Redrawing Pakistan?—II Political census before constitutional cartography

Part I exposed the false choice between new provinces and empowered districts. The next task is to replace territorial guesswork with a political census. This is not another headcount or a plebiscite improvised around a government map. It is a public, independently verified account of the demand, affected territory, functions, resources and constitutional consequences. Cartography should record a political settlement; it cannot manufacture one.

Ahsan Iqbal’s case begins with real failures: government is distant, service delivery is unequal and devolution has stalled in provincial capitals. His comparative arithmetic is less persuasive. The number of units in India, Afghanistan or China cannot establish an optimal number for Pakistan. These countries differ in constitutional status, population, fiscal powers, party systems and local-government design. A count of administrative units is not an outcome variable. It proves neither that fragmentation causes development nor that a larger province causes deprivation.

Comparative research supports caution rather than paralysis. The OECD’s extensive work on decentralisation finds that results depend on clear responsibilities, adequate finance, local revenue authority, administrative capacity, coordination, equalisation and public accountability. Partial decentralisation can produce unintended effects. The serious inquiry is not, ‘How many provinces do successful countries have?’ It is, ‘Which institution should perform each function, with what money, personnel and answerability?’

The first part of a political census must measure democratic demand. A commission should record resolutions of elected bodies, party commitments, civil-society evidence and properly designed surveys at district and sub-district levels. Hearings must include women, religious and linguistic minorities, labour, business, farmers and communities near proposed boundaries. A bare yes-or-no question is inadequate. People must distinguish demands for identity and representation from grievances about jobs, policing, municipal services or access to a provincial capital.

Consent must also be located constitutionally. Article 239(4) of the Constitution requires an amendment altering a province’s limits to secure two-thirds of the affected provincial assembly’s total membership, in addition to two-thirds in each House of Parliament. Consultation can inform that decision; a conference, survey or nationwide referendum cannot replace it. The United States and Australia also make affected units’ consent central to internal territorial change. Federalism rests on shared rule and security against unilateral dismemberment.

The second count is demographic and functional. The 2023 digital census supplies district-level population data, but a viable map needs more: settlement patterns, migration, commuting zones, language, access to services, poverty, education, health, water stress, transport and climate exposure. Boundaries should reflect how people live and economies operate. A line dividing a metropolitan labour market, irrigation system or ecological region may create more coordination failures than it cures.

Every proposal should carry a constitutional impact statement. A new province changes representation in the national and provincial assemblies and, more profoundly, equal provincial representation in the Senate. It changes the membership and bargaining structure of the Council of Common Interests (CCI) and National Economic Council (NEC). It affects the National Finance Commission (NFC), superior courts, electoral administration, public services and regulators. A map without draft amendments to these provisions conceals the most consequential choices.

The fiscal census is equally exacting. For each proposed unit, the public should see five-year estimates of its tax bases, own-source revenue, share of federal transfers and expenditure responsibilities. Separate figures are needed for salaries, pensions, debt-related obligations, operations and maintenance, development spending and equalisation needs. Capital expenditure on an assembly, secretariat, courts, police command and other institutions must be distinguished from their permanent recurrent cost. A province created without credible revenue assignments can become a transfer-dependent administration rather than an instrument of responsive government.

Fiscal viability, however, must not become a veto exercised by richer regions. Federations use equalisation precisely because citizens should receive reasonably comparable public services despite unequal tax capacity and service costs. The proper test is transparent sustainability within a redesigned transfer system, not financial self-sufficiency. Pakistan must decide how a revised NFC would treat population, poverty, revenue effort, inverse density and other needs before—not after—new claimants acquire constitutional shares. The existing NFC process itself remains a forum where consensus among governments is indispensable.

Assets and liabilities require their own ledger. Provincial land and buildings, public corporations, universities, hospitals, irrigation works, archives, vehicles and information systems cannot be divided by drawing a line. Nor can employees, pension obligations, guarantees, litigation, unfinished development schemes and public debt. Each proposal needs a transition law stating valuation principles, allocation rules, staff options, dispute resolution, service continuity and a funded timetable. Otherwise, the constitutional celebration will be followed by years of administrative litigation and interrupted services.

Water and natural resources expose the danger of treating territory as geometry. Provincial rights and duties arise under Articles 155, 158, 161 and 172(3), while water distribution operates through an interprovincial accord. A new province would raise questions about representation, entitlements, royalties, ownership, regulation and environmental burdens. These cannot be deferred to goodwill. Hydrological evidence, resource maps and climate risk assessments should accompany each boundary proposal, with agreed mechanisms for shared rivers, canals, aquifers and energy infrastructure.

The same examination must compare provincehood with less disruptive alternatives. If the dominant grievance is a distant service, the baseline options should include genuine implementation of Article 140A, predictable provincial finance commission awards, elected metropolitan governments, stronger district administrations, regional benches, delegated provincial departments and asymmetric arrangements for exceptional areas. The Supreme Court has already treated political, administrative and financial devolution to elected local governments as a constitutional obligation. Enforcing it is not a consolation prize for regions denied provincehood.

Alternatives analysis also protects genuine provincehood claims. South Punjab, Hazara and any other region should not be reduced to entries in a centrally chosen quota of provinces. Each possesses a distinct history, political constituency and set of territorial questions. A claim grounded in durable identity, representation and consent may survive even where administrative decentralisation improves services. Conversely, a demand generated mainly by patronage or the location of a new capital should not prevail merely because a national target remains unfilled.

Pakistan needs an independent Federal Reorganisation Commission established by law, not an executive committee confirming an announced number. It should have multiparty parliamentary and equal provincial representation, supported by constitutional lawyers, public-finance specialists, demographers, geographers, water experts and local-government practitioners. Members should disclose interests; data, submissions and hearings should be public; and minority reports should accompany recommendations.

The commission’s terms should require a separate dossier for every proposed unit and a common evaluation matrix. Each dossier would identify the grievance, affected territory, evidence of consent, minority protections, administrative capacity, fiscal model, impact on federal institutions, division of assets and liabilities, resource arrangements and transition risks. It would compare at least three scenarios: the proposed province, empowered local and regional government within existing boundaries, and no structural change. Draft boundaries, legislation, constitutional text and ten-year fiscal projections should be published together in a white paper.

Sequencing matters. Public evidence must precede boundary recommendations; boundary recommendations must precede final fiscal and transition bargains; and those bargains must be visible before legislatures vote. Parliament may ultimately conclude that one claim is ready, another requires local-government reform first and a third lacks consent. That is not inconsistency. It is federal judgment applied to different facts. No scientifically defensible method is likely to produce a round national number fixed in advance.

A political census is sometimes portrayed as a device for delay. Properly designed, it is the shortest route away from slogans and irreversible error. It allows Pakistan to change where change is justified, while enforcing local self-government everywhere now.

The choice is neither frozen provincial boundaries nor immediate constitutional refounding. It is evidence-based reform through consent, functional assignment, fiscal candour and enforceable transition. The concluding Part III will set out the institutional package through which empowered local governments and legitimate provincehood claims can be reconciled within the 1973 Constitution.

[To be continued]

Huzaima Bukhari, lawyer and author, has been Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Senior Visiting Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE). She also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 2003.

Dr. Ikramul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court, Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), holds an LLD in tax laws. He was full-time journalist from 1979 to 1984 with Viewpoint and Dawn. He also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 1996.