As Gulf nations abundant in oil resources aim to broaden their range of military alliances, they find themselves entangled in the escalating rivalry for global supremacy between the United States and China.
Among the United States’ most intimate partners in the region, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is set to conduct its inaugural military exercise with China this month, as revealed by the Chinese defense ministry in the previous month. The UAE has previously collaborated with American forces on six occasions and has acquired cutting-edge weaponry from Washington, solidifying its role as a military collaborator.
Named the China-UAE Falcon Shield-2023 joint air force maneuver, this exercise is scheduled to occur in August within China’s northwestern Xinjiang region, although a specific date has not been disclosed. A UAE official has articulated that these joint drills reflect the nation’s ongoing endeavors to bolster international cooperation across diverse domains and contribute to the reinforcement of global peace and stability. The UAE has a history of participating in joint and multilateral training exercises with a variety of international partners spanning the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and Asia.
China initially identified a prospect in the Middle East during the tenure of former U.S. President Barack Obama and his “pivot to Asia” approach, which sought to redirect American military and diplomatic focus to the East. Regional nations perceived this as potentially compromising the U.S.’s dedication to their own security.
For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, these concerns materialized when they encountered significant attacks on their territories in 2019 and 2022, respectively, marking the most substantial assaults in years. These attacks, attributed to either Iran or its Houthi proxy in Yemen, were met with a subdued response from Washington. The UAE likened its experience to its own version of 9/11.
The absence of perceived security left by the US has given rise to a new opportunity,” stated Mohammed Baharoon, the director general of the Dubai Public Policy Research Center, known as B’huth. He noted that China’s increased presence in the Middle East is a direct reaction to the region’s growing importance and the lack of viable solutions to address the Gulf’s security apprehensions. The US’ three-decade-long approach of isolating Iran, Baharoon argued, yielded no substantial gains.
In the eyes of these nations, the United States seems to have failed to fulfill its stated obligations as a security guarantor, either due to incapability or unwillingness.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has been quick to emphasize that its international partnerships extend beyond the US. When asked whether the kingdom was aligning with Russia in the Ukrainian conflict, Saudi ambassador to the US, Princess Reema bint Bandar Al Saud, underlined their policy of engagement with all parties.
Despite claims to the contrary, Washington denied any retreat from the Middle East and reaffirmed its dedication to safeguarding allies, particularly against Iran and its proxies. Saudi Arabia, however, seems to be testing this commitment. Recent reports suggest that the kingdom is seeking a formal security agreement from the Biden administration as a condition for recognizing Israel. According to the Wall Street Journal, the US desires Saudi Arabia to lessen its economic and military ties with Beijing in exchange.
Saudi Arabia might consider the potential shift in the US administration next year before finalizing any major agreements with Washington. This anticipation arises from concerns that any arrangements made could be disregarded with the arrival of a new government.
Contrary to suggestions of reduced involvement in the Middle East, Washington has refuted any such withdrawal and reaffirmed its unwavering dedication to safeguarding its allies, particularly against Iran and its proxies. Saudi Arabia appears to be assessing the extent of this commitment. Reports indicate that the kingdom is now requesting the Biden administration to formalize security assurances through a formal agreement in exchange for recognizing Israel. According to the Wall Street Journal, the US is seeking Saudi Arabia’s distancing, both economic and militarily, from Beijing as part of the arrangement.
Saudi Arabia is likely to consider the potential transition in the US administration next year before engaging in any significant negotiations with Washington. This cautious approach stems from concerns that an agreement might lose its value with the arrival of a new government.
While the United States and Europe remain primary arms suppliers to the Middle East, Gulf Arab states namely Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE comprise four of the top 10 importers of US arms. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also made acquisitions from China. In recent times, China and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement to domestically co-manufacture drones within the kingdom, and the UAE procured advanced trainer jets from China.
Some of these acquisitions were prompted by restrictions imposed by the Biden administration on arms sales to Gulf States. While there’s a fundamental preference for US equipment, Gulf States are keen on diversifying and localizing their defense procurement efforts.
As Gulf States intensify their interactions with China, the extent to which they are willing to challenge Washington remains uncertain. The price they are willing to pay to sever budding ties with Beijing is also a pivotal consideration.
Analysts note a dual purpose in Gulf States’ relationship with China. It grants them economic, diplomatic, and military advantages, all while enhancing their bargaining position with a US concerned about China’s escalating influence in the region.
However, there is not unanimous consent regarding the feasibility of renegotiating ties with China. The relationship between the Gulf States and China won’t lead to either a “marriage” or a “divorce.” Nonetheless, the partnership with China is in a phase of growth and expansion; its economic dominance persists.
Regarding Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it is pointed out that they are not constrained by the “ideological polarization” characterizing the US-China relationship. It is noted that aligning with a coalition against China, Russia, or Iran would not serve their interests.
China and the Gulf states share overarching objectives and agendas beyond those involving the US. China will continue to be a significant purchaser of Gulf oil and the Gulf States’ intent to utilize their ties with China vis-à-vis the US is merely one aspect among several factors being weighed.
