The Yemeni surge and the Pakistani options

In the background of a much-awaited ground offensive by the Saudi Arabian ground forces against the Houthi rebels in control of a chunk of territory, there are signs that apart from the ground offensive about which there are conflicting claims and counter claims, the Houthi response in the form of the warheads on select Saudi Arabian air bases as well as airports has escalated the stakes to prohibitive level.

The Yemeni civil war which was symbolically the demise of the modern nation state in Yemen erected by the Free Officers coup against the Zaidi Imamate in the late sixties, practically opened the old wounds, without any party trying to reach out to the other political faction. That polarization precipitated an armed conflict which Pakistan was tactically able to avoid way back in March 2015; but as things stand, it is unavoidable now.

The Free Officers movement best symbolized by the late Ali Mohammad Saleh ruled the country from early 70s till 2015. For obvious reason the Saudis had stakes in a stable Yemen and the stakes if looked into in the past, were not guided by sectarian considerations rather by the political thought process. The Free Officers movements in the form of twin Baathist takeovers in Baghdad and Damascus, Qaddafi in Libya and finally an Egyptian Nasserist backed insurgency in Yemen, overthrew the conservative Zaidi Monarchy. It is worthy to note what while the left leaning Egypt drained its resources in the Yemen war, the apparently puritan Wahabi Saudi State stood in support of the Zaidi monarchy in Sanaa, who happened to be a Shia cluster group. It is a fact recorded in the history that the Saudi Air Force British made Lightening Aircrafts were deployed along the Yemeni air space to discourage Egyptian intrusions.

Back to 2015, the overthrow of the Ali Mohammad Saleh political dispensation created a vacuum which could have been bridged but was overtaken by the narrow geo strategic considerations by Riyadh and Tehran. Riyadh instead of reaching out to the descendants of the Zaidi monarchy, the Shia faith professing Houthis preferred to have their favorites as the shadow or a government in exile. The Houthis, left out in the spoils of the new setup in offing were naturally agitated and found a receptive pair of ears in the form of the Quds force; a formal title for the IRGC external and overseas operations. That reaching out obviously alarmed the Saudis who felt that the IRGC was just a stone throw away from their territory for practical purposes.

At that point of time, the Pakistanis woke up in mid-March 2015 to the statement by the Saudi crown prince MBS that the Pakistani Air force was already assigned the intended strike packages for a quick onslaught on Shia controlled chunk of Yemen. Sense prevailed and the political dispensation in complete coordination with the military establishment precipitated a decent refusal to the Saudis through a meticulously drafted Pakistani national assembly resolution.

Fast forward to the times of Gaza conflict and the attrition between CENTCOM, and IDF on one side and the IRGC and the ARTESH and regional allies on the other side. The Houthi strikes on IDF targets and occasional strikes on Saudi targets practically rebranded the Houthi as the most effective part of the Iranian led resistance. The Houthi strikes of IDF were responded from time to time by the USAF and IDF air strikes, but post strikes ground assessment proved they were ineffective in inflicting any lasting damage.

It was a foregone conclusion that the CENTCOM game plan would include neutralization of the Iranian allies one by one. In Iraq, the political road map was followed. In Lebanon it was a mix of political and military roadmap. In the case of Yemen, it was felt that a ground offensive was the only solution to that.

Here it is important to recognize the fact that Pakistan has been so far successful in treading a delicate path while being part of a Saudi led military CENTO like arrangement, but keeping its diplomatic options open. In not to so distant past, Pakistani ships in Bab Mandab Area near the Red Sea were allowed passage by the Houthis despite a declared blockade; precisely due to the better diplomatic options exercised by the Pakistani nation state.

However, as the scenario is developing, with unconfirmed reports of the failed Saudi ground offensive, followed by relentless missile barrages by the Houthis on select air bases in Saudi Arabia including the Taif AFB, pressure is mounting of the Saudis themselves, the Islamic CENTO and finally on Pakistan to do something.

The Twitter or X handles backed by the Pakistani military establishment, if they are gauge of the things to come, are indicating that Pakistan had to ‘carefully’ contemplate getting into the conflict, even if they are token air strikes. These handles are already taking terms of deploying Pakistani built “Thunders” for strikes inside the Houthi held territories.

Fo Pakistan it is a catch 22 situation, which has been partially influenced by the economic dire straits. It is a hard fact that economically ill managed nation states like Pakistan and Egypt; being superior in military expertise are expected to do the ‘dirty job’, which is a momentary utility intervention; which is to be followed by diplomatic negotiations in western capitals. What is more important for the war machines willing to do that job under ‘duress’ is that the damage continues as baggage for a long time to come.

It is imperative for effective voices in the corridors of power to avoid being embroiled in the conflict in the first place. For good or for bad, Pakistan remains a rare and unique nation state amongst the comity of Muslim nations which commands respect across; such an honor may not be squandered over faulty geo political assumptions.