The Egyptian Suez Canal precedent

By Syed Nayyar Uddin Ahmad

Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in 1956 is a relevant historical example of public ownership of strategic infrastructure.

However, an important feature of the Egyptian decree was that it provided for compensation to shareholders and established an independent authority to manage the canal.

The Egyptian Suez Canal Authority records that the compensation was subsequently paid in full by 1963.

Pakistan should learn from the institutional arrangements of this experience, not assume that nationalisation by itself guarantees efficiency.

A professionally managed public energy system, if supported by sound economics and transparent governance, could be considered as one option for protecting strategic national interests.

7. Establishing twenty-four-hour courts and a fifteen-day justice system

The judicial system is one of the most important foundations of a functioning state. Without timely justice, constitutional rights become difficult to enforce, commercial disputes discourage investment, criminal cases remain unresolved, and public confidence in institutions deteriorates.

Pakistan cannot claim to uphold the rule of law while citizens wait years for decisions in ordinary civil, criminal, family, commercial, and property disputes.

The scale of the judicial problem

The Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan’s January–June 2025 statistics reported approximately 2.27 million pending cases across the superior and district judiciary at the end of June 2025.

The report recorded:

Category Pending cases, June 2025

Superior courts 361,677

District courts 1,908,907

Total 2,270,584

This backlog demands a radical improvement in judicial administration.

Proposal: Courts should operate twenty-four hours a day

Pakistan should introduce a twenty-four-hour judicial service system through staggered day and night shifts and the subsequent need of judges may be met by hiring retired judges.

The purpose is to increase the productive use of court infrastructure, provide citizens with more accessible judicial services, and reduce the accumulation of pending cases.

The proposed arrangement should include:

Day shift: Regular hearings, evidence recording, civil proceedings, commercial disputes, and appellate matters.

Evening and night shifts: Urgent applications, remand proceedings, bail matters, family disputes, selected civil cases, and other matters suitable for extended judicial operations.

Specialised courts: Dedicated courts for commercial disputes, land and property disputes, family cases, banking matters, consumer complaints, and minor offences.

Emergency judicial services should remain available throughout the night, including weekends

and public holidays, for matters requiring immediate judicial intervention.

Proposal: Every case should be decided within fifteen days

The national objective should be under the policy of justice delayed is justice denied so that every case receives a final judicial decision within fifteen days of formal registration.

This is an ambitious target and should become a central performance objective of judicial reform.

However, a distinction is essential between the fifteen-day target and the right to a fair trial. A criminal case involving complex forensic evidence, multiple witnesses, or serious allegations cannot responsibly be decided by forcing the judge to meet an arbitrary deadline.

The proposed system should therefore operate as follows:

1. All cases must receive an initial judicial hearing within a prescribed short period.

2. Simple and uncontested cases should ordinarily be decided within fifteen days.

3. Routine bail applications, remand matters, and urgent applications should be decided within hours or days, as appropriate.

4. Straightforward commercial, family, and property disputes should receive a fifteen-day disposal target where evidence and legal requirements permit.

5. Complex cases should be assigned a strict case-management timetable, with extensions requiring written judicial justification.

6. Adjournments should be restricted and properly documented.

7. Judgments should be announced and made available promptly after hearings conclude.

The fifteen-day objective should not be used to deny defendants adequate legal representation, suppress evidence, or prevent appeals.

Article 10-A of Pakistan’s Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial and due process. Any accelerated judicial system must preserve this constitutional protection.

Additional judicial reforms

– Digital filing and electronic case records.

– Video hearings where legally appropriate.

– Specialised training for judges and court personnel.

– Independent evaluation of judicial performance.

– Digital publication of judgments.

– Improved prosecution and investigation services.

– Adequate legal aid for poor citizens.

– Strict penalties for deliberate obstruction of proceedings, subject to due process.

Judicial performance should be measured not merely by the number of cases disposed of, but also by the quality, fairness, enforceability, and sustainability of decisions.

The ultimate objective is simple: justice should not depend upon a citizen’s wealth, influence, political connections, or ability to wait for decades.

8. Establishing independent accountability and professional public administration

No national reconstruction programme can succeed if public officials are not answerable for their decisions and use of public money.

Public Expenditure Certification

To be signed by every federal, provincial, and local government official, civilian and military, for every expenditure, large or small:

“I solemnly certify that this expenditure is necessary, lawful, and prudent, and that it will directly or indirectly benefit the poorest citizens of Pakistan, who still lack basic necessities such as housing, healthcare, education, food, and security. I accept personal responsibility for this certification and understand that a false declaration may result in disciplinary and legal action.”

Pakistan needs an accountability system that investigates wrongdoing irrespective of the political affiliation, institutional position, or economic influence of the person concerned.

The IMF’s 2025 governance assessment identifies weaknesses in accountability institutions, procurement controls, regulatory independence, and coordination among anti-corruption agencies.

Proposed accountability reforms

First: Independent investigations

Investigating agencies should be protected against political interference and selective prosecution.

Second: Transparent public procurement

Every major public contract should be published digitally, including its cost, bidding process, successful bidder, implementation timetable, and final payment.

Third: Asset declarations

Senior public officials and elected representatives should submit independently verifiable declarations of assets, income, liabilities, and conflicts of interest.

Fourth: Performance accountability

Every government department should publish annual objectives and achievements. Departmental heads should be assessed against independently verified indicators.

Fifth: Protection for whistleblowers

Individuals reporting corruption, financial irregularities, or abuse of public office should receive legal protection.

Sixth: Professional civil service

Recruitment, promotion, and transfers should be based on competence, professional conduct, and performance rather than political patronage.

Accountability must be applied consistently. It should never become an instrument for settling political scores. Conflict of interest should be declared as a crime for which minimum punishment should be 10 years RI.

9. Reforming the tax system and ending elite economic privileges

Pakistan cannot achieve financial independence while its tax system remains narrow, complicated, and vulnerable to exemptions and preferential treatment.

The IMF governance assessment specifically identifies weaknesses in tax administration, customs, public financial management, and regulatory oversight.

A New National Taxation Policy

Government of Pakistan must immediately remove the institutionalized distinction of a “filer” versus “non-filer” where a separate legal or administrative class exists penalizing non-filers with higher withholding taxes and service restrictions on everyday transactions, does not exist in other countries.

Global Tax System Comparison

Pakistan: Uses a distinct two-tier (or formerly three-tier) system where individuals who file annual returns are on the Active Taxpayer List (ATL) and pay standard/lower rates, while “non-filers” are legally allowed to exist outside regular filing while facing severe withholding tax surcharges (e.g., double rates on banking, property, and vehicle transactions).

United States: Operates under a self-assessment and audit-based enforcement system. There is no “non-filer” status that you legally pay a higher fee or tax rate to bypass; failing to file a tax return is a legal violation or tax evasion, subject to IRS penalties, fines, or criminal prosecution rather than a permanent alternative rate category.

United Kingdom: Uses a self-assessment system managed by HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC). Late or missing filings incur civil penalties, fines, and accumulated interest, not a parallel tier of legal non-filing.

India: Implements a one-tier income tax system. Non-compliance, failure to file, or tax evasion results in legal penalties, notices, or prosecution under the Income Tax Act, rather than a recognized “non-filer” class with alternate transaction fees.

Bangladesh & Nigeria: Rely heavily on value-added tax (VAT) compliance, direct registration, and withholding taxes at the source rather than a dual filer/non-filer institutional framework.

In most major global economies, failing to file taxes is treated simply as an illegal act or default of tax law, whereas Pakistan uniquely formalizes the non-filer as a distinct, ongoing category within its economic and banking architecture.

The government should:

1. Bring all eligible income groups into the tax system.

2. Ensure that agricultural income is taxed under applicable constitutional and provincial arrangements.

3. Remove unjustified tax exemptions and concessions.

4. Simplify tax laws and procedures.

5. Digitise tax collection and customs administration.

6. Reduce opportunities for discretionary decisions.

7. Ensure that small businesses are not burdened by unnecessarily complicated compliance requirements.

8. Publish annual tax expenditure reports identifying the beneficiaries and fiscal costs of exemptions.

Taxation should be progressive, predictable, and fair.

The objective should not be to extract more money from already compliant taxpayers, but to broaden the tax base and eliminate privileges that undermine fairness.

10. Making Pakistan an export-oriented industrial and agricultural economy

Pakistan must move away from excessive dependence on imports, external borrowing, and short-term financial arrangements.

A sustainable economic model should be built around competitive exports, productive industries, modern agriculture, and technological innovation.

The Pakistan Economic Survey 2024–25 provides an important baseline for measuring agricultural, industrial, fiscal, and export performance.

Priority export sectors

– Textiles and value-added garments.

– Agricultural processing and food exports.

– Information technology and software services.

– Pharmaceuticals and medical equipment.

– Engineering goods and light manufacturing.

– Minerals and mineral-based industries.

– Renewable energy equipment.

– Fisheries and livestock products.

The government should provide a stable policy environment, competitive energy tariffs, efficient ports, modern logistics, and access to international markets. In this regard, Pakistan’s Foreign Missions should be motivated with the offer of lucrative rewards for their contributions in bringing FDI and export orders.

Export incentives should be linked to actual export performance rather than political connections.

Supporting small and medium enterprises

Small and medium enterprises must become a central part of the national reconstruction programme.

They require:

– Affordable financing.

15. Establishing a National Reconstruction and Performance Commission

One of the greatest weaknesses in Pakistan’s governance is the discontinuity of policies whenever governments change.

A long-term national programme cannot succeed if each incoming administration abandons the policies of its predecessor.

Pakistan should therefore establish a National Reconstruction and Performance Commission through an appropriate constitutional or statutory framework.

The commission should consist of independent professionals, economists, agricultural scientists, educationists, constitutional experts, industrial specialists, and representatives of relevant public institutions.

Its responsibilities should include:

– Monitoring implementation of the twenty-year reconstruction programme.

– Publishing quarterly and annual performance reports.

– Auditing government development expenditure.

– Measuring progress against predetermined targets.

– Identifying institutional failures.

– Recommending corrective measures.

– Providing Parliament and the public with independently verified information.

The commission must not become another expensive bureaucracy or an alternative government. Its function should be monitoring, evaluation, and public accountability.

Suggested national performance indicators

Sector Performance indicator

Politics Independently verified intra-party elections

Governance Merit-based appointments and audited performance

Education Every school-age child enrolled and learning

Agriculture Higher farmer income and water productivity

Industry Competitive energy costs and increased production

Judiciary Reduced backlog and faster, fairer decisions

Economy Higher exports and a broader tax base

Energy Reduced circular debt and distribution losses

Local government Greater financial and administrative devolution

Social welfare Reduced poverty and improved access to essential services

Targets should be established after baseline assessments, rather than announcing arbitrary figures that cannot be achieved or independently verified.

16. The constitutional question: How can these reforms be implemented?

A national reconstruction programme must be legally sustainable.

Pakistan’s Constitution already provides an important foundation for several proposed reforms:

Constitutional provision Relevance to national reconstruction

Article 10-A Right to fair trial and due process

Article 17 Freedom of association and political parties

Article 19-A Right to information

Article 25 Equality of citizens

Article 25-A Free and compulsory education

Article 140-A Devolution to elected local governments

The proposed technocratic administration, any compulsory acquisition of private educational or energy assets, and changes to political representation would require careful examination of the relevant constitutional provisions, legislation, provincial responsibilities, and property rights.

Where constitutional amendments are necessary, they should be pursued through the prescribed parliamentary procedure.

A reform programme that violates constitutional protections in the name of national reconstruction could ultimately weaken the very institutions it seeks to strengthen.

The objective should be to build a powerful state through strong institutions, not through unlimited powers vested in any individual.

17. What Pakistan should avoid during national reconstruction

It is equally important to identify approaches that could undermine the proposed reforms.

First, personality-based government: Pakistan should not replace one powerful political personality with another. Institutions must be stronger than individuals.

Second, arbitrary political exclusion: Political parties should not be prohibited from participating in democratic processes merely because they are unpopular or have failed to deliver. They should be required to meet genuine democratic and constitutional standards.

Third, indiscriminate nationalisation: Public ownership must be justified through independent economic assessments, transparent procedures, and professional management. Government ownership without accountability can reproduce the same inefficiencies.

Fourth, rushed judicial decisions: The fifteen-day target must never become an excuse for denying fair hearings, legal representation, or proper examination of evidence.

Fifth, unverified agricultural promises: The PQNK system should be evaluated through independent, transparent research before its claimed benefits are adopted as national policy.

Sixth, politically motivated accountability: Anti-corruption institutions must not become instruments for punishing political opponents.

Seventh, discontinuity of policies: National development objectives must survive changes in political leadership and government.

These safeguards are essential because national reconstruction should produce lasting institutional improvement rather than another temporary political experiment.

Conclusion: Pakistan needs reconstruction, not another change of government

Pakistan’s continuing political, economic, and institutional difficulties demand a national response of unprecedented seriousness.

The country has experimented with different political governments, military administrations, economic policies, and development programmes. Yet the fundamental problems of elite capture, weak institutions, inadequate education, agricultural inefficiency, expensive industrial energy, delayed justice, and inconsistent governance have persisted.

The solution cannot be found in simply replacing one group of political leaders with another.

Pakistan needs a comprehensive restructuring of the system through which political leadership is produced, public money is spent, institutions are managed, justice is administered, and economic opportunities are distributed. For Pakistan, a stagnant economy is now a matter of survival and national security. The minimum financial requirements of a nuclear-armed state far exceed what the current defence budget provides. Yet nations prosper only when the entire environment surrounding the economy is healthy: economies need a supporting ecosystem of stable institutions, sound policy and the rule of law. Building that ecosystem is the urgent need of the hour, and it requires Pakistan to put the cart (politics) behind the horse (development).

Political parties must demonstrate genuine democracy within their own organisations. Leadership must emerge from merit and public service rather than hereditary privilege. Furthermore, politicians and political parties that have previously held office, including as members of a coalition government, and failed to implement their manifestos should be disqualified by law from sitting in parliament. A professionally selected and constitutionally accountable technocratic administration should be considered as a transitional instrument for national reconstruction.