Summary
- Drawing equally from constitutional principles, environmental law and Islamic teachings, Justice Minallah articulated a vision of governance in which compassion was not an act of charity but a legal obligation.
- Justice Soomro did not simply reinforce an existing policy; he elevated animal welfare into the broader framework of constitutional governance.
- To deny such protection is not merely to neglect a creature of God, but to diminish the ethical content of law itself.” He continued: “The prevention of cruelty to animals is thus not an isolated statutory concern; it is integrally connected with the broader constitutional promise of a civilized society governed by dignity, restraint, and compassion.” Perhaps the most memorable passage in the judgment is also its most universal: “The true measure of a lawful society lies not in how it treats the powerful, but in how it safeguards those living beings that are wholly dependent on human conscience and institutional responsibility.” The Court also reminded us that animal welfare and human welfare are not competing interests.
The law is often remembered for its judgments. Yet the most enduring judgments are remembered not because they resolve a dispute, but because they change the way we think.
Justice Athar Minallah’s article Guardians or captors: the two faces of humanity published in Dawn serves as a reminder that the law is capable of something far greater than settling legal controversies. At its best, it reflects society’s conscience. His reflections on animal rights revisit a constitutional journey that began with a simple but transformative proposition: animals are not things. They are living beings deserving of dignity, compassion and legal protection.
When the Islamabad High Court decided the landmark Islamabad Wildlife Management Board v Metropolitan Corporation Islamabad case in 2020, it marked a turning point in Pakistan’s legal history. The Court rejected the centuries-old view that animals exist solely for human use and recognised them as sentient beings capable of pain, suffering and emotion. Drawing equally from constitutional principles, environmental law and Islamic teachings, Justice Minallah articulated a vision of governance in which compassion was not an act of charity but a legal obligation.
At the time, many viewed those observations as aspirational. They inspired lawyers, students, environmentalists and animal welfare advocates, but the question remained whether those ideals would ever move beyond philosophy into enforceable law.
That question has now been answered.
In Nelofar v Chief Commissioner, ICT (W.P. 2165 of 2025 and connected petition), Justice Khadim Hussain Soomro has built upon that constitutional foundation and taken Pakistan’s animal rights jurisprudence to its next stage. The case, successfully argued by Advocate Altamush Saeed, is far more than a dispute about stray dogs. It is a judgment about governance, constitutional responsibility and the rule of law.
The Court held that the State cannot continue to rely on arbitrary campaigns of poisoning or shooting stray dogs while ignoring its own policy obligations. Instead, authorities must implement the Islamabad Capital Territory Stray Dog Population Control Policy in its true letter and spirit through vaccination, sterilisation, scientific population management, public education, veterinary oversight and transparent administration.
What makes the judgment particularly significant is the constitutional language that accompanies these directions. Justice Soomro did not simply reinforce an existing policy; he elevated animal welfare into the broader framework of constitutional governance.
He observed:
“It is now increasingly acknowledged in modern constitutional thought that animals are not mere chattels or inanimate objects to be dealt with solely at human convenience; rather, they are living, sentient beings, capable of pain, distress, comfort, and social response. The law, therefore, cannot remain indifferent to their existence.”
This is a remarkable statement. It rejects the outdated legal notion that animals are simply property and instead recognises that the law itself must respond to scientific understanding and moral progress.
The judgment went further, explaining that constitutional protection is not confined solely to human survival, but forms the foundational premise upon which protection against cruelty and unnecessary suffering rests.
Justice Soomro wrote:
“An animal, by virtue of being alive, possesses a natural claim to exist in an environment compatible with its behavioral, social, and physiological needs. To deny such protection is not merely to neglect a creature of God, but to diminish the ethical content of law itself.”
He continued:
“The prevention of cruelty to animals is thus not an isolated statutory concern; it is integrally connected with the broader constitutional promise of a civilized society governed by dignity, restraint, and compassion.”
Perhaps the most memorable passage in the judgment is also its most universal:
“The true measure of a lawful society lies not in how it treats the powerful, but in how it safeguards those living beings that are wholly dependent on human conscience and institutional responsibility.”
The Court also reminded us that animal welfare and human welfare are not competing interests. They are inseparable.
Justice Soomro observed:
“The injury inflicted upon animals, their needless killing, or the destruction of their habitat, ultimately reverberates through the human condition itself. Thus, compassion towards animals is not merely a matter of sentiment; it is a constitutional necessity, an ecological imperative, and a marker of legal maturity.”
These observations represent far more than eloquent judicial prose. They demonstrate how the philosophy first articulated by Justice Athar Minallah has matured into enforceable constitutional doctrine. What began as a recognition that animals are sentient beings deserving of dignity has now evolved into a framework that places affirmative obligations upon the State.
Justice Soomro’s judgment requires public authorities to implement the ICT Stray Dog Population Control Policy in both letter and spirit. It mandates humane capture, sterilisation, vaccination, veterinary oversight, transparent record-keeping, public education, responsible pet ownership, scientific surveys, improved waste management, expert advisory committees, NGO participation and the adoption of a One Health approach that recognises the inseparable relationship between human health, environmental protection and animal welfare.
The judgment is equally significant for its reliance upon Islamic principles. Justice Soomro reaffirmed that mercy towards animals is deeply embedded within the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), reminding public authorities that even where euthanasia becomes necessary, it must remain an exceptional measure carried out only by qualified veterinary professionals and never as a substitute for sound public policy.
This is not simply an animal rights judgment.
It is a governance judgment.
It recognises that ineffective administration cannot be replaced by bullets. Rabies cannot be eradicated through indiscriminate killing. Sustainable public safety requires science, transparency, accountability, responsible waste management, veterinary expertise and humane administration.
For lawyers, judges and policymakers alike, this decision represents the natural evolution of Pakistan’s constitutional jurisprudence. Justice Athar Minallah laid the intellectual and constitutional foundation by recognising that compassion towards animals is consistent with our Constitution, our faith and our environmental obligations. Justice Khadim Hussain Soomro has now transformed those constitutional principles into a comprehensive framework of enforceable legal duties that public authorities are bound to implement.
That is how jurisprudence develops.
One judgment plants an idea.
Another nurtures it.
A later judgment transforms it into binding constitutional doctrine.
Together, these two judgments tell the story of Pakistan’s emerging animal rights jurisprudence. They demonstrate that compassion is no longer merely a moral aspiration or an ethical ideal. It has become an essential component of constitutional governance.
Courts can illuminate the path, but implementation now rests with the executive. Humane animal management requires political will, institutional accountability, investment in veterinary services, scientific data, public education and effective enforcement of existing policies. The roadmap has been drawn. The responsibility to follow it now lies with the institutions entrusted with governance.
Justice Athar Minallah’s reflections remind us where this constitutional journey began. Justice Khadim Hussain Soomro’s judgment demonstrates how far it has progressed.
From principle to practice, Pakistan’s courts have shown that the protection of the voiceless is not an act of charity.
It is a constitutional duty.
