Israel’s entry into the Gulf puts Pakistan to a strategic test

The Middle East appears to be standing at another dangerous crossroads. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent visit to Abu Dhabi and his meeting with UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed have generated questions about the direction of regional security politics and the possibility of a new strategic alignment. Reports initially suggested that representatives of several Arab countries had participated in an expanded discussion involving Israel and the UAE, with Iran, the Houthis, air defence and regional security reportedly among the subjects under discussion. However, Saudi Arabia and Jordan have denied that their representatives attended such a meeting. Therefore, claims about a ten-country or wider regional security gathering should be treated with caution rather than presented as an established alliance.

Yet the controversy itself is significant. Even if the reported wider meeting did not take place in the form initially described, the fact that such reports emerged at this particular moment reveals the strategic anxiety gripping the region. Israel is seeking deeper security cooperation with Arab states, while Gulf countries are looking for protection against missiles, drones and other threats. Iran, meanwhile, views expanding Israeli security cooperation in the Gulf with profound suspicion. The result is a geopolitical chessboard on which every move can have a knock-on effect.

For Pakistan, the timing could hardly be more sensitive. Islamabad has recently entered into a new collective-defence arrangement with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. The agreement provides that an armed attack on one signatory would be regarded as an attack on all, while the three countries have also been working to enhance military coordination, intelligence sharing and defence capabilities. Their military chiefs recently met in Riyadh to discuss closer cooperation and the evolving regional security situation.

This development places Pakistan in a delicate strategic position. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia is a longstanding strategic partner and the security of the Kingdom has enormous importance for Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan shares a border and a long history of diplomatic engagement with Iran. Islamabad therefore has to walk a tightrope: it must honour its commitments to Saudi Arabia without allowing itself to become an automatic participant in every regional confrontation.

Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir’s recent military engagement with Saudi and Turkish counterparts has taken place against precisely this backdrop. The emphasis on coordination, deterrence and collective security suggests that Pakistan is preparing for emerging contingencies while maintaining a broader regional perspective. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government, meanwhile, has continued to combine its commitment to Saudi security with diplomatic engagement and an emphasis on avoiding a wider regional conflagration. That balance will become increasingly important if tensions between Israel, Iran and Gulf states continue to rise.

The UAE’s growing security relationship with Israel is another matter that Pakistan cannot afford to view casually. The Emirates established formal diplomatic relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, and cooperation has expanded in several fields. The latest Netanyahu visit has once again placed security cooperation under the microscope. Reports surrounding the Abu Dhabi meeting have suggested discussions about air-defence systems and ways of countering Iranian and Houthi threats, although the precise composition of any wider gathering remains disputed.

This is where the debate becomes particularly sensitive in the Muslim world. Critics of the UAE’s increasingly close security relationship with Israel may describe it through the historical analogy of Mir Jafar and Mir Sadiq—figures remembered in South Asian history as symbols of internal division and collaboration during periods of external pressure. That analogy is a political criticism, not an established historical equivalence, but its emergence reflects the depth of mistrust among sections of Muslim public opinion toward any arrangement that appears to give Israel a larger security role inside the Muslim world.

For Pakistan, this concern has an additional dimension. During the 2025 India-Pakistan military confrontation, India used Israeli-made HAROP loitering munitions, and Pakistan said it had intercepted such drones at several locations. India has long maintained significant defence cooperation with Israel, including the acquisition of drones and other military technology. The

Consequently, Islamabad cannot look at Israeli military technology in the region as an abstract matter. Pakistan’s own recent security experience has demonstrated how Israeli-origin systems can appear in a conflict directly involving Pakistan. This does not mean that every Israeli-Arab security arrangement is directed against Pakistan, but it does mean that Islamabad has legitimate reasons to examine such developments with strategic caution.

The Houthi question adds another layer of complexity. Pakistan has publicly committed to Saudi Arabia’s defence under the new arrangement, while also maintaining diplomatic channels with Iran. Pakistani officials have indicated that the country supports negotiations even as it recognises its defence commitments to Saudi Arabia. This dual-track approach is important because the conflict cannot be reduced to a simple Saudi-Iran or Sunni-Shia equation.

The use of sectarian language makes an already dangerous situation even more combustible. Attempts to declare an entire political or military movement outside Islam can open a Pandora’s box of sectarian polarisation. Pakistan, which has experienced the consequences of sectarian conflict for decades, has every reason to avoid rhetoric that turns a geopolitical confrontation into a religious war.

There is also growing discussion in the region about Israel’s long-term strategic ambitions and the concept sometimes described as “Greater Israel.” Such claims should not be presented as established government policy without concrete evidence. Nevertheless, the continuing expansion of Israel’s military and diplomatic reach has generated serious debate about the future architecture of the Middle East. For Pakistan, the important question is not merely what Israel intends, but how the emerging regional system could affect Pakistan’s security environment.

If Israel develops deeper security links with Gulf states while Iran increasingly relies on its regional partners, the Middle East could become more polarised rather than more stable. The Gulf states may seek advanced air-defence capabilities; Israel may seek greater strategic depth; Iran may perceive encirclement; and regional armed groups may respond accordingly. Such a chain reaction could make the entire region more vulnerable to miscalculation.

Pakistan should therefore keep its powder dry. Its relationship with Saudi Arabia is strategically important, and the new defence arrangement creates clear obligations. Its relationship with Türkiye is also becoming more significant. At the same time, Pakistan should keep diplomatic channels with Iran open and avoid being dragged into a conflict whose consequences could spread far beyond the Gulf.

The UAE-Israel relationship will continue to attract attention, but Pakistan’s response should be guided by national interest rather than emotion. Islamabad needs to strengthen its own air defence, intelligence and technological capabilities while maintaining diplomatic flexibility. It should also work with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to ensure that the new defence framework remains fundamentally defensive and does not become a springboard for unnecessary confrontation.

The writing on the wall is clear: the Middle East is entering another uncertain phase. Whether the reported wider security gathering in Abu Dhabi eventually develops into a formal regional arrangement remains to be seen. What is already evident, however, is that the old regional order is under pressure.

For Pakistan, the challenge is to remain a reliable partner to Saudi Arabia, maintain strategic cooperation with Türkiye, preserve working relations with Iran, and at the same time protect its own sovereignty and security interests. In such turbulent waters, diplomacy must pour oil on troubled waters rather than add fuel to the fire.

The coming months will show whether the region moves toward a broader security architecture or deeper fragmentation. Pakistan should prepare for both possibilities without becoming collateral damage in a conflict designed by others.