The Referendum Paradox

Muhammad Imran
8 Min Read

Summary

  • Military rulers, too, have repeatedly introduced local government systems, but often as instruments of political legitimacy rather than genuine democratic decentralisation.
  • The problem, therefore, is not simply the absence of local elections; it is the unwillingness to transfer meaningful administrative, political and financial authority to elected local representatives, as per the dictates of Article 140A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.
  • The real test of democracy is not how frequently political parties invoke popular sovereignty, but how willing they are to share power with the people.
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By Muhammad Imran, Staff Member, SAHSOL-LUMS Maria Batool, Law Graduate-2025, SAHSOL-LUMS

Pakistan’s history of referendums presents a curious constitutional paradox: an instrument designed to strengthen democracy has repeatedly been employed by military rulers to legitimise authoritarianism. Although Article 48 of the Constitution of 1973 recognises the referendum as a means of obtaining the people’s opinion on matters of national importance, its political application has remained far removed from its democratic purpose. Ironically, no elected civilian government has meaningfully employed this constitutional provision, while all three nationwide referendums in independent Pakistan were conducted under military dictators.

General Ayub Khan held the first referendum on Feb 14, 1960, using the Basic Democracies system as an electoral college rather than seeking a direct vote from the entire adult electorate. General Ziaul Haq followed on Dec 19, 1984, seeking endorsement of his Islamisation programme and securing a five-year presidential mandate. General Pervez Musharraf conducted the third referendum on April 30, 2002, to obtain public approval for his continuation as president for another five years. Despite their different political circumstances, all three exercises shared a common objective: consolidating the authority of the incumbent ruler.

The referendum, therefore, acquired a distinctly dictatorial legacy in Pakistan. Instead of allowing citizens to decide an important national question, it became a mechanism through which those already exercising power sought popular endorsement. This distinction is fundamental to understanding the difference between direct democracy and political legitimisation.

The debate has resurfaced in the context of recent political developments. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari has criticised the referendum as an institution associated with dictatorships and questioned the circumstances surrounding the passage of the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments. However, the subsequent political engagements involving the President and Prime Minister have raised questions about the consistency of political positions and the extent to which constitutional principles survive changing political alliances.

Meanwhile, Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi’s reference to ‘resetting the system’ has coincided with renewed discussion about creating additional administrative units and provinces. The Pakistan Peoples Party has traditionally resisted the division of Sindh, while the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and other political voices have advocated the creation of new provinces. Remarks by the Director General of the ISPR on the subject have added another dimension to an already sensitive political debate.

The demand for new provinces is not inherently undemocratic. Demands originating from South Punjab, Hazara and other regions have often reflected genuine grievances concerning political representation, administrative accessibility and equitable distribution of resources. However, the question is whether these demands are being advanced in response to local aspirations or are becoming part of a broader political and institutional agenda.

More importantly, are additional provinces necessarily the answer to Pakistan’s governance crisis?

The more pressing issue is the absence of effective and autonomous local government institutions. Creating additional provinces may bring administration closer to some communities, but it does not automatically guarantee better governance. An empowered local government system, on the other hand, can deliver public services at citizens’ doorsteps, strengthen political participation and make elected representatives directly accountable to their communities.

There is a historical irony here. Lord Ripon, during British rule in India, regarded local self-government as a ‘school of democracy’. His vision was to cultivate democratic leadership from the grassroots by allowing ordinary citizens to participate in local administration. Pakistan’s political parties, however, have consistently demonstrated reluctance towards financially and administratively autonomous local governments. They appear comfortable with democracy at the provincial and federal levels but considerably less enthusiastic about devolving power to the grassroots.

Military rulers, too, have repeatedly introduced local government systems, but often as instruments of political legitimacy rather than genuine democratic decentralisation. The problem, therefore, is not simply the absence of local elections; it is the unwillingness to transfer meaningful administrative, political and financial authority to elected local representatives, as per the dictates of Article 140A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.

The constitutional framework for a referendum is provided under Article 48(6) and (7). Under the present arrangement, the Prime Minister may propose that a matter of national importance be referred to the people, subject to approval by a joint sitting of Parliament. The President subsequently directs the holding of the referendum on the Prime Minister’s advice. Article 48(7) empowers Parliament to legislate on the procedure for conducting the exercise and determining its results. The 18th Amendment substantially revised this mechanism, strengthening parliamentary involvement.

There is considerable democratic potential in this constitutional provision. A referendum could facilitate public consultation on questions involving major constitutional reforms, institutional restructuring or the creation of new provinces. In the latter case, however, public consultation cannot displace the constitutional requirements of Article 239(4), which requires the approval of the provincial assembly concerned by at least two-thirds of its total membership for an amendment affecting provincial boundaries.

Pakistan should consider making meaningful use of referendums, but only after establishing safeguards against political manipulation. The Election Commission of Pakistan should ensure transparent administration, neutral formulation of questions, equal campaigning opportunities and credible counting of votes. Judicial scrutiny should remain available to examine the legality of the process. There is also a case for considering a citizen-initiated referendum mechanism, subject to an appropriate constitutional threshold and safeguards.

A referendum must never become an alternative to Parliament, a shortcut around constitutional amendments or a device for extending the tenure of an incumbent ruler. Its legitimacy must arise from the freedom of citizens to express their opinion, not from the political convenience of those in power.

Pakistan’s democratic deficit is not simply a consequence of military interventions. It is also sustained by civilian political parties that have failed to institutionalise democracy within the structures of governance. They have resisted empowering local governments while remaining eager to exercise authority at the federal and provincial levels.

The real test of democracy is not how frequently political parties invoke popular sovereignty, but how willing they are to share power with the people. Pakistan needs neither politically engineered referendums nor administrative restructuring for its own sake. It needs institutions that distribute power, encourage participation and ensure accountability.

After all, a referendum should ask the people what they want, not ask them to endorse whoever happens to be in power. That is the difference between popular sovereignty and political legitimisation.

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