For last 24 years, Vladimir Putin has been at the helm of Russian affairs: first as President (1999-2008), then as Prime Minister (2008-12), and once again as President (2012-till today). One can differ with his policies from multiple angles but it is undeniable that he was able to considerably revive and maintain Russia’s grandeur; lost with the collapse of Soviet empire in 1991. According to Holly Elliott of CNBC in her commentary dated 11,October, 2022: ‘Love him or loathe him; there is no doubt that Vladimir Putin has been instrumental in keeping Russia firmly on the global geo-political stage during his tenure in office’. It all happened due to his radical and bold initiatives in numerous spheres which impacted the country: conclusively and comprehensively. However, over the period of time, the situation has changed: it will be discussed at the relevant junctures of this writing.
In the course of Putin’s long ascendency, the Russian economy went through highs and lows. During first 16 years, it developed noticeably due to Putin’s three-pronged policy to attract foreign direct investment, boost a variety of industries and to exploit Russia’s natural resources, especially oil and gas. Roble devaluation, flat income tax@ 13%, reduced profit-tax, cheap credit from Western banks, and very positive amendments in Land and Civil codes also played their role. This led to reduction in poverty by more than half and attained an average growth rate of 7% a year: not an ordinary achievement in a country which spans from Europe to Asia and has population of more than 144 million. According to the joint analysis of Ben Aris and Ivan Tkachev, ‘it was the first systematic attempt to reform Russia’s economy’. However, from 2014 onwards the economic indicators started showing a decline due to multiple factors i.e. Russia’s total indebtedness declined from $732 billion in June 2014 to $455 billion in December 2018, restricting Russia’s investment and consumption; and decreasing annual growth rate to just 1%. Some obstacles were of his own making: international sanctions due to 2014 Crimean annexation and 2016 alleged meddling in the US elections. Some barricades were beyond his control: 2008 financial crash, 2014 oil-price nose-dive, the Covid- 19 crises and finally Ukraine-war- related sanctions. Regarding the economic slow-down of Russia, William E. Pomeranz of Kennan Institute, Washington opines that Russia needed to have a ‘diversified economy, a vibrant entrepreneurial class, the rule of law and stable business environment to support a fast economic turnaround’ however these factors were ignored or over-looked by the country’s policy-makers. William Pomeranz also points-out that Putin has sparked Russian anti- Western and isolationist rhetoric that made Moscow’s road to recovery significantly more difficult’. Putin’s style of making economic decisions at personal level, assisted by only few key ministers, has also been severely criticized and the analysts prefer to call it a ‘manual management’. Some of the political observers claim that Putin embarked-upon a belligerent foreign policy i.e. 2008-invasion of Georgia, 2014-annexation of Crimea and 2022-attack on Ukraine, to divert people’s attention from economic problems and keep them engaged in military activities.
Parallel to these developments, the political liberties were sharply curtailed inviting ‘wide-spread condemnation’ by human rights organizations and the global media. The political analysts, particularly from the western background, do not hesitate in branding him out-rightly a ‘dictator’. The authoritarian political system is concentrated in the hands of one person: President Vladimir Putin. According to the survey of ‘Freedom House’, a Washington -based NPO, ‘with loyalist security forces, a subservient judiciary, a controlled media environment, and a legislature consisting of a ruling party and pliable opposition factions; the Kremlin is able to manipulate elections and suppress genuine dissent’. The observation of Michael McFaul an American expert of Russian affairs and the US Ambassador to Moscow (2012-14) merits consideration. He comments that Putin’s ‘impressive short-term growth came simultaneously with the destruction of free media, threats to civil society and an unmitigated corruption of justice’. On the other hand Andranik Migranyan, a Russian politologist, views that Putin regime has restored ‘the natural functions of the government after the period of the 1990s, when the oligopolies expressing only their own narrow interests ruled Russia’. Anders Aslund, a senior fellow at the ‘Stockholm Free World Forum’ has been harsher in commenting upon his track-record as a modern-day ruler. He laments that though Putin initially clasped ‘progressive notions of domestic reform and international integration’ but gradually led the country deeper and deeper into ‘authoritarian isolation’. Comparing himself with Peter the Great and issuing threats to his domestic and external adversaries represent a changed ‘low’ in his ‘depressing journey from a would-be reformer to a war criminal’.
At present, Putin is caught-up in the dilemma that whether to proceed or withdraw from the ‘stalemated’ Ukraine war. Schism is growing between the policy-makers who favor the escalation and those who warn against doing so. The pragmatists insist that ‘war’ should be re-thought coolly and realistically keeping in view Russia’s rather ‘limited capacities’ and the situation on the front. The hawks emphasize that Russia should ‘not only unleash its full military might against Ukraine, but also re-structure its own political and economic system’. The outcome of this ‘struggle for supremacy’ between the two factions depends upon the performance in the battlefield: if Russia under-performs the realists will carry the day otherwise fire-brands will dominate the decision-making process. The handling of ‘war’ is crucially important for Putin at personal level as well because next Presidential election is due in 2024 and the events of the on-going year will decisively affect it. A feeling of ‘stagnation’ is growing fast both among the elite and the commoners and the inculcation of ‘dynamism and effectiveness’ in the system is required. To satisfy the effective quarters of the state and society Putin has to look for ‘new ideas’. Though Putin is reputed to be fond of making decisions at the eleventh hour, often based upon situational factors and in defiance of popular expectations, but this time the scenario is different——-he should start taking the bull by the horns early.
The last word: Vladimir Putin is encircled by multidimensional internal and external issues. He needs to rationalize his policies early as the time is running-out.
