The dangerous price of India’s nuclear expansion 

By Sharjeel Afzal

“Nuclear weapons do not respect borders. The survival of humanity depends on the responsible control of such power.”

Mikhail Gorbachev (Former Leader of the Soviet Union)

Nuclear security within a state remains a sovereign national responsibility. A nation’s credibility in this domain is measured not by statements or assurances, but by its ability to always maintain absolute control over its most hazardous materials. By this standard, India’s performance over the past several decades raises serious concern. Repeated incidents involving unauthorized possession of radioactive substances, failures in material accounting, and lapses in command-and-control discipline reveal systemic vulnerabilities that challenge India’s carefully cultivated image as a reliable steward of nuclear technology.

This troubling pattern stands in sharp contrast to the international indulgence India continues to enjoy. Despite not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India was granted a special waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), allowing it access to global nuclear commerce. That exemption was premised on the assumption that India possessed the institutional maturity and technical safeguards necessary to manage sensitive nuclear materials responsibly. The evidence, however, increasingly suggests otherwise.

These concerns are not abstract or hypothetical. They are borne out by a series of documented incidents over the past decade. Radioactive substances have repeatedly surfaced in public spaces, transit hubs, and illicit markets, locations where such materials should never appear. The detection of radioactive material at Chaudhary Charan Singh International Airport in Lucknow in August 2024 was emblematic of this broader trend. Rather than an isolated lapse, it reflected persistent failures in detection, inventory control, and regulatory enforcement, the very foundations of any credible nuclear security regime.

The Lucknow episode was not an outlier. Around the same period, authorities intercepted an attempt to traffic californium in Bihar’s Gopalganj district, where three individuals were found in possession of approximately 50 grams of the highly radioactive substance, valued on the black market of nearly INR 8.5 billion. More troubling than the arrest itself was the opacity surrounding the material’s origin and composition, as forensic verification of the specific isotopes proceeded slowly and without public clarity. Whether Cf-249, Cf-251, or the far more dangerous Cf-252, the very presence of californium outside regulatory control points to profound failures in material accounting and custodial oversight. Given Cf-252’s exceptionally high rate of spontaneous fission and its potential misuse in radiological weapons, such incidents cannot be dismissed as routine law-enforcement successes, they are warning signs of deeper systemic breakdowns.

Taken together, these incidents form part of a much larger and deeply troubling pattern. Available records indicate that more than 153 cases involving the theft, loss, or illicit handling of nuclear and radioactive materials have been reported in India since the 1980s. This long-running trend cuts across decades, governments, and regulatory reforms, underscoring that the problem is neither episodic nor accidental. Instead, it reflects entrenched weaknesses in material protection, accounting systems, and enforcement mechanisms. The sheer volume and persistence of these cases point to a chronic failure of nuclear governance, one that cannot be explained away by isolated negligence or criminal opportunism, and one that continues to place both regional and global security at risk.

Independent evaluations have further reinforced these concerns. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a leading US-based non-proliferation organization, has consistently ranked India near the bottom of its Nuclear Security Index, particularly in categories related to material protection, insider threat mitigation, and regulatory effectiveness. Such assessments are significant not because they reflect adversarial criticism, but because they are based on standardized, globally applied benchmarks. India’s poor performance under these metrics highlights a persistent gap between its stated commitments and its actual capacity to secure nuclear and radiological materials, especially as its nuclear programme continues to expand in scale and complexity.

Rather than consolidating control and addressing these vulnerabilities, India is now expanding access to nuclear materials while simultaneously diluting oversight. A striking example is the near USD 2.8 billion uranium supply deal between India and Canada, under which Cameco, one of the world’s largest uranium producers, is set to supply nuclear fuel to India. While framed as a purely commercial energy arrangement, the deal significantly expands India’s access to imported nuclear material at a time when its nuclear security record remains deeply compromised.

This expansion coincides with a major domestic policy shift. In late December 2025, India’s parliament passed the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill, fundamentally altering the country’s civil nuclear framework. Passed by voice vote amid an opposition walkout, the legislation opens segments of India’s nuclear energy sector to private participation for the first time, effectively ending exclusive state control over key components of the nuclear ecosystem.

Privatization of the nuclear sector in a country already struggling to secure radioactive materials is not reform, it is recklessness. India has repeatedly failed to prevent theft and illicit trafficking even under a centralized, state-controlled system. Introducing private actors, driven by profit motives and operating within a weak regulatory environment, risks fragmenting accountability, increasing insider threats, and further eroding control over sensitive nuclear and radiological materials.

The convergence of expanded uranium access through international supply agreements and reduced state oversight under the SHANTI framework marks a dangerous trajectory. It raises serious concerns regarding inventory management, regulatory enforcement, and institutional capture. In an environment where radioactive substances have repeatedly appeared on the black market, privatization is far more likely to exacerbate vulnerabilities than to address them.

If these trends persist, the consequences could be catastrophic. Continued leakage of radioactive materials creates conditions ripe for radiological terrorism, including the construction of so-called “dirty bombs.” Given India’s history of externalizing blame, particularly toward Pakistan, the possibility of a false-flag narrative or manufactured attribution cannot be dismissed. Past experience suggests that such claims would find receptive audiences in Western capitals, where strategic and economic considerations have often overridden objective assessment.

Nuclear theft incidents reveal more than episodic failures; they expose deep structural flaws that allow criminal networks to operate with alarming ease. They also raise uncomfortable questions about corruption, regulatory capture, and enforcement fatigue within India’s nuclear governance framework. Yet instead of confronting these shortcomings, India has frequently relied on deflection and denial.

The West’s selective blindness only compounds the problem. Whether on nuclear safety, human rights in Indian-Occupied Kashmir, or adherence to international legal norms, India has often been shielded from meaningful accountability. Only in cases involving extraterritorial killings or attempted assassinations on Western soil has India faced even muted criticism, and even then, consequences have been limited. Political expediency continues to trump ethical responsibility.

India is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and is bound by UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Persistent failures to prevent theft and illicit trafficking directly undermine these commitments and weaken the global non-proliferation regime. In this context, continued indulgence by NSG members, particularly through uranium supply arrangements, risks hollowing out the very norms they claim to uphold.

Ultimately, nuclear safety and security are national responsibilities with global consequences. India must undertake immediate and comprehensive reforms to strengthen oversight, transparency, and accountability before expanding access or privatizing control. The international community, especially major powers, must move beyond political convenience and confront the reality of India’s nuclear security failures. The time to act is now. Another breach may not merely expose negligence – it could trigger an irreversible disaster with consequences far beyond South Asia.