Federation or Fragmentation?

“Federalism is self-rule plus shared rule”—Daniel J. Elazar

The recurring demand for creating new provinces in Pakistan resurfaces with remarkable regularity. Whenever governance falters, regional disparities widen or perceptions of neglect become politically expedient, voices emerge advocating the redrawing of provincial boundaries. Southern Punjab, Hazara, Bahawalpur and other regions are periodically cited as compelling examples of territories whose aspirations can supposedly be fulfilled only through separate provincial status. 

The proposition appears deceptively simple: smaller provinces would bring government closer to the people and consequently ensure better governance. Yet constitutional questions are seldom answered by geographical arithmetic. Before redrawing Pakistan’s political map, we must first answer a more fundamental question: what is the constitutional purpose of a province within a federation?

The quote by Daniel J. Elazar, one of the foremost scholars of federalism is a simple expression that encapsulates the philosophy underlying every successful federation. A federation is neither a unitary state nor a loose confederation of independent entities. It is a constitutional partnership in which constituent units voluntarily participate in the exercise of shared sovereignty while retaining their distinct political identities. The essence of federalism, therefore, lies not in the number of constituent units but in the constitutional balance between unity and diversity.

Pakistan’s provinces were never intended to function merely as administrative divisions. Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan represent historical regions possessing distinct linguistic, cultural and political identities. Their constitutional status cannot be viewed solely through the lens of administrative convenience. They constitute a federal compact upon which Pakistan’s constitutional structure rests. Altering provincial boundaries is therefore not merely a question of improving governance; it involves reconsidering the architecture of the federation itself.

None of this implies that demands for new provinces are devoid of merit. Those advocating separate provincial status often point towards genuine grievances. Regions distant from provincial capitals frequently complain of inadequate public investment, poor infrastructure, unequal employment opportunities, weak political representation and an enduring sense of neglect. Such concerns deserve neither dismissal nor ridicule. Every federation must continuously reassess whether its institutions are responding equitably to the aspirations of all its citizens.

There are, undoubtedly, persuasive arguments in favour of creating additional provinces. Smaller administrative units may improve governmental accessibility, reduce bureaucratic distance, strengthen regional representation and permit more focused development planning. 

India’s creation of states such as Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and Telangana was largely justified on similar considerations. In certain instances, administrative decentralisation has indeed facilitated more responsive governance. It would therefore be intellectually dishonest to dismiss the proposal merely because it challenges existing boundaries.

Yet comparative constitutional experience also counsels caution. Nigeria expanded from three regions to thirty-six states without eliminating corruption, insecurity or administrative inefficiency. India itself continues to witness demands for further statehood despite repeated territorial reorganisation. The number of constituent units has never, by itself, guaranteed good governance. Effective administration ultimately depends upon the quality of institutions rather than the quantity of provinces.

This distinction is often overlooked in Pakistan’s public discourse. Governance failures are frequently attributed to geography when they are, in reality, institutional. Weak local governments, politicised bureaucracies, uneven fiscal distribution, inadequate accountability and inconsistent policy implementation cannot be remedied simply by drawing new boundaries upon a map. Multiplying provinces without simultaneously strengthening constitutional institutions merely reproduces existing weaknesses on a smaller scale.

Perhaps the most neglected dimension of this debate is local government. Modern constitutional democracies recognise that genuine democracy begins not in distant capitals but within local communities. The closer government remains to the citizen, the greater its responsiveness and accountability. 

Unfortunately, Pakistan has historically oscillated between centralisation and reluctant decentralisation, often treating elected local governments as temporary administrative experiments rather than permanent constitutional institutions. Before concluding that additional provinces constitute the solution, we ought first to ask whether meaningful local self-government has ever been sincerely allowed to flourish.

Equally important is the constitutional process itself. The creation of new provinces cannot become an instrument of transient political expediency or electoral bargaining. It must emerge from broad constitutional consensus, careful economic evaluation, administrative necessity and, above all, the informed consent of those directly affected. Constitutional engineering undertaken without social consensus has rarely strengthened federations; more often, it has deepened existing divisions.

The debate, therefore, should not be framed as one between those who favour additional provinces and those who oppose them. The real issue is whether territorial reorganisation genuinely addresses the underlying causes of poor governance or merely offers an attractive political slogan. A federation derives its strength not from the number of provinces appearing on its map but from the confidence its citizens repose in the fairness of its institutions. Where constitutional principles are respected, resources distributed equitably and local governments empowered, both large and small provinces can flourish. Where these foundations are absent, no amount of territorial rearrangement can compensate for institutional decay.

Pakistan’s future will ultimately be determined less by the cartography of its provinces than by the constitutional maturity of its federation. If new provinces emerge through genuine constitutional consensus and demonstrable administrative necessity, they may well strengthen the federal structure. If, however, they arise merely as instruments of political convenience or regional rivalry, they risk replacing the promise of federalism with the peril of fragmentation. 

The challenge before Pakistan, therefore, is not simply to decide how many provinces it should have. It is to determine whether the federation can faithfully uphold the constitutional promise of self-rule and shared rule upon which every enduring federal democracy ultimately depends.

_____________________________________________________________________________

The writer, lawyer and author, is former Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), a member Advisory Board and Senior Visiting Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE)