Summary
- Global trade has long rested on an assumption so familiar that nobody bothered to state it: that the narrow places of the sea belong to everyone and can be closed by no one.
- Governments with no fiscal space, one eye on their creditors and another on Tehran and Muscat, will notice that geography can be monetised.
- If maritime security is no longer a free good for the world, why should the poorest littoral states keep supplying it free?
Global trade has long rested on an assumption so familiar that nobody bothered to state it: that the narrow places of the sea belong to everyone and can be closed by no one. The United States Navy underwrote that assumption. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention gave it legal form through the doctrine of transit passage. Together they turned geography into a public good, and for forty years shippers treated it as a law of nature rather than a policy.
It was a policy, and it is being revised. Littoral states, militias and great powers are now rewriting the terms in real time, replacing unconditional freedom of navigation with conditional corridors, security surcharges and gatekeeping by negotiation.
The sharpest revision is under way in the Strait of Hormuz. Since the US-Israeli strikes on Iran in late February, traffic has fallen by as much as ninety-five percent, leaving a daily shortfall of roughly thirteen million barrels. Chatham House noted in April that no state had levied transit charges there since the late 1980s. Within weeks Iran had mined the approaches, hit vessels and begun asserting a right to collect fees. Coercion first; paperwork later.
The paperwork is now being drafted in Muscat. Iran and Oman have reportedly been shaping a bilateral shipping framework in which inbound vessels answer to Iranian oversight while outbound traffic uses an Omani-backed corridor, cleared after notice to Tehran. The 1968 traffic separation scheme, which the two countries themselves proposed to the International Maritime Organization, would be shelved. Oman speaks the language of safety. Its June notice to mariners called the old lanes unsafe, and it has said publicly that it backs no transit fees. Iran is less coy. A senior official has floated charges of five to seven percent of cargo value, Oman is reportedly weighing something near three, and Washington wants nothing at all.
Name the charge what you like: environmental levy, pilotage due, service fee. The convention does not permit coastal states to tax ships for the privilege of passing, and a fee survives scrutiny only if it pays for a service actually rendered. A permit regime, a prescribed route and a mandated insurer are not services. They are conditions. Once passage depends on conditions, it has stopped being a right and become a dispensation that can be withdrawn.
Shipping markets understood this before the lawyers did. Reuters reported in August that industry sources regarded the scheme as unworkable, in part because new war-risk wording would terminate cover for any ship that pays. A toll that voids your insurance is not a toll. It is a stalemate with a price tag.
Contagion follows the sea lanes. Some two thousand nautical miles to the southwest lies the Bab al-Mandab, where the Houthis have spent years showing what cheap drones and missiles can do to a global supply chain. In July, Yemen’s internationally recognised government alleged that Revolutionary Guard advisers were helping the movement build a fee-collection mechanism. The Houthi-run coordination centre denied any plan for formal tariffs. The denial is beside the point. Selective targeting, selective clearance and punitive war-risk premiums collect revenue and exert pressure just as effectively as a published schedule.
Now consider the incentives facing the indebted. Egypt and the Horn of Africa have lost billions in port income and Suez receipts as container lines turned south around the Cape. Governments with no fiscal space, one eye on their creditors and another on Tehran and Muscat, will notice that geography can be monetised. If maritime security is no longer a free good for the world, why should the poorest littoral states keep supplying it free?
The same logic has reached the Atlantic alliance. Washington’s campaign over Greenland ended in September with a trilateral agreement signed by Donald Trump, Mette Frederiksen and Jens-Frederik Nielsen. Greenland’s parliament approved it on 3 November, the Folketing on 19 November. The talk was of minerals; the arithmetic was naval. Greenland anchors the western flank of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, the passage Russian Northern Fleet submarines must transit to reach the open Atlantic. Its western coast, along the Davis Strait and Baffin Bay, also fronts the eastern approach to Canada’s Northwest Passage. As Arctic ice thins and Sino-Russian shipping ambitions grow, Washington chose not to leave those approaches to European consensus. The pact expands Pituffik and opens new defence areas at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig. Denmark kept its sovereignty, which Copenhagen and Nuuk treated as non-negotiable. It lost a good deal of everything around it.
In Southeast Asia, Malacca shows what it costs to hold the line. The strait carries the lifeblood of East Asian manufacturing, and its three littoral states, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, would be the first casualties of closure or taxation. So they patrol it. But sustained surveillance is expensive, and outside navies, India reportedly among them, are edging into an already crowded theatre. Keeping a strait open has become a military project.
Strip away the regional detail and the pattern is plain. The post-1945 maritime order was cheap because someone else paid for it. That someone has stepped back, or stepped forward with a price list. Shippers will pay in service fees, in war-risk premiums to London underwriters, in bunker fuel burned on twelve-day detours around southern Africa, or in the cost of permanent escorts. The invoice differs; the payer does not.
For Pakistan, the payer is unmistakable. Its energy security, export competitiveness and brittle external accounts all ride on affordable seaborne transit through the Arabian Sea and the straits beyond it. A permanent premium on freight and insurance is an exogenous shock that Islamabad’s thin fiscal space cannot absorb. It can diversify routes, build reserves and press for multilateral guarantees at the IMO before the next precedent hardens.
Great powers will keep redrawing the map of naval dominance. The toll will be collected from the global South.
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