Mecca Defense Pact: Will Iran be included?

In light of the evolving situation, some reports suggest that Iran’s name might also emerge in the agreement reached between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in the coming days. According to reports, the likelihood of Iran joining this agreement has increased significantly compared to before, it is no longer merely a matter of speculation, as reports have emerged indicating that Iran has been invited to join the Mecca defense pact. However, this has not yet been officially finalized. Based on the latest information and reports, there is a roughly 50 to 60 percent chance that Iran will become part of this new regional defense arrangement in some form. However, the likelihood of full membership is lower. Iran has reportedly received a formal invitation to join this agreement. The head of the Iranian parliamentary news agency has told “Al-Mayadeen” that Tehran has received an invitation and is considering it. However, the Iranian Foreign Ministry or the three original signatories—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—have not yet officially confirmed this. Pakistan maintains relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Islamabad is currently also playing a role in diplomatic contacts between Iran and the United States. The recent visit to Tehran by Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, also holds special significance in this context. According to Iran, a new defense agreement involving Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia will also be discussed during this meeting. Türkiye, too, is not in favor of completely isolating Iran under the new circumstances, but the biggest obstacle is Saudi Arabia. This is where the matter becomes very interesting. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have improved significantly since 2023, yet fundamental differences regarding regional influence, Yemen, the Gulf, and security matters have not yet been resolved. On the other hand, the Mecca Agreement embodies the principle that an armed attack on one member will be considered an attack on all three. If Iran also joins this agreement, the question will arise: “How would the agreement function if a military crisis were to erupt between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the future?” That is why including Iran would represent not merely a political move, but a major shift in the agreement’s fundamental defense architecture. What do I consider to be the more practical path? I think it is difficult for Iran to immediately become the fourth full military member, but its inclusion in a broad regional security framework is quite possible. By including Iran, this alliance would cease to be merely a “Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani defense alliance” and could instead evolve into a broader regional Muslim security system, It is also significant that some analysts now view this agreement not as an alliance against Iran, but as a new regional security framework that is relatively independent of the U.S. security system. The most significant development now is General Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran. If this meeting yields a positive signal from Iran regarding its participation in the agreement, it would mark a massive shift in the balance of power across the entire Middle East. However, if you look at the defense pact involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, the issue of Yemen could also prove to be a major test for this agreement. However, a very significant change has occurred in the latest developments. Saudi Arabia itself is advancing talks with Ansar Allah regarding a renewed, permanent ceasefire. According to the latest report, Saudi and Omani delegations are preparing to visit Sanaa next week to negotiate a permanent ceasefire with the Houthis. What does this mean? In my view, the war in Yemen is certainly the biggest obstacle preventing Iran from joining this agreement, but it is not an insurmountable one. General Asim Munir’s recent visit to Tehran holds exceptional significance. According to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, the issue of Ansarullah, alongside the Mecca defense agreement, will be discussed during this visit. But a danger still exists. The fundamental principle of the Makkah Agreement is that an armed attack on one member will be considered an attack on all three. Now, suppose the Houthis launch another large-scale missile or drone attack on Saudi Arabia in the future, the question will arise, will Pakistan and Turkey undertake military action to defend Saudi Arabia? This is the point where the agreement will face its real test. The situation is also sensitive at this time because military tensions between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia have escalated again in August, with the Houthis launching attacks against Saudi targets. But there is also a very interesting possibility. If Saudi Arabia and the Houthis agree to a permanent ceasefire, it will become much easier for Iran to move closer to the Mecca Agreement. Because then Iran could say: “I am not going to war against Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia is not fighting against the Houthis—Iran’s allies—in Yemen either; therefore, regional defense cooperation is possible.” This is the scenario in which Pakistan can play the role of a bridge. Pakistan has itself clarified that the Makkah agreement is defensive in nature and not directed against any country, and that Islamabad is striving to de-escalate the regional crisis through dialogue with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Therefore, in my view, the Yemen issue does not rule out Iran’s involvement, rather, if the Saudi-Houthi ceasefire succeeds, this very issue could pave the way for Iran’s participation, And if the Saudi-Houthi ceasefire, the Iran-Saudi rapprochement, and Pakistan’s mediation efforts all move forward simultaneously, then the creation of a broad regional security framework involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran could indeed become a possibility.