From 9/11 to Bab al-Mandab?

In the future, we may receive news that the Yemeni government has regained control of Sana’a from the rebels. There may also be several successes in stopping attacks originating from the coastal cities, but there appears to be no effective way to stop Ansar Allah’s missiles launched from Yemen’s interior, short of putting boots on the ground. Another question under discussion is: how far can Pakistan and Türkiye go in supporting the Saudis in accordance with the Mecca Agreement? Certainly, planning is taking place in this regard, but both countries also face, internally, a certain degree of visible and invisible pressure from their Shiite communities. The discussion began with the similarities between the 9/11 attacks by al-Qaeda and the recent attacks by Ansar Allah. On the surface, there is a clear religious difference between al-Qaeda and Ansar Allah. Al-Qaeda was, or is, a Sunni-oriented jihadist organization whose roots emerged from Saudi Arabia. Everyone is aware of Osama bin Laden’s Saudi background. Yemen, meanwhile, although a neighboring Arab country of Saudi Arabia, is home to Ansar Allah, a Zaydi Shiite movement that is widely regarded as an Iranian proxy, much like Lebanon’s Hezbollah. The question, therefore, is this: despite the intense Sunni-Shiite hostility among Arabs, why is there such a striking similarity between al-Qaeda and Ansar Allah when it comes to their targets? A deeper examination, according to the argument presented here, suggests that the fundamental objective of both is to bring an end to the moderate Saudi Kingdom and establish their own form of caliphate or imamate in the sacred land of the Hijaz. Since they regard the United States as a major obstacle to this objective, opposition and hostility toward America are considered necessary. To understand this in greater detail, we must go back to the earliest period of Islamic history. Immediately after the passing of our Prophet, events such as the meeting at Saqifah Banu Sa’idah took place, details of which are recorded not only in historical works such as al-Tabari’s History and the Seerah of Ibn Hisham, but also in authoritative collections such as Bukhari and Muslim among the six major canonical books of Sunni Islam. It is another matter that most of us neither read these sources nor consider it appropriate to express opinions about them. In brief, the emergence of the Shi’a of Ali had already taken place during the period of the Rashidun Caliphate. In Shiite doctrine, the concept of Imamate, distinct from and parallel to the institution of the Caliphate, eventually became a fundamental religious principle. The importance of the Two Holy Mosques—Mecca and Medina—to Islam and Muslims needs no explanation. Throughout Islamic history, the greatest religious prestige and respect have generally been associated with whoever exercised authority over these sacred cities. The first three caliphs maintained Medina as their capital, but circumstances were created in which the fourth caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib, was compelled to establish Kufa as his capital. Despite all this, the followers of Ali continued to cherish the aspiration of establishing their rule over the Hijaz and the Two Holy Mosques. Although Egypt’s Shiite Fatimid Empire managed, at the height of its power, to gain control over these sacred territories for a period of time, this control was, in a sense, indirect. The Sharif of Mecca continued to have the sermon delivered in the Fatimid ruler’s name, but the Ottoman Turks did not allow them to remain there for long. In demographic terms, Shiites have historically remained a minority while Sunnis have constituted the majority. The Shiite community, particularly in the Arab world, generally struggled to gain broad acceptance among the wider Muslim population or to establish significant influence within the corridors of political power. Although the Abbasids came to power after the Umayyads, with the support of Shiite groups, they ultimately proved to be perhaps even harsher toward the Alids than the Umayyads and later the Ottomans. The followers of Ali repeatedly endured horrors such as those associated with Karbala. In Iran, the reign of Shah Ismail Safavi represented a golden period for the Shi’a after the Fatimids, but its duration was insignificant compared with the long history of Sunni-ruled caliphates. Then came 1979. Under the leadership of Imam Khomeini, an uprising against the monarchy was launched with revolutionary slogans invoking Ali. Khomeini ultimately sidelined parties such as the Tudeh Party and shaped the revolution around the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, according to which political authority would remain in the hands of the Islamic jurist as the deputy of the Hidden Twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi. At the same time, he instilled another powerful slogan in the minds of his Shiite followers: that the Iranian Revolution should be exported to other Muslim countries. The result of this struggle, according to the argument presented here, was that Shiite communities across many Muslim countries experienced a renewed political awakening, with slogans increasingly aligned with Khomeini’s thinking. Compared with other Muslim countries, their principal target was Saudi Arabia itself. They did not even consider the term “Saudi Arabia” appropriate, frequently referring to the country in speeches and statements as “Arabistan.” To undermine the Saudis in the eyes of the wider Muslim community, they portrayed them as Najdis and as the House of Saud, associating them rhetorically with the “House of Israel.” They regarded the United States as the protector and guardian of both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Israel, reminding their followers that America was the “Great Satan” that had established military bases in the Gulf states and enabled the House of Saud to remain in control of the Two Holy Mosques.
(To be continued…)