SJC Amendments to Judicial Code of Conduct: Implications under the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments

By Muhammad Imran, Staff Member, SAHSOL-LUMS and Bushra Zeb Khan, Lecturer, Department of Law, Malakan University and Syed Liaquat Ali Shah, Lecturer, Department of Law, SBBU Shringal

The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) has approved amendments to the Code of Conduct for Judges, recalibrating ethical and procedural standards governing members of the superior judiciary, particularly in light of the evolving constitutional framework shaped by the 26th and 27th Amendments.

According to an official statement issued on Saturday, the Council meeting on June 11, 2026, under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and SJC Chairman Yahya Afridi, has refined existing provisions relating to judicial propriety, institutional independence, and administrative coordination, while also extending the applicability of the Code to judges of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). The revisions further align judicial governance mechanisms with the post-amendment constitutional architecture introduced through the aforementioned constitutional changes.

Key Amendments to Article XII: Judicial Participation in Public Functions

A key substantive modification pertains to Article XII of the Code. Previously, judges of the superior judiciary were categorically required to refrain from presiding over or attending social, cultural, political, and diplomatic engagements. In its revised form, the provision now draws a clear distinction: participation in political and diplomatic functions remains prohibited unless prior authorization is obtained from the relevant Chief Justice, whereas attendance at social and cultural events no longer requires such approval, thereby introducing a more nuanced regulatory threshold consistent with judicial dignity and institutional flexibility.

The Council further underscored the principle of judicial independence in relation to external and internal influences. It reiterated that a judge must preserve the integrity of the office by maintaining steadfast impartiality in the face of any form of undue influence. In instances where legal mechanisms exist to counter such pressures, judges are expected to exercise the full extent of their judicial authority. Where no explicit legal remedy is available, they are required to promptly seek an appropriate institutional response, strictly within the parameters of law and constitutional propriety.

Amendments to Article XV: Judicial Reporting and Institutional Coordination

In addition, the SJC approved amendments to paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article XV, which govern judicial reporting protocols. These revisions integrate the Federal Constitutional Court into the institutional reporting framework and delineate the roles of its Chief Justice and senior judges alongside those of the Supreme Court. Under the revised mechanism, judges are obligated to communicate relevant matters to the concerned Chief Justice and designated senior judicial officers through the respective registrarial channels.

The amendments further stipulate that in cases involving High Courts where prescribed procedural timelines are not adhered to, the matter may be escalated to the Federal Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court forum already seized of the information provided by the reporting judge. This restructuring is intended to ensure procedural efficiency, reinforce accountability, and harmonize inter-court coordination within the constitutional order as reshaped by the 26th and 27th Amendments.

Critical Appraisal: Constitutional and Institutional Implications

The Supreme Judicial Council’s recent amendments to the Code of Conduct for judges—particularly those recalibrating judicial participation in public functions and revising inter-court reporting mechanisms—represent a significant institutional adjustment within Pakistan’s evolving constitutional framework, shaped by the 26th and 27th Amendments. While presented as measures to refine judicial ethics and administrative efficiency, the reforms invite a more critical examination of their normative implications for judicial independence, institutional hierarchy, and the separation of powers.

At the core of the revised Article XII lies a recalibration of restrictions on judges’ engagement with non-judicial functions. The prior regime imposed a broad prohibition on attendance at social, cultural, political, and diplomatic events, reflecting a maximalist interpretation of judicial aloofness designed to preserve both actual and perceived impartiality. The amended framework, however, introduces a differentiated standard: while political and diplomatic engagements remain conditionally restricted, social and cultural participation has been liberalized.

From a critical standpoint, this bifurcation reflects a pragmatic attempt to reconcile judicial isolation with contemporary expectations of institutional visibility. Yet it also raises questions regarding the coherence of ethical boundaries, as the distinction between social and political spaces is often blurred in practice. Delegating discretionary approval power to Chief Justices enhances flexibility but risks centralizing ethical authority and producing uneven standards across jurisdictions.

More broadly, in light of the 26th and 27th Amendments, which have reconfigured constitutional institutions and introduced the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), these amendments reflect a broader trend toward institutional densification. The extension of the Code to FCC judges promotes doctrinal consistency but also raises concerns about overlapping judicial cultures and transitional fragmentation during institutional consolidation.

The amendments relating to undue influence reaffirm the classical principle of judicial independence and emphasize resistance to internal and external pressures. However, the expectation that judges must seek institutional remedies where none exist potentially shifts the judiciary toward a more assertive institutional role, blurring traditional boundaries between adjudication and institutional engagement.

The revision of Article XV, incorporating the FCC into judicial reporting mechanisms, is perhaps the most structurally significant change. While it enhances coordination and prevents procedural stagnation, it also introduces a dual supervisory structure between the Supreme Court and the FCC. If not carefully managed, this may create jurisdictional ambiguity and overlapping authority in procedural oversight.

Although the reforms aim to strengthen accountability and efficiency, they simultaneously risk reinforcing hierarchical centralization within the judiciary. The requirement for reporting through registrarial channels consolidates vertical control but may constrain judicial discretion at lower levels, thereby affecting institutional balance.

Viewed through the lens of the 26th and 27th Amendments, these reforms represent an attempt to achieve coordinated governance within a pluralized judicial framework. However, their long-term success will depend on whether they enhance judicial independence or gradually institutionalize administrative centralization.

Conclusion

The SJC’s amendments, in the constitutional context of the 26th and 27th Amendments, reflect a deliberate reconfiguration of judicial ethics and institutional coordination within a rapidly evolving constitutional order. They aim to balance ethical refinement with procedural modernization while accommodating a more complex judicial architecture.

Ultimately, these reforms sit at a constitutional crossroads: they may either reinforce institutional coherence and public confidence in a diversified judiciary or generate subtle structural tensions if administrative centralization outweighs judicial autonomy. Their true significance will be determined not by their textual precision, but by their practical application in preserving the judiciary’s foundational principle—independence, both real and perceived.

It might be a fruit of accepting the 26th and 27th Amendments in the Constitution, for those who align with the Executive.