Pakistan shapes the emerging order

Pakistan laid the foundation for a NATO-style alliance among Muslim nations as Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on August 7, 2026. The agreement represents a powerful recognition of Pakistan’s growing strategic importance.

The other two signatories included Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Salman, and Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who, along with Sharif, gathered at Al-Safa Palace in Mecca. In a joint statement, these countries announced that the agreement is “guided by the longstanding historical ties among the three states, based on the enduring bonds of brotherhood and Islamic solidarity that unite them, and building upon their shared strategic interests and longstanding defence cooperation.” The agreement asserts a commitment to treat an armed attack against any one of the three countries as an attack against all three.

The historic trilateral defence agreement was held at the Mecca Al-Mukarramah Summit for Joint Defence. It was also attended by Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) and Chief of the Army Staff Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, and Deputy PM and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. The foreign and defence ministers of Turkiye and Saudi Arabia were also in attendance.

While the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan described the agreement’s terms as technically comparable to NATO’s Article 5, it is pertinent to note that the pact is not equivalent to NATO. Its precise operational mechanisms and institutional framework are yet to be developed. Both Pakistan and Turkish officials have, however, reinforced that the agreement is not directed against any particular country. It is also not designed to replace any existing alliance or strategic relationship, and this particularly holds for Türkiye, which is already a member of NATO.

That said, the Mecca agreement is merely a defensive arrangement. It is crucial to make this distinction because these countries are not preparing for war. Instead, they are attempting to make collective security more credible. Simply put, the goal is to protect each other from outside threats. This is where Pakistan serves as the main pillar of the arrangement.

Pakistan has earned its seat at the table owing to the evolving strategic position under Sharif and Munir. Throughout his tenure, Sharif has strengthened Pakistan’s diplomatic relationships not only with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, but also with other regional powers. Munir, at the same time, oversaw Pakistan’s most significant military conflict in recent years, prompting the country’s expanding role in regional security diplomacy. Together, they bring credible diplomacy and military strength.

Pakistan did not emerge as a catalyst for the agreement overnight. The foundations of the Mecca agreement were laid by Sharif and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in Riyadh roughly a year earlier. On September 17, 2025, they signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The agreement declared that aggression against either country would be considered aggression against both. Building upon a nearly eight-decade-long relationship, the two countries committed to strengthening the defence alliance and mutual deterrence.

That pact was a crucial achievement for Sharif’s government. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have often described their relationship as strategic and deeply rooted in shared interests. Although Pakistan’s military personnel have trained and worked alongside their Saudi counterparts for decades, Sharif’s diplomacy has transformed the relationship into a more structured partnership covering defence, investment, politics, and regional diplomacy. The September agreement essentially laid the foundation for the trilateral defence framework, now strengthening Pakistan-Saudi longstanding ties by bringing Türkiye into the alliance.

Sharif does not treat Pakistan’s relationships as isolated bilateral partnerships. He refuses to choose a single ally and maintains strong ties with multiple powers. Be it Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, China, Iran, or the US, each serves different strategic interests for Pakistan. This gives Islamabad greater flexibility and independence in its foreign policy, without becoming overly dependent on any single country.

The flexibility paid off in 2026 when the Iran crisis forced Pakistan into one of the most challenging diplomatic balancing acts. Pakistan is Iran’s neighbour, but it also has ties with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Iran shares a long border with Pakistan and longstanding economic, political, and cultural ties. A regional war involving Iran thus constituted a direct threat to Pakistan. Islamabad could have chosen to shelter behind its borders and wait for the crisis to pass; however, it chose to influence its trajectory. Sharif spoke directly with regional leaders, whereas Munir directed the security framework of the mediation initiative.

On April 9, the Prime Minister’s Office stated Sharif and Munir reviewed Pakistan’s peace efforts and expressed satisfaction with the positive de-escalation achieved at that stage. The two also reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to support the parties in securing a negotiated settlement.

On April 25, Sharif discussed the regional crisis and Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Prime Minister’s Office later reported that Pezeshkian extended his gratitude to Sharif, Munir, and Deputy Minister Ishaq Dar for their pivotal roles in fostering peace. A month later, the Iranian President once more reiterated his appreciation for Sharif and Munir for their efforts to bring peace to the region.

This was a turning point for Sharif. He shifted Pakistan’s foreign policy from simply reacting to regional crises to actively steering their outcomes.

As Sharif drew the diplomatic map, Munir gave it a military backbone. The evolution became especially evident in May 2025.

The clashes between Pakistan and India transpired as the most serious direct military crisis between the two nations in decades. Following the April 22 Pahalgam attack that left 26 dead, India launched airstrikes across Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Pakistan retaliated with Operation Bynyan-ul-Marsoos, which led to both sides agreeing to a ceasefire on May 10. It became a defining moment for Munir.

Pakistan demonstrated the potential of its armed forces to conduct sophisticated operations under extreme pressure. It also proved that its military apparatus could impose high costs on a much larger military. That is the cornerstone of credible deterrence for Islamabad. As for Munir, the Pakistan-India conflict redefined his position within the country’s defence establishment.

On May 20, 2025, Munir was promoted from General to Field Marshal. Sharif’s office credited Munir with preserving national security, attributing the decision to his leadership during the conflict. On Sharif’s advice, the president later appointed Munir as the country’s first Chief of Defence Forces, a dual role he holds alongside his position as Chief of Army Staff.

The trajectory is remarkable. In 2022, Munir assumed the role of army chief. In 2025, he was promoted to Field Marshal, and later also became Pakistan’s first Chief of Defence Forces. The significance of his role, however, extends beyond the front line.

Under his leadership, Pakistan’s military is now heavily involved in strategic diplomacy at a time when regional security and foreign affairs are inextricably linked. This role became apparent in the 2026 war between Iran and the United States, which put Pakistan in a diplomatic crossfire.

Pakistan did not enter the war. Instead, it positioned itself as a diplomatic channel. After weeks of conflict and a weak ceasefire, Munir visited Tehran in May to mediate between Iran and the US. Pakistan’s diplomatic role was noteworthy because it came from a country with substantial military power. Consequently, Munir became a central figure in Pakistan’s growing international standing. With its military supporting diplomatic efforts alongside traditional defence, Pakistan has expanded its strategic influence.

Sharif and Munir have increasingly complemented one another during the recent regional crises. This convergence makes the Mecca agreement particularly powerful and an important moment for Pakistan.

The most obvious contribution from Pakistan is its military capability. Pakistan has one of the world’s largest standing militaries, with extensive operational experience. It also possesses something that the other two signatories lack: a nuclear deterrent.

Islamabad has persistently maintained that its nuclear capability is intended only to keep peace and prevent attacks in South Asia. The Mecca agreement does not incorporate a promise to share these weapons with Saudi Arabia. Having nuclear power, nevertheless, gives Pakistan a strategic weight that not many Muslim states can match.

This is deterrence. The purpose of defence capability is not to use it, but to make the possibility of aggression so costly that aggression becomes less attractive in the first place. Having shaped Pakistan’s defence outlook, this conceptual framework is now becoming relevant to larger regional dialogue.

Its ties with Saudi Arabia are already profoundly institutionalized. Its defence alliance with Türkiye continues to expand. In addition, its diplomatic standing enables it to maintain channels for opposing regional sides.

The Mecca agreement works because it brings together complementary capabilities of three countries.

Saudi Arabia brings vast economic resources, geographic importance, and power across the Gulf and wider Arab world. Meanwhile, Türkiye boasts one of the region’s largest conventional militaries and a sophisticated and increasingly autonomous defence industry. It also possesses NATO experience and considerable aerospace and drone capabilities.

Together, these assets and capabilities forge a more formidable regional security alliance than any of the three could achieve alone.

The emergence of the Mecca agreement inevitably sparked questions about its implications for Iran, even though officials from the participating nations, including Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, have explicitly stated that the agreement does not target any specific country, including Iran.

Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said that Tehran sees no reason to be worried. He said that Tehran views the agreement as a shift in regional countries leaning more heavily on their own capabilities rather than outside powers.

Iran’s response also highlights the deeper significance of the agreement. The possibility that Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are creating an alternative, more regionally driven security framework at a time when confidence in the existing order has diminished.

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement is therefore more than a story about three countries signing an agreement. It is about Muslim nations starting to stand on their own, collectively strong enough to protect their interests, deter hostility and shape their own future.

It is also pertinent to note that the bloc is not limited to three countries. The defence alliance could eventually include other Muslim-majority countries such as Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, and so on.

As the Muslim world reclaims control over security matters, Pakistan aims to drive the emerging order rather than simply responding to it.