of rising middle powers, such as Brazil’s Lula, advocate for multipolarity, it often serves as an attempt to position their countries as prominent nonaligned nations.
One might question whether the debate over polarity, along with its misconceptions, holds any real significance. The straightforward answer is that the number of power poles within the global order carries substantial weight, and misconceptions can obscure strategic thinking, ultimately leading to misguided policies.
