From US militarism to Chinese peace building: Opportunities for Saudi Arabia in Houthi challenge

Houthis of Yemen are now knocking at the door of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the conflict in the Gulf, which followed the US-Israeli attack on Iran in February this year, refuses to go away.
Every challenge is an opportunity and I think the current situation will unlock the potential of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to explore China’s credentials for peacebuilding after the US militarism has squarely failed to offer any solutions.
A new question that I have left at the end of this writeup is about exploring the roots of Houthi confrontation to the anti-corruption drive Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman launched after assuming the office of the defence minister in 2015, the year when Houthis started intensifying their hostilities against Saudi Arabia.
Houthi attacks have recently escalated from sporadic cross-border skirmishes into a sustained campaign targeting Saudi airports, oil infrastructure, and military installations.
King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has reportedly been targeted multiple times with ballistic missiles and drones. A major strike on October 10–11 killed at least 14 people and injured more than 300, severely disrupting airport operations.

Earlier strikes between October 5 and 7 killed a Sudanese resident and wounded several others. Abha International Airport, located near the Yemeni border, was hit in early October, killing one Moroccan and one Algerian national and wounding 28 others.
Houthi forces also claimed to have carried out a drone operation against King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, in the Eastern Province, on October 11. Saudi Arabia’s General Authority of Civil Aviation reportedly confirmed the claim. Unlike previous attacks, however, no fatalities were reported in this incident.
According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), at least 16 attacks targeting Saudi oil facilities and tankers were recorded between mid-July and mid-August 2026. September and October have since witnessed a sharp increase in the intensity and frequency of these attacks.
I reviewed the opinions published on the Houthi attacks in Asharq Al-Awsat and Arab News, two prominent Saudi newspapers that regularly publish contributions from the heads of Saudi research and diplomatic institutions. I focused on articles published between October 10 and 12.
A common theme across these commentaries was the appeal to the United States to fulfil its responsibility to counter the Houthi threat. In his Arab News column, “Riyadh Airport Attack Requires a Shared Security Response,” Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, founder and chairman of the Gulf Research Centre, argued that the Houthi problem is not merely an internal Yemeni matter. Its consequences, he warned, could extend far beyond the Middle East.
Sager also suggested that Iran could play a diplomatic role in preventing the support that enables attacks on neighbouring states and in addressing the humanitarian crisis that has developed in Yemen amid the conflict.
Since his column was published on October 11, Sager must have written it before that date, without knowing that Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, would soon call his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, to express “deep concern” over the escalating tensions.
Araghchi also stated that “there is no military solution” to the region’s crises and declared Iran’s readiness to provide “any kind of assistance” to facilitate dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Yemen and achieve a political settlement.
Saudi Arabia, however, knows that the conflict would not have reached its current intensity without Iranian support for the Houthis. Tehran’s offer to facilitate a settlement may therefore serve purposes beyond de-escalation.
By positioning itself as a potential mediator, Iran seeks to ease pressure on itself, reassert its regional influence, and gain diplomatic advantage.
Iran is too consequential a regional power for Saudi Arabia to ignore. Yet the Gulf’s diplomatic landscape is also shaped by smaller states like Qatar, which sometimes seek influence beyond what their size alone might suggest. Looking at the regional chessboard, we can see Qatar and Oman using their diplomatic influence to pursue peaceful solutions to Gulf tensions.
This does not necessarily mean that they support Iran’s call for the United States to leave the region. Neither Qatar nor Oman has, so far, talked about a post-US regional order.
This is where Saudi Arabia can turn the crisis to its advantage.
In his article, Sager noted that the United States had demonstrated its ability to counter the Houthis through military strikes but subsequently reached a truce with them in 2025. In his assessment, neither development adequately served Saudi interests.
I believe Washington should have included Saudi Arabia in its negotiations with the Houthis. Instead, the United States has demonstrated its inability to protect the interests of its allies, particularly in the Gulf. Iran has exploited this gap in American policy to strengthen its own position in the current conflict.
On May 6, 2025, President Donald Trump abruptly announced an immediate halt to US bombing of the Houthis, presenting the ceasefire arrangement mediated by Oman as a way out of the confrontation. On May 13, Trump arrived in Riyadh for the first major foreign trip of his second term, with investment agreements and regional security high on the agenda.
It gives a clear message that Trump was concerned not about Houthi attacks on Riyadh but rather he was concerned about Houthi attacks while he was staying in Riyadh. The situation explains itself, rendering the work of any opinion writer useless.
Sager has also emphasised the need for Washington to coordinate more effectively with Gulf states to minimise the adverse consequences of its military actions in the region.
His organisation, the Gulf Research Centre (GRC), is collaborating with the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) to hold a webinar on October 14 titled “Saudi-Chinese Relations in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape: Regional Developments and Evolving Security Frameworks.”
The discussion centres on a key question: How are Riyadh and Beijing adapting their partnership to a changing Middle East?
It will explore cooperation beyond energy and trade, Saudi and Chinese perspectives on regional developments, and China’s evolving role in Gulf security. According to the GRC announcement, the webinar will also examine opportunities for diplomatic coordination, conflict de-escalation, maritime stability, and energy security, alongside the prospects for more inclusive regional security frameworks.
This is a step in the right direction.
Saudi Arabia has already engaged China at multiple levels to press Iran to honour the Beijing Agreement, which provided a framework for restoring Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations and pursuing peaceful relations between the two countries. Araghchi’s recent offer to help facilitate a settlement involving Saudi Arabia and the Houthis may reflect Chinese efforts to encourage Iran to uphold the spirit of that agreement.
However, the Houthi problem has another dimension, one directly relevant to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS).
Houthi confrontation with Saudi Arabia intensified after MBS became defence minister in 2015. The relationship between this escalation and the crown prince’s rise to power deserves closer examination.
When MBS assumed the defence portfolio, Saudi Arabia also embarked on a major anti-corruption drive. Powerful individuals in Saudi Arabia and across the wider region, whose interests may have been threatened by these changes, could have developed grievances against him.
Whether, and to what extent, these political and economic tensions are connected to the escalation of Houthi hostilities remains an open question. The relationship deserves systematic investigation rather than assumption.
For Saudi Arabia, the immediate challenge is to protect its people and critical infrastructure. The longer-term challenge is to build a regional security framework that does not depend exclusively on American military power or leave the Kingdom vulnerable to the strategic calculations of other states.
The present crisis offers Riyadh an opportunity to strengthen its diplomacy with China, improve coordination with its Gulf partners, and pursue a more inclusive regional approach to security. The ultimate test will be whether these diplomatic efforts can translate into lasting peace and greater protection for the Kingdom.