Why Trump welcomed Makkah pact?

The signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye on August 7 has opened a new and potentially consequential chapter in the security architecture of Asia and the Gulf. The agreement states that an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all three, while envisaging deeper military coordination, joint exercises, intelligence cooperation and collaboration in areas including drones, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence and defence production. Türkiye has also indicated that the framework could eventually be expanded to other countries.

What makes the development particularly significant is not simply the agreement itself, but the reaction from Washington. President Donald Trump has welcomed the pact as a “big, bold, important first step” towards regional countries being able to defend themselves more meaningfully. His words raise a larger strategic question, is the United States beginning to transfer a greater share of the burden of confronting Iran to regional powers, particularly the Gulf and Asian countries? Or making this region as its main combatant force against Iran? And what are the possible next steps?

The answer is more complicated than a simple American withdrawal. Washington is unlikely to abandon the Middle East, its military assets, intelligence networks, diplomatic influence or relationships with Gulf states. What appears to be changing is the distribution of responsibility. The Trump administration’s broader philosophy of burden-sharing suggests that countries possessing substantial financial, military and strategic resources should assume greater responsibility for their own security rather than expecting Washington to carry the entire cost.

In that sense, America may not be handing over the war against Iran, but it may be regionalising the consequences of that war.

The distinction is crucial. A regionalised conflict can become much more dangerous because the number of actors involved increases. At the same time, regional ownership of security could eventually create a framework in which regional states themselves negotiate a new balance rather than remaining permanently dependent on an external power.

The Pakistan-Saudi relationship provides the foundation for this transformation. The two countries signed their Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in September 2025, committing themselves to collective security. The new Mecca agreement effectively brings Türkiye into a much broader strategic framework.

Each country brings a different strategic asset.

Saudi Arabia possesses enormous financial resources, energy influence and geographical importance. Türkiye brings one of the region’s most capable conventional militaries, a rapidly developing indigenous defence industry, drone technology and NATO experience. Pakistan brings a large and experienced military establishment and, uniquely among Muslim-majority states, a nuclear deterrent.

The combination therefore has significance beyond its three signatories. It links the Gulf, South Asia and the eastern Mediterranean in a single security conversation.

For Saudi Arabia, the agreement represents strategic insurance. Riyadh has increasingly understood that sophisticated American weapons alone cannot eliminate vulnerabilities created by missiles, drones, cyberwarfare and attacks on energy infrastructure. Diversifying its security relationships allows Saudi Arabia to maintain its partnership with Washington while simultaneously developing alternative sources of military capability.

For Türkiye, the pact fits into Ankara’s long-standing ambition to exercise greater strategic autonomy. Türkiye remains a NATO member, but it has increasingly demonstrated that it does not want its foreign policy to be dictated by any single great power. A defence relationship stretching from Türkiye through Saudi Arabia to Pakistan expands Ankara’s influence across two strategically vital regions.

For Pakistan, however, the equation is much more delicate.

Pakistan has the opportunity to emerge as an important security bridge between South Asia and the Gulf, but it also has a geographical reality that cannot be ignored, it shares a border with Iran. Islamabad cannot afford to treat Tehran simply as an enemy without exposing itself to enormous security, economic and diplomatic risks.

Pakistan therefore faces the most difficult balancing act of the three.

Its relationship with Saudi Arabia is strategically important. Its relationship with Türkiye is deepening. Its partnership with China remains fundamental. Its relationship with the United States is economically and strategically significant. Yet Iran is its immediate western neighbour, with which it shares a long border and important diplomatic and economic interests.

This makes Pakistan potentially more valuable as a mediator than as a frontline combatant.

If Islamabad can defend Saudi Arabia while simultaneously maintaining communication with Tehran, it could acquire an extraordinary diplomatic role. Pakistan could become one of the few countries capable of speaking to the Gulf, Iran, Türkiye, China and Washington at the same time.

That possibility is already visible in Pakistan’s efforts to maintain diplomatic engagement with Iran while navigating its defence commitments to Saudi Arabia.

The Iranian response will be critical.

Although the three countries have described the agreement as defensive rather than an alliance directed against a particular state, Tehran will inevitably examine its military implications. A coordinated Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani security structure potentially means improved intelligence, air defence, military exercises, drone capabilities and defence-industrial cooperation around Iran’s strategic neighbourhood.

But this could produce two very different outcomes.

The first is escalation. Iran could interpret the emerging architecture as an attempt to encircle it and respond by strengthening its missile forces, regional partnerships and asymmetric capabilities. The Gulf could then become increasingly militarised, with every defensive measure interpreted by the other side as preparation for aggression.

The second possibility is deterrence leading eventually to diplomacy.

If Iran concludes that it cannot achieve regional dominance through military pressure, while Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states conclude that permanent dependence on American protection is neither sufficient nor sustainable, both sides may eventually have an incentive to negotiate a regional security arrangement.

That would be the more constructive outcome.

The danger, however, is that the emerging alliance could be interpreted through a sectarian lens. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are all Sunni-majority states, while Iran is the region’s principal Shia power. If the new security architecture becomes identified as a Sunni military bloc confronting Shia Iran, it could revive precisely the sectarian competition that has destabilised the Middle East for decades.

Pakistan should be particularly careful about this possibility. Its participation must be framed around collective defence, sovereignty and regional stability rather than sectarian confrontation.

The economic consequences could be as important as the military ones.

The Gulf is central to global energy markets. The Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea routes are vital to international trade. Türkiye controls strategic connections between Europe, the Black Sea and the Middle East, while Pakistan sits close to the Arabian Sea and important routes connecting the Gulf with South Asia and China.

Any prolonged Iran conflict therefore affects oil prices, shipping, insurance, foreign investment, food security and national currencies far beyond the battlefield.

This creates another reason for these countries to cooperate. A regional security arrangement could eventually evolve into a broader economic-security framework protecting energy and trade corridors.

India will also be watching closely.

Pakistan’s participation gives the agreement a South Asian dimension that cannot be separated from the wider India-Pakistan strategic competition. New Delhi will have to assess whether the emerging Gulf-Pakistan-Türkiye relationship could influence its own relations with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the wider Muslim world.

China is another major factor. Beijing has deep economic and strategic interests in Pakistan, the Gulf and Iran. It has also positioned itself as a supporter of diplomatic engagement rather than permanent military confrontation. A new regional security architecture could therefore create opportunities for China to expand its diplomatic influence without directly replacing the United States militarily.

Israel, meanwhile, will be watching whether this new alignment eventually becomes an organised regional counterweight to its own military freedom of action and whether the Iran conflict accelerates the formation of a broader Muslim strategic bloc.

The greatest uncertainty is whether the Mecca agreement will remain primarily political symbolism or become an operational military structure?

Its credibility will ultimately depend on practical mechanisms, permanent command arrangements, intelligence sharing, integrated air defence, joint exercises, defence production, clear rules of engagement and agreement on what circumstances would actually trigger collective military action.

Without these mechanisms, it will remain an important political signal rather than a NATO-style alliance.

With them, however, it could fundamentally alter the regional balance.

The most important development may therefore not be the emergence of an “Islamic NATO,” but the gradual decline of the assumption that Gulf security must be organised exclusively around Washington.

Trump’s endorsement is revealing precisely because he appears to welcome greater regional self-reliance. America may continue to provide weapons, intelligence, diplomatic support and strategic deterrence while expecting regional partners to assume more responsibility for the immediate security burden.

The future could consequently produce a three-layered security environment. American strategic power, an increasingly autonomous regional Muslim security network, and China’s expanding economic and diplomatic influence.

The real contest is therefore no longer simply about who will fight Iran.

It is about who will shape the political, military and economic order that emerges after the Iran conflict.

For Pakistan, the answer should not be to become somebody else’s battlefield. Its greatest strategic asset is its ability to speak to multiple sides. It should strengthen its defence partnership with Saudi Arabia, deepen technological cooperation with Türkiye, preserve its relationship with China, maintain communication with Iran and keep Washington engaged.

The wisest Pakistani policy would be defence without provocation, alliance without dependency and diplomacy without surrender.

If Islamabad succeeds, the Mecca agreement could transform Pakistan from a peripheral participant in Middle Eastern politics into a central bridge between South Asia and the Gulf.

If it fails, Pakistan could once again find itself paying the human, economic and political price of a war whose origins and objectives were never entirely its own.

The next phase of the Iran conflict will therefore not be decided only by missiles and military power. It will be decided by alliances, economic resilience, diplomacy and the ability of regional powers to prevent a defensive alliance from becoming an engine of permanent war.