India’s War Hysteria: The $25 Billion Defense Spending Surge

India's recent defense procurement surge, marked by the Defence Acquisition Council approving around $25 billion in projects

India’s recent defense procurement surge, marked by the Defence Acquisition Council approving around $25 billion in projects, is not a routine modernization step but the largest set of approvals in years, spanning land, air, sea, and joint-service capabilities that could significantly shift the military balance in South Asia. The scale—exceeding the annual defense budgets of many mid-sized countries and nearly triple Pakistan’s yearly military spending—has fueled debate, with critics calling it “war hysteria” and India framing it as necessary for threats from China and Pakistan, citing events like the 2020 Galwan clashes and ongoing tensions along the Line of Control. The breadth of acquisitions—including S-400 air defense systems, drones, transport aircraft, artillery, tank ammunition, communications networks, surveillance platforms, fighter jet engine overhauls, and coast guard hovercraft—signals a doctrinal shift from limited engagements toward high-intensity, multi-front warfare without reliance on nuclear escalation. The S-400 system alone could reshape aerial dynamics by extending defensive coverage deep into Pakistani airspace, while forcing Pakistan to seek countermeasures or risk diminished operational capability. Complementary systems like advanced radar, transport aircraft for rapid troop deployment to Ladakh or the western front, and long-endurance armed drones enhance India’s ability to sustain prolonged, flexible operations and conduct precision strikes, potentially even in gray-zone scenarios below full-scale war.

At the same time, the package strengthens battlefield mobility, firepower, and network-centric warfare through mobile air defense for armored units, next-generation tank ammunition capable of defeating advanced armor, longer-range artillery like the Dhanush howitzer, and resilient communications and surveillance systems that integrate real-time battlefield data. Upgrades to Su-30 fighter engines indicate preparation for sustained air campaigns, while unmanned systems and hovercraft expand operational reach from inland battlefields to contested coastal zones like Sir Creek. Beyond hardware, analysts point to the political and ideological context under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the BJP, where military strength is tied to nationalist narratives and past conflicts such as 1962 and Kargil, alongside moves like the revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy, as evidence of a more assertive posture. This combination of ideology and capability raises concerns that India may feel emboldened to take greater risks, while Pakistan—facing far tighter economic constraints—views the buildup as an existential challenge to its deterrence, leaving it caught between the inability to match India’s expansion and the danger of appearing strategically vulnerable, a dynamic that risks accelerating an arms race with potential for escalation.

Pakistan’s military establishment has already signaled that it will seek to counter the S-400 through a combination of electronic warfare (including the development of airborne jammers and decoys), low-observable cruise missiles like the Ra’ad-II with a range of 600 kilometers and stealth features, and by deploying its own advanced air defense systems, possibly the HQ-9BE from China which has similar range and engagement capabilities to the S-400. The armor-piercing ammunition approval has already spurred Pakistan’s Heavy Industries Taxila to accelerate development of fourth-generation active protection systems (similar to the Israeli Trophy or Russian Arena) and composite armor for its upcoming Haider main battle tank, which is based on the Chinese VT-4 chassis. The drone acquisition by India has led Pakistan to double down on its own UCAV programs, including the Burraq (a small, slow loitering munition) and the more advanced Shahpar-III (which has a 2,500-kilometer range and can carry four anti-tank missiles), as well as to seek Turkish Bayraktar TB2s (which proved effective in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine) and Akıncıs (which can carry up to 1,500 kilograms of munitions and fly at 40,000 feet). This tit-for-tat procurement cycle is precisely what analysts call a classic security dilemma: one nation’s defensive buildup is perceived by the other as offensive intent, triggering counter-builds, which then reinforce the original nation’s fears, creating a spiral that neither side can easily escape without political trust that is entirely absent. The international community, particularly the United Nations and major powers like the US, China, Russia, and the European Union, faces a profound dilemma. On one hand, India is a crucial counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, and a major market for arms and technology from the West. On the other hand, an arms race between two nuclear-armed adversaries—India and Pakistan—with unresolved territorial disputes over Kashmir, Sir Creek, Siachen Glacier (the world’s highest battlefield), and water sharing from the Indus River system, raises the risk of miscalculation, accidental escalation, and even intentional nuclear use if one side believes it is about to suffer a conventional defeat. The world has already witnessed the dangers of war hysteria in the subcontinent: the 2019 Balakot airstrikes and subsequent dogfight, where India’s MiG-21 Bison was shot down and its pilot captured after crossing the Line of Control, could have spiraled into a full-scale war had Pakistan not exercised restraint and returned the pilot within days. Now, with far more advanced weaponry on both sides—including hypersonic missiles, ballistic missile defense systems, and cyber warfare capabilities—the threshold for conflict is paradoxically both higher (because mutual vulnerability to retaliation is greater) and lower (because each side perceives a possible window of opportunity to win a limited war before the other can respond).

Analysts who warn that the “fundamentalist and conservative Modi government” might pose a danger to the world base their argument on the prime minister’s track record of militarized nationalism, including the 2016 surgical strikes across the Line of Control, the 2019 air strikes into Pakistani territory, and the 2020 Galwan Valley clash with China where India suffered 20 fatalities but reportedly inflicted much heavier losses on Chinese forces. They note that Modi’s government has systematically weakened India’s secular institutions, promoted Hindu majoritarianism through policies like the Citizenship Amendment Act and the National Register of Citizens, and used external threats to consolidate domestic power, often conflating criticism of the government with anti-nationalism. In such an environment, advanced weaponry—especially offensive systems like unmanned attack aircraft, long-range cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)—could be used not just for defense but for preemptive strikes, regime change ambitions in Pakistan, or even to provoke a short, victorious war to boost electoral prospects, much like the 1999 Kargil War was used to boost the BJP’s fortunes at the time. The $25 billion spending surge, while justified by New Delhi as a response to China’s own massive military modernization (including the deployment of DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicles, DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles, and a fifth-generation stealth fighter, the J-20) and Pakistan’s alleged cross-border terrorism (including the 2008 Mumbai attacks and more recent grenade attacks in Jammu), is seen by critics as a self-fulfilling prophecy. By acquiring weapons that negate Pakistan’s conventional deterrents—such as the S-400 neutralizing Pakistan’s air force, the new tank ammunition neutralizing Pakistan’s armor, and the drones neutralizing Pakistan’s artillery—India forces Pakistan to rely more heavily on its tactical nuclear weapons (the Nasr and Ababeel systems, which are short-range, battlefield nuclear missiles designed to stop an Indian armored thrust). This reliance lowers the nuclear threshold dramatically, because Pakistan has explicitly stated that it would use Nasr against massed Indian conventional forces if they penetrate Pakistani territory, a doctrine known as “full spectrum deterrence.” A conventional war could thus turn nuclear within days or even hours, with catastrophic consequences for the entire region and beyond, given that a single 10-kiloton nuclear detonation could kill hundreds of thousands of people directly, and multiple detonations could cause a nuclear autumn or winter effect, reducing global temperatures, disrupting agriculture, and causing famine worldwide. Moreover, the world should indeed take notice, as the analysts argue, because the India-Pakistan rivalry no longer remains localized.

China has a vested interest in preventing India from dominating the region, and would likely supply Pakistan with intelligence, spare parts, and even direct support if a war broke out. The US wants India as a partner against China but also wants to prevent nuclear war and protect its assets in Afghanistan and the Gulf. Russia wants to maintain its arms sales to both India and Pakistan, and has already conducted joint military exercises with both nations. Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates watch nervously as their economic investments in both countries—worth hundreds of billions of dollars—could be incinerated in a war, and they also rely on Pakistani troops for their own defense while courting Indian investment. Therefore, urging India to halt the weapon race is not merely a moral plea but a strategic necessity for global stability. The only viable pathway to stability is a comprehensive dialogue covering not just arms control but the root causes of Indo-Pak hostility: the Kashmir dispute, water sharing under the Indus Waters Treaty, cross-border terrorism, trade normalization, and cultural exchanges. BJP uses Pakistan bashing to unite its Hindu voter base. In the meantime, the $25 billion worth of approved projects will move forward through India’s defense procurement bureaucracy, which is notoriously slow but has been accelerated by emergency powers granted after the Galwan clashes. Factories will churn out Dhanush guns and armor-piercing shells, Russian technicians will help integrate the S-400 into India’s integrated air command and control system, drones will soon patrol the skies from the Arabian Sea to the Himalayas, and Su-30 engines will be overhauled to fly thousands more hours. The subcontinent thus stands at a perilous crossroads: either this massive military buildup leads to a stable deterrence through mutual fear, where both sides recognize that war is unwinnable and therefore avoid escalation, or it becomes the prelude to a conflagration that neither side fully intended but neither could prevent because of miscalculation, miscommunication, or militant provocation.

The world watches, and while the United Nations Security Council has issued vague statements urging restraint, there is no serious effort to mediate the underlying disputes or to cap the arms race through a treaty similar to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the US and Russia. Whether the world will act before the Indian hysteria translates into war remains the most pressing and unanswered question of our time, and the answer may well determine the future of not just South Asia but the entire international order in the 21st century.