What Comes After Islamabad?

Islamabad is not a province, yet it may soon have an assembly, a chief executive and 27 administrative departments. If this experiment succeeds, can the federal government realistically expect its political consequences to stop at the boundaries of the capital?

This is the central question emerging from a proposed new administrative structure for Islamabad, which has brought a potentially significant issue to the centre of Pakistan’s federal politics. The proposal envisages an elected assembly for the federal capital, a chief executive and 27 administrative departments. It reportedly includes 21 directly elected seats, along with reserved representation for women and minorities.

If implemented through the proper legal and constitutional process, the proposal would introduce a new experiment in the governance of Islamabad. But it may be too simplistic to view it merely as an administrative change confined to the capital. Its wider political implications will depend on the powers granted to the proposed government, its relationship with federal institutions and, above all, whether it improves governance and public services.

If a model based on elected representation and greater administrative authority succeeds in the federal capital, similar demands for greater autonomy could gain political momentum elsewhere. That possibility exists, although it should not be treated as a predetermined outcome.

Islamabad is different from a province

The constitutional distinction is fundamental to this debate. Islamabad is a federal territory, whereas Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan are constitutional provinces. Therefore, establishing a new administrative government in Islamabad cannot simply be equated with dividing an existing province.

An administrative unit, district, division, metropolitan government and province are not interchangeable concepts. Each can have a different legal status and may require a different constitutional or legislative process.

Islamabad’s model could therefore become an example for other regions without necessarily leading to the creation of new provinces.

The real test is performance

Creating an assembly, by itself, is no guarantee of better governance.

The real questions are: What powers will the proposed government have? How will the 27 departments be transferred to its control? Where will its financial resources come from? How will responsibilities be divided between the federal government and the new administration? And, most importantly, to whom will the chief executive ultimately be accountable?

If the new system improves health, education, environmental management, municipal services and other areas of public administration, it could become a meaningful experiment in decentralised governance.

But if it merely creates additional institutions, higher administrative costs and new disputes over authority, the fundamental question will remain: was the structural change actually necessary?

The sensitive question of Sindh

The debate over administrative and political reorganisation in Sindh is not new. The Sindh Assembly’s opposition to the division of the province and the creation of new administrative units reflects the sensitivity surrounding the issue.

The Sindh government’s position is fundamentally linked to the protection of the province’s geographical unity and constitutional status. This position should not be viewed merely as political resistance; it must also be understood in the context of Sindh’s political history and the sensitivity surrounding its territorial identity.

The Sindh United Party, Qaumi Awami Tehreek, Awami Tehreek, Sindh Pasand Party and other nationalist and semi-nationalist groups have, at different times, expressed concerns regarding the unity of Sindh. Various religious political groups, journalists’ organisations, lawyers and voices associated with the Sindh Bar Council have also taken positions on aspects of the debate.

These organisations do not necessarily share identical political ideologies or strategies. It would therefore be inaccurate to portray them as a single political bloc. Yet the protection of Sindh’s geographical unity is clearly an important issue for many of these groups.

Supporting Sindh’s position does not mean ending the debate

Understanding the Sindh government’s position does not mean that questions about governance in the province should be ignored.

Sindh’s major cities continue to face serious administrative challenges, including weak local institutions, questions surrounding the distribution of resources, inadequate municipal services, transport difficulties, water shortages, sanitation problems, and shortcomings in health and education.

But the existence of these problems does not automatically make the division of Sindh the only possible solution.

A more effective response for the Sindh government could be to maintain the province’s territorial unity while presenting a clear policy for transferring meaningful administrative and financial powers to lower levels of government.

In other words, the debate should not remain confined to the question of whether Sindh should be divided. It should also ask: how can power be brought closer to the people within a united Sindh?

That approach could allow the defence of Sindh’s geographical unity and the demand for better governance to coexist rather than compete with each other.

The Karachi question

Karachi remains the most complex example in this debate. Its enormous population, economic importance and administrative scale have produced competing political visions for its governance.

Some political forces advocate greater municipal and metropolitan autonomy, while others place greater emphasis on maintaining provincial unity and authority.

A practical middle ground may lie in strengthening metropolitan and local governments.

If a city has sufficient powers and financial resources to address its basic civic problems, not every administrative failure necessarily has to be resolved by drawing a new provincial boundary.

The interpretation of Mohsin Naqvi’s statements

Statements by Federal Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi regarding new administrative units have also become part of the debate. But they should be interpreted carefully.

If “public consent” means that administrative reforms should reflect public opinion and proceed through political consultation and the constitutional process, that is consistent with a basic democratic principle.

However, if such statements are interpreted to mean that the constitutional role of a provincial assembly is irrelevant under all circumstances, they would raise a different constitutional question.

Political statements and constitutional authority are not the same thing. The legal status of any particular proposal will ultimately depend on the Constitution and the legislation applicable to it.

The issue, therefore, should be approached through constitutional procedure rather than political rhetoric.

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa dimension

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also adds another dimension to the discussion. Different political forces in the province have expressed varying views over administrative units and territorial reorganisation. Political positions associated with the PTI have also included concerns regarding such proposals.

This makes it important for the federal government to establish clear, consistent and non-discriminatory principles for any future administrative reform.

If different provinces have concerns about administrative or territorial changes for their own political, historical or constitutional reasons, those concerns should be addressed through consultation rather than through assumptions about political motives.

Otherwise, there is a risk that administrative reform could be perceived as being driven by political considerations rather than by consistent principles of governance.

What if Islamabad succeeds?

If the Islamabad model proves successful, demands for greater administrative autonomy could emerge in other major cities and regions.

But those demands would not necessarily take the form of demands for new provinces.

They could instead focus on stronger local governments, metropolitan institutions, fiscal decentralisation or greater regional administrative authority.

In that sense, Islamabad could become less a precedent for the division of provinces and more a catalyst for a wider debate about how Pakistan should be governed.

A test for nationalist forces as well

For Sindh’s nationalist and semi-nationalist groups, protecting the province’s territorial unity has long been an important political issue. But alongside that position, presenting practical alternatives on governance, resource distribution and administrative efficiency is equally important.

Opposing division alone does not provide a complete governance policy.

Likewise, pointing to administrative deprivation and presenting a new province as the only solution may not necessarily be sufficient.

The more useful question is: which system can give citizens meaningful political representation, better public services and accountable government?

The challenge for the federation and the provinces

If the Islamabad experiment moves forward, the federal government would do well to make its objectives, powers, financial structure and constitutional basis clear to the public.

For the Sindh government, the challenge is to combine its position on territorial unity with a credible model of strong local government and genuine administrative decentralisation.

For nationalist forces, the challenge is to defend Sindh’s unity while also offering practical solutions to administrative and economic grievances.

For journalists, lawyers and civil society, the responsibility is to move the debate beyond political slogans and examine its constitutional, financial and public-interest dimensions.

Conclusion

The proposed administrative structure for Islamabad should not yet be presented as proof of an imminent transformation of Pakistan’s federal system.

But neither should it be dismissed as an ordinary administrative adjustment.

If the model succeeds, demands for greater autonomy could increase elsewhere. If it fails, it may demonstrate that strengthening existing institutions is more important than creating new ones.

The concerns expressed by the Sindh government and various political and social groups regarding Sindh’s geographical unity have political and constitutional significance. At the same time, the province cannot ignore the need for better governance and meaningful decentralisation.

Perhaps the more balanced approach is to seriously examine the distribution of powers within existing provinces before turning every administrative grievance into a debate over new provinces.

For citizens, after all, what matters more than lines drawn on a map is whether government is accessible, accountable and effective.

Whether Islamabad’s experiment succeeds or fails, its most important lesson for Pakistan may be this:

The purpose of decentralisation should not be to redraw maps, but to improve the lives of the people.