Summary
- Its Foreign Minister, MOTEGI Toshimitsu, chose to visit Saudi Arabia on August 19 and 20, one month after Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan had concluded his own visit to Beijing on July 1.
- Japan’s Foreign Ministry issued a lengthy, carefully-worded statement on the visit It reads, “Minister MOTEGI … stated that Japan intends to provide support including for strengthening the oil stockpiling capacity across Asia under ‘POWERR Asia’ initiative launched by Japan, and that Japan wishes to work closely with Saudi Arabia, which possesses abundant energy resources.” The statement made no mention of China.
- The most striking passage of the statement concerned Iran: It said, “…Minister MOTEGI…stated that it is important to re-open the Strait of Hormuz as soon as possible, and then, to reach a final agreement, including on Iran’s nuclear issue … Minister MOTEGI expressed his strong concern over the Houthis’ continued attacks against Saudi Arabia and the Government of Yemen, and strongly denounced the series of attacks carried out by the Houthis.” This is where Japan broke its diplomatic neutrality.
When two nations lock horns on a battleground, it is often assumed that a third party will emerge victorious. But history offers a sobering lesson: when the battle moves to the deep seas, it drags entire regions into its vortex and nobody comes up as a winner.
Japan appears poised to ignore this lesson. Its Foreign Minister, MOTEGI Toshimitsu, chose to visit Saudi Arabia on August 19 and 20, one month after Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan had concluded his own visit to Beijing on July 1.
The timing speaks volumes. To understand Tokyo’s urgency, one must place Motegi’s Riyadh mission against the broader canvas of Prince Faisal bin Farhan’s Beijing visit.
The Saudi Foreign Minister’s trip to China was highly significant for several reasons.
First, it coincided with the 10th anniversary of the Saudi-China “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”.
Second, the visit occurred amidst visible strains in the US-Saudi relationship. Washington, entangled in a war prompted by Israeli provocations, insisted that Riyadh “do more.” Saudi Arabia had counseled restraint from the beginning, urging either a halt to hostilities or a swift resolution. Its warnings went unheeded.
Third, Saudi Arabia views China as a crucial partner. The China-sponsored Shanghai Agreement with Iran has significantly softened Tehran’s attacks on the Kingdom, a diplomatic achievement unmatched by any other power.
China’s response to the Gulf crisis was measured, wise, and globally resonant. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged “all parties to preserve dialogue,” declaring that “talking is better than fighting, and dialogue is better than confrontation.”
The joint statement from Beijing focused on shared goals: de-escalation, enhanced “security and stability,” and ensuring “freedom of navigation.”
Prince Faisal bin Farhan’s official statements, alongside his Chinese counterpart’s reactions, reveal a visit that was a diplomatic success because both sides stood on equal footing. There was no rush, no “hard sell.” The partnership spoke for itself.
In stark contrast, Foreign Minister Motegi’s visit to Riyadh had all the hallmarks of a diplomatic sprint .
He seemingly made no secret of his intent: to leverage the Gulf conflict against China, to bargain for more than Japan’s due from Saudi Arabia.
Once a mega-business partner, Tokyo had begun ignoring the Kingdom. In its absence, China surged ahead offering better products at cheaper prices, with bilateral trade surpassing $107 billion in 2024. Japan is nowhere near China.
Japan’s Foreign Ministry issued a lengthy, carefully-worded statement on the visit
It reads, “Minister MOTEGI … stated that Japan intends to provide support including for strengthening the oil stockpiling capacity across Asia under ‘POWERR Asia’ initiative launched by Japan, and that Japan wishes to work closely with Saudi Arabia, which possesses abundant energy resources.”
The statement made no mention of China. Neither did it mention Pakistan. Both were conspicuously excluded from the POWERR Asia initiative.
That omission was not accidental. It was a signal.
Motegi also took the opportunity to promote Japan’s updated “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy, which he framed as an initiative to “enhance the autonomy and resilience of each country.”
In diplomatic language, this is a clear attempt to build a narrative against China —for Japan is the host of anti-China forces stationed in the Indo-Pacific and around the South China Sea.
The most striking passage of the statement concerned Iran:
It said, “…Minister MOTEGI…stated that it is important to re-open the Strait of Hormuz as soon as possible, and then, to reach a final agreement, including on Iran’s nuclear issue … Minister MOTEGI expressed his strong concern over the Houthis’ continued attacks against Saudi Arabia and the Government of Yemen, and strongly denounced the series of attacks carried out by the Houthis.”
This is where Japan broke its diplomatic neutrality.
Japan has long championed neutrality as its foreign policy slogan. Yet here, its Foreign Minister denounced Iran, albeit indirectly, by condemning its proxy, the Houthis.
In diplomatic language, this is known as “soft balancing.”
And it was done precisely because China, which also cherishes neutrality, had refused to do it. Japan condemned Iran because China did not, it seems.
Motegi’s charm offensive extended beyond official statements. He also penned an opinion piece for an Arabic-language newspaper, which was later carried by Arab News.
In his column, he recalled the milestones:
“Last year, which marked the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Saudi Arabia, Japan hosted Expo 2025 Osaka-Kansai. A large number of Saudi ministers also visited Japan, including Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan and Minister of Culture Prince Badr bin Abdullah bin Farhan. These visits opened new horizons for strengthening the strategic partnership between the two countries.”
He concluded with a flourish, juxtaposing an Arab proverb and a Japanese proverb:
“There is an Arab proverb: ‘He who seeks the heights spends sleepless nights.’ Japan, too, has a proverb: ‘A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.'”
The sentiment is admirable. But the strategy behind it is transparent.
China released no official reaction to Japan’s “hard sell.”
Saudi Arabia, too, treated Motegi’s visit with diplomatic diligence—and nothing more.
A single tweet. A brief article in Arab News. That is all the Kingdom offered in return for Japan’s elaborate statements, ministerial columns, and carefully crafted narratives.
The asymmetry speaks volumes.
Japan was eager to signal a breakthrough. Saudi Arabia was signaling restraint.
Japan does not need to be overambitious in dealing with Gulf affairs.
This war in the Gulf will benefit none. History is unambiguous on this point: no US war has ever truly benefitted anyone. Not the region. Not the allies who are drawn into its orbit.
Japan would be wise to design its foreign policy focused on its own interests, rather than exploiting conflicts for competitive advantage.
The Gulf is not a chessboard for Tokyo to challenge Beijing. It is a complex, volatile region where patience, principle, and partnership matter far more than rushed diplomacy and implicit condemnations.
When wars turn to the deep seas, they drag regions into chaos. And in the end, nobody wins.
Japan’s Foreign Minister Motegi travelled to Riyadh to “outpace” China. He offered frameworks, promised support, and broke diplomatic neutrality to signal his country’s reliability.
But Saudi Arabia, a nation schooled in the art of strategic hedging, offered only routine courtesy. It did not endorse Japan’s narrative. It did not choose sides.
The Kingdom knows that China is its largest trading partner. It knows that Beijing helped normalize its relations with Tehran. It knows that Japan is offering a framework, but China is offering a long-term partnership built on trust, trade, and shared interests.
Japan’s hard sell in Saudi Arabia is unlikely to work—not because Japan lacks ambition, but because its strategy rests on a faulty premise.
