Makkah Pact: Deterrence without entrapment

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye on August 7, 2026, has already been given an arresting label: a “Muslim NATO”. The description gained authority when Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said its collective-defence commitment was technically similar to NATO’s Article 5—an armed attack on one signatory would be treated as an attack on all. Headlines, however, are not institutions. A phrase borrowed from post-war Europe can conceal the interests and dangers shaping this alignment.

NATO emerged from a bipolar contest, had a clearly identified adversary and rested upon overwhelming American military power. The Makkah pact has arisen in a fragmented order marked by declining confidence in US guarantees, the Iran war, attacks on Gulf infrastructure and shipping, Israeli military ascendancy, Palestinian devastation, instability in Yemen, and disruption in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea. China is an indispensable economic partner of all three signatories, while each retains consequential ties with Washington. This is an attempt by middle powers to widen their choices.

Developments since the signing show that the agreement is more than ceremonial, although its operational obligations remain unpublished. On August 13, 2026, Türkiye outlined political and military mechanisms bringing together foreign and defence officials and armed-forces commanders. The agenda includes exercises on land, at sea, in the air and in cyberspace; strategic coordination; and cooperation in unmanned systems, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, joint production and technology transfer. A ministerial committee and permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia are envisaged. This is an institution under construction.

Collective-defence language can deter only when adversaries understand what triggers a response, who decides, and what each member must do. The public statement does not answer these questions. Does “aggression” include a missile fired by a state-aligned actor?

Would an attack on Saudi shipping compel Pakistani military action? Could Türkiye invoke the pact after an incident arising from its operations elsewhere? Is every response automatic, or subject to constitutional processes? Some ambiguity provides flexibility; too much weakens deterrence and invites miscalculation.

The agreement combines substantial but different assets. Saudi Arabia contributes financial strength and energy leverage. Türkiye brings NATO’s second-largest military and an expanding defence industry. Pakistan contributes a professional military, strategic geography and the Muslim world’s only nuclear arsenal. Their interests overlap but are not identical.

Riyadh wants protection for its territory and energy system. Ankara seeks influence without abandoning NATO. Islamabad wants economic support and diplomatic space while preserving ties with China, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Iran.

This behaviour is better understood as strategic autonomy or hedging than as an Islamic military bloc. States facing renewed great-power competition seek overlapping relationships rather than permanent submission to one patron. Saudi Arabia is diversifying after decades of reliance upon Washington.

Türkiye has long pursued an increasingly independent foreign and defence policy from within NATO. Pakistan cannot afford exclusive alignment at all: its security, trade, energy and external financing depend upon relationships that cut across rival camps.

The pact can enlarge that space only if it remains defensive, non-exclusive and resistant to pressure to identify permanent enemies.

Iran is the immediate test. Iranian officials initially played down the pact and said they had no reason to regard it as directed against Tehran. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called for regional self-reliance and “true brotherhood”, while Iranian critics later dismissed the agreement as inadequate for Saudi security. The opening for reassurance should not be squandered.

On August 17, 2026, Tehran warned of renewed escalation if its interim arrangements with Washington were not honoured and again raised the possibility of action in the Strait of Hormuz. On the same day, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan urged President Donald Trump to resume talks with Iran and offered Turkish support alongside Pakistan and Qatar. This diplomatic role is exactly what the pact should preserve.

An anti-Iran alliance would turn strategic autonomy into strategic entrapment. Iran cannot be excluded from the security of the Gulf: geography, demography, energy resources and military capacity make it a permanent regional power.

Pakistan has additional reasons for caution. It shares a long border with Iran; Balochistan, sectarian stability, Afghanistan, counterterrorism and future connectivity require sustained engagement. Islamabad must not acquire an obligation that allows decisions taken in another capital, or an uncontrolled regional escalation, to determine when Pakistan enters a war.

The same principle applies to Palestine and Israel. No credible security architecture for Muslim states can remain indifferent to Palestinian dispossession, Gaza’s destruction and West Bank violence. The Abraham Accords tried to reorganise the region while postponing Palestinian statehood; Palestine cannot be detached from regional peace.

Collective strength should support a lawful, viable settlement and restrain aggression. It should not create permanently hostile camps in which deterrence replaces diplomacy and Palestinians again become instruments of wider competition.

Nuclear ambiguity is even more dangerous. Pakistan’s membership immediately produced speculation that Saudi Arabia had acquired an implicit nuclear umbrella. No publicly established evidence supports nuclear sharing or an extension of Pakistan’s deterrent to the Gulf.

Islamabad should say so clearly. Pakistan’s nuclear capability arose from the particular strategic balance in South Asia. Extending it to undefined contingencies in West Asia would create grave problems of command, credibility, proliferation and escalation, while unsettling India and inviting pressure from major powers. Strategic autonomy must not become strategic overstretch.

Expansion presents another dilemma. Erdoğan and Fidan have encouraged other states to join and repeatedly mentioned Egypt. Cairo would add the Suez Canal, the Arab world’s largest population and a major military. It has not joined; its decision will reveal whether the pact can accommodate different threat perceptions and constitutional constraints.

A wider arrangement could acquire economic and diplomatic weight. Hurried enlargement without agreed rules would multiply vetoes, contradictions and entanglements. Membership should follow institutional clarity.

The most promising path lies beyond military commitments. Saudi capital and energy, Turkish manufacturing and defence technology, Pakistani geography and human capability, and potentially Egypt’s control of the Suez route could support trade corridors, food and energy security, maritime protection, infrastructure, research and joint industrial production.

Cooperation in drones or air defence may reduce external dependence, but genuine autonomy also requires payment systems, transport links, technology ecosystems and production networks. A security organisation that imports most of its critical systems and relies upon external finance will remain strategically dependent, however impressive its declarations.

China will watch closely, as will the United States. Beijing depends upon Middle Eastern energy, has deep interests in Pakistan and substantial relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Washington retains bases, arms relationships and regional influence.

The signatories need not convert self-reliance into hostility towards either power. A local arrangement that lowers war risks, protects sea lanes and supports negotiation could coexist with competing great powers. One directed permanently against Iran, China, Israel or the West would reproduce destructive bloc politics.

For Pakistan, the correct contribution is diplomatic and institutional, not primarily nuclear. Islamabad should press for publication of the pact’s governing principles; a precise definition of aggression; collective but non-automatic decision-making; protection against participation in wars initiated by a member; parliamentary and constitutional scrutiny; mechanisms for mediation; and an explicit commitment to the UN Charter.

Pakistan should also seek regular dialogue with Iran and ensure that defence cooperation is matched by a geoeconomic programme. These safeguards would not weaken the pact. They would give its promise of collective security credibility and democratic legitimacy.

The Makkah agreement reflects a real transformation: regional states no longer wish to depend entirely upon outside patrons for their survival. Its value will not be measured by ceremonies, military spectacle or resemblance to NATO.

The pact will be measured by whether it prevents war, preserves sovereign choice, strengthens lawful collective defence and builds material cooperation without deepening sectarian and geopolitical divisions. A “Muslim NATO” is an attractive slogan. A non-sectarian security and economic architecture, capable of collective strength without permanent enemies, would be a far more consequential achievement.

Selected sources

• Reuters, August 7, 2026: signing and public terms
• Reuters, August 13, 2026: proposed political-military mechanisms
• Reuters, August 17, 2026: Türkiye urges diplomacy with Iran
• Saudi Press Agency: official joint statement

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Dr. Ikramul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court, writer, literary critic, Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), holds an LLD in tax laws. He was full-time journalist from 1979 to 1984 with Viewpoint and Dawn. He also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 1996.