We, the people of the United States of America

The Constitution of the United States of America begins with three deceptively simple yet profoundly consequential words: “We the People.

We, the people of the United States of America

Muhammad Imran, Staff Member, SAHSOL-LUMS

Asma Rahmat, Final Year Law Student, SLC

Muhammad Ameer Hamza, Final Year Law Student, SLC

Popular Sovereignty, Electoral Accountability and Lessons for Pakistan

The Constitution of the United States of America begins with three deceptively simple yet profoundly consequential words: “We the People.” Few constitutional expressions articulate the principles of popular sovereignty, democratic legitimacy and representative government with comparable brevity and authority. These words embody the fundamental proposition that sovereignty resides in the people, whose collective will, expressed through the ballot, determines who exercises political authority and in whose interests the state is governed. Notwithstanding its historical contradictions and institutional shortcomings, the American constitutional experiment rests upon the principle that governmental authority derives from the consent of the governed.

Nearly six decades ago, African Americans continued to endure institutionalised racial segregation and systemic discrimination. They were denied equal access to public transport, educational institutions and other public facilities. Yet, through sustained civil rights movements, political mobilisation and constitutional reforms, the United States gradually dismantled much of its legally sanctioned racial segregation. It evolved into a society offering considerably greater opportunities irrespective of race, colour or religious affiliation. This transformation, although incomplete, demonstrates the capacity of democratic institutions to confront historical injustices and expand the boundaries of equal citizenship.

The American midterm elections of 2026 have delivered another consequential political message. The Democratic Party’s sweeping victories in both chambers of Congress, securing a reported 54 seats in the Senate and 232 in the House of Representatives, have fundamentally altered the political landscape. The results represent a significant repudiation of President Donald Trump’s political approach, particularly its reliance on polarisation, confrontation and divisive rhetoric. Democratic victories in traditionally Republican strongholds further demonstrate the extent of public dissatisfaction with the administration’s domestic and foreign policies.

Among the most remarkable developments was the election of Abdul El-Sayed, a Muslim, to the United States Senate from Michigan, making him the first Muslim elected to that chamber. His victory represents considerably more than an individual political achievement; it is a milestone for religious minorities and a powerful illustration of political pluralism. His campaign was subjected to attacks that extended beyond conventional political disagreement. His religious identity, name and political convictions became targets of ridicule, and he was portrayed as sympathetic to Islamic extremism and hostile to Jewish and Christian communities. Nevertheless, the electorate of Michigan demonstrated that religious prejudice and political intimidation cannot necessarily prevail over democratic choice. Support from diverse religious and social communities further challenged the assumption that religious identity must determine political allegiance.

The electoral setback has also raised fundamental questions about the Trump administration’s foreign policy, particularly its unconditional strategic alignment with Israel and its military confrontation with Iran. The humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, military escalation against Iran, rising energy prices and inflationary pressures appear to have contributed significantly to Republican electoral difficulties. President Trump acknowledged that the Iran conflict was among the factors behind the defeat, while Vice President JD Vance also indicated that the war had contributed to the electoral setback. The results reinforce an essential principle of democratic governance: foreign policy, no less than domestic policy, remains subject to electoral accountability.

Successive American administrations have maintained an exceptionally close strategic relationship with Israel. However, previous presidents generally avoided direct military confrontation with Iran on the scale witnessed under the Trump administration. They understood Iran’s geographical significance, military capabilities, regional influence and complex political structure, together with the potentially devastating consequences of a prolonged conflict. The decision to pursue military escalation therefore raises serious questions about strategic judgement and the extent to which American foreign policy has become responsive to Israeli priorities.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reported assurances regarding the ease and speed of achieving military objectives in Iran appear to have underestimated the country’s resilience and capacity for retaliation. The conflict has exposed the limitations of conventional assumptions about the invulnerability of Israel’s Iron Dome and the ability of American military superiority to guarantee strategic success. Iran’s response has demonstrated that military superiority does not automatically translate into political submission or victory.

The humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza has further intensified international criticism of American policy. Washington’s continued military and diplomatic support for Israel, despite immense civilian suffering, has raised serious questions about the consistency of American commitments to international law and human rights. These concerns are no longer confined to Muslim-majority countries; they have become increasingly visible within American political and civil society. Nevertheless, it would be premature to interpret the Democratic victory as an automatic transformation of American foreign policy. Democratic administrations, too, have participated in military interventions and maintained strong strategic relationships with Israel. Greater congressional oversight may constrain the administration, but the President retains substantial constitutional powers, including the power to veto legislation.

The consequences of the Iran conflict extend beyond the immediate battlefield. Arab states, particularly those hosting American military installations, have been compelled to reconsider the reliability of existing security arrangements. The inability of an established American security architecture to prevent regional escalation has generated serious apprehensions among Gulf states. These developments may accelerate the search for a more autonomous regional security framework involving Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Iran and other influential regional actors, including Pakistan.

For Pakistan, the American electoral outcome carries another important lesson concerning the risks of excessive dependence upon individual political leaders and transient international alliances. Historically, Pakistan’s close association with Washington during the 1960s, 1980s and 2000s generated substantial economic and strategic benefits. However, these relationships were largely determined by changing American geopolitical priorities. Each time Washington’s strategic interests shifted, Pakistan was left confronting the consequences of an external relationship that had assumed disproportionate importance in its domestic and foreign-policy calculations.

The recent rapprochement between Pakistan’s political and military leadership and President Trump generated considerable diplomatic visibility, including opportunities for high-level engagement, trade-related concessions and a prominent diplomatic role in efforts to de-escalate the Iran conflict. These achievements should not be dismissed. However, the tendency to personalise foreign relations through extravagant public praise and conspicuous political endorsement carries inherent risks. Pakistan’s conspicuous nomination of President Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize and repeated public attribution of extraordinary diplomatic achievements to him may have generated short-term goodwill. Yet, diplomatic calculations must also consider how such gestures might be perceived by a future American administration or Congress. International relationships must be founded upon enduring institutional interests rather than the political fortunes of individual leaders.

The possibility of congressional scrutiny of commercial arrangements involving businesses associated with the Trump family further underscores the importance of institutional transparency. Pakistan’s engagement with foreign commercial entities, particularly those linked to politically influential individuals, must be governed by clear legal safeguards, transparent procedures and demonstrable national benefit. No allegation of wrongdoing should be presumed without evidence; equally, diplomatic convenience must never substitute for accountability.

Pakistan’s regional engagement, including its defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye and its diplomatic interaction with Iran and other neighbouring states, should continue according to a coherent national strategy. The changing political balance in Washington must not dictate the direction of Pakistan’s regional diplomacy. Indeed, a more inward-looking United States may create opportunities for regional powers to assume greater responsibility for their own security and diplomatic arrangements.

The American electoral experience must also be examined through the lens of political pluralism and equal citizenship. The election of Abdul El-Sayed, alongside the growing representation of Muslim candidates, illustrates how democratic institutions can accommodate religious diversity. The strength of a constitutional democracy is not measured merely by the frequency of elections, but by whether every citizen, irrespective of religious identity, ethnicity or social background, enjoys a genuine opportunity to participate in governance and attain positions of public authority.

This development should prompt serious constitutional reflection in Pakistan. Can we genuinely envisage a citizen belonging to a religious minority rising through the electoral process to occupy the highest constitutional offices of the state? More fundamentally, when will we give substantive meaning to the words “We the People of Pakistan”?

Our Constitution already recognises the principles of equality, political participation and minority protection. Articles 17 and 25 guarantee freedom of association and equality before the law, while Article 36 requires the state to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities. The challenge, therefore, is not merely the absence of constitutional guarantees but the persistent failure to translate them into institutional practice and lived realities.

Ultimately, the true measure of constitutional democracy lies neither in the identity of those who govern nor in the numerical strength of the majority, but in the legitimacy of the process through which political authority is acquired and exercised. Democracy cannot flourish where electoral mandates are manipulated, constitutional institutions are weakened, and discrimination becomes an instrument of political mobilisation. Pakistan must move beyond the formal celebration of democracy and embrace its substantive constitutional foundations.

“We the People” must mean precisely what the words proclaim: the people are the ultimate source of political authority; the Constitution is supreme; the ballot is inviolable; public institutions are accountable; and no citizen, irrespective of religion, ethnicity, political affiliation or social standing, is inferior to another before the law.