Ankara’s Long Road from the NATO Flank to Makkah.

Nida Amir Afridi
By
Nida Amir Afridi
The writer is PhD scholar at University of the Punjab
7 Min Read

Summary

  • Accession talks with Brussels stalled amid European reluctance and Ankara’s own inward turn, and Turkey stopped defining itself by a door it could not enter.
  • Turkey says the three capitals will build political and military mechanisms to coordinate defence and security policy, and it has called the pact open to expansion, with Egypt a possible entrant.
  • Turkey did not abandon the West so much as stop waiting at its door.
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Sentry duty defined Turkey’s Cold War. From the alliance’s southeastern edge it watched the straits, housed American missiles and asked for little beyond a seat in a European club that never sent the invitation. Washington’s arms embargo after Cyprus in 1974 taught a bitter lesson about conditional loyalty, and Ankara absorbed it quietly. The Middle East stayed what Kemalist planners had always taken it for, a neighbourhood to be endured, best left alone.

Modesty ended with the Justice and Development Party in 2002. Ahmet DavutoÄŸlu’s doctrine of strategic depth recast a country with Ottoman memory and Turkey’s map as a centre rather than a flank, obliged by geography to act. Early evidence flattered the theory. Accession talks with Brussels stalled amid European reluctance and Ankara’s own inward turn, and Turkey stopped defining itself by a door it could not enter. Visas were waived, free-trade deals signed, contractors sent into Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf. TİKA’s aid, Turkish television serials and the novelty of a prosperous Muslim democracy bought ErdoÄŸan a following on the Arab street that no Western leader could touch. He brokered indirect talks between Israel and Syria and dealt with Hamas when others would not. “Zero problems with neighbours” made a fine slogan. Policy it was not.

The Arab uprisings of 2011 showed the gap. Convinced that history was moving its way, Ankara bet on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and on Islamist oppositions in Syria and Libya. History moved elsewhere. Morsi fell in 2013, Assad held on, and Turkey stood at odds with Damascus, Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi all at once, with Israel thrown in for good measure. Ruptures piled up fast. Zero problems had become a long list of them. ErdoÄŸan took up Gaza as his loudest cause and sharply downgraded once-close military and diplomatic ties with Israel, which won applause abroad and cost him friends nearer home.

Soldiers went where influence could not. After 2016, Turkish forces pushed into northern Syria and Iraq against the YPG and PKK, carving out buffer zones as they went. Bases rose in Qatar and Somalia. Drones and advisers tilted the Libyan war toward Tripoli and sharpened Azerbaijan’s hand in Karabakh. The Bayraktar became a calling card, reshaping battlefields and winning security partners from the Gulf to Africa. A country that sells armed drones on that scale stops asking permission.

Labels followed, most of them lazy. Chatham House, weighing Ankara’s flirtation with a Saudi-Pakistani arrangement last January, cut through one of them:

“The idea that this might be an ‘Islamic NATO’ is misleading.”
Chatham House expert comment, January 2026

Islamabad should take the rebuke to heart. Signed on 7 August, the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement lets the three states treat an attack on one as an attack on all. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan called the clause technically the same as NATO’s Article 5, while Ankara insists the pact contradicts no alliance commitment and does not target Iran. Call it insurance, not creed. Riyadh buys the guarantee of NATO’s second-largest army. Turkey buys a hedge against a Washington it no longer reads with confidence. Pakistan, party to its own mutual defence agreement with Saudi Arabia since last September, buys a wider circle and new defence-industrial partners.

Pragmatism explains the 2020s.

Battered by inflation and boxed in over the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey mended fences with the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and, for a time, Israel, until Gaza ended that thaw. Its leverage in Syria, Iraq and Libya stayed put, backed by an arms industry that supplied the bargaining weight diplomacy alone never could. The fine print tells the same story. Defence Minister YaÅŸar Güler has ruled out sending troops against the Houthis under the pact. Parliament ratified it by 279 votes to 119, hardly a national embrace. Qatar received a separate mutual defence agreement only days ago. Treaties are collected, obligations rationed.

More machinery is coming. Turkey says the three capitals will build political and military mechanisms to coordinate defence and security policy, and it has called the pact open to expansion, with Egypt a possible entrant. Cairo, whose rulers Ankara denounced after 2013, would make a curious fourth. That is how alliances grow in this region, by necessity first and reconciliation afterwards.

Pakistan’s position is less comfortable. A three-way guarantee looks sturdy while Iranian missiles and Houthi drones menace the Gulf, but a guarantee is only as good as the will of the guarantor, and Ankara’s habit of rationing is on public display. Turkish commentators such as Murat Yetkin have themselves questioned how automatically Turkey might be drawn into contingencies like a direct Iranian assault on Saudi territory. Islamabad shares a long border with Iran and has a hostile eastern frontier to manage. It should read the Makkah clause as a negotiating position, not a promise, and ask what its partners will actually do when the telegram arrives. Alliances are tested in the first crisis, not at the signing ceremony. Hope is not a strategy.

Turkey did not abandon the West so much as stop waiting at its door. It now collects doors. Pakistan would do well to count how many it can afford to stand in.

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The writer is PhD scholar at University of the Punjab
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