The system in peril; are provinces the answer?

It was almost a month ago when the federal interior minister, reputed to be close to the civil and military establishment, argued that the way out was simple: divide the country and the current federating units into further units called provinces, as small as an administrative division, so that things could be managed more efficiently.

That statement did trigger responses from a wide spectrum of the political landscape, as well as the media and intelligentsia. As things stand, the debate has died down, at least in the public domain. There are fair chances that, in the corridors of power, these matters are being debated and formulated to give the idea a concrete shape for implementation.

Whatever might be the trajectory of events, the minister’s statement was practically no more than a calculated teaser to inform the public. Here, it is important to note that the hybrid arrangement in vogue since the last two general elections—in 2018 and again in 2024—has been influenced by a hard fact: the state has taken on the image of a hard state. The populace is not asked for comments or input; rather, they are ‘only informed’ about developments or steps in advance.

While the establishment’s apologists might feel that a return to the Ayub era is the ideal way to govern the country, in practical terms, this style has created a vast gulf between the rulers and the ruled.

The biggest casualty of that state of mind and affairs is that the system is unable to gauge what the man on the street is thinking or contemplating with reference to the micro-management of his or her own life, and how he or she views the way macro-management is being undertaken by the establishment, the political government or the administration.

The end result of such a state of affairs, in modern history, has been public protests, about which, in most cases, the established orders in any country are clueless. The ringleaders of such protests mostly have no previous profile on record with that country’s intelligence agencies or law enforcement agencies, suggesting that the protest is practically indigenous.

Given the fragmented nature of Pakistani polity and society along many divides, it is unlikely that any such protests would ever precipitate on the major thoroughfares of any big city in the country. However, that state of affairs can give rise to a simmering feeling of dissent, which may, at most, reflect itself in the next electoral exercise. Though it remains a big question mark whether the exercise itself can be authentic and representative of what has actually been decided by the most important component of the nation-state: the masses.

However, what has been missed by establishment-backed politicians, ‘regime insiders’ and the meek media is that the real issues underlying the anger of the masses with the system at work are not the administrative units or the number of them required to manage the country.

The rule of law, the impression that all are equal before the regulations, and the need to recognise the mandate of the people at every tier of elections—be they national, provincial or city-based—are the basic ingredients that need the attention of the ruling establishment, as well as the major components of the state, be they the administration, the legislature or the judiciary.

The discussion at hand needs to be kept on a philosophical plane for two reasons. First, it is important to recognise where the problem lies and what self-correcting modes and options are available. Second, it is important to pinpoint the contradictions without raising red flags in a manner that might prove to be counterproductive.

The reasons for the second caution emanate from the simple fact that, despite its preamble being revised every March 23 and August 14 to state that the country was visualised as a welfare state based on democratic principles, over the years it has transformed into a hard state whose preamble demands unquestionable compliance. There is no room available for debate, except on the floors of Parliament or the provincial assemblies, where debates are invariably clouded by party considerations rather than a conceptual approach to the issues. Furthermore, the superficial nature of the debate does not resonate with the man on the street.

Any debate on correcting the system cannot be swept under the rug with the simplistic solution that a few more provinces will solve the problems. There has to be a realistic approach on the part of the establishment itself to face the issue head-on.

Parallels can be found in the political turmoil of 1968, when the system was honest enough to confess that it had created a class-based dichotomy, where resources were concentrated at one end of society and the economy, invariably affecting the polity as well.

Such truth and reconciliation on the part of the system might deliver the goods, or at least set into motion the needed process, where the organs of the state, such as the government, legislature and judiciary, can play their respective parts.

The debate needs to be developed initially along more realistic and conceptual parameters before the groundwork for a renewed design of statecraft, within the already drawn lines, is finalised. The discussion is invariably philosophical; rather, pages like the one here can be the place where ideas can be synthesised and finalised.