Parliament’s Self-Disempowerment: The Erosion of Constitutional Democracy in Pakistan

By Muhammad Imran, Staff Member, SAHSOL-LUMS and Muhammad Ameer Hamza, Final Year Law Student, SLC and Asma Rahmat, Final Year Law Student, SLC

Introduction – The paradox of parliamentary sovereignty: Pakistan’s current parliament faces a fundamental constitutional paradox: an institution empowered to legislate, scrutinise the executive and represent the people risks undermining its own authority by approving measures that weaken institutional checks and balances. The problem is not necessarily the absence of formal powers, but the erosion of the independence, deliberative capacity and democratic responsibility required to exercise them effectively.

In a constitutional democracy, parliament is more than a body that assembles numerical majorities to pass legislation. It is the principal forum for debating national policies, holding the executive accountable, protecting fundamental rights and scrutinising the distribution of state power. When parliament merely endorses decisions formulated elsewhere, it risks becoming an instrument of political legitimation rather than an independent institution of democratic governance.

The distinction is between the formal exercise of parliamentary authority and its substantive exercise. While the former concerns the ability to pass legislation and constitutional amendments, the latter requires independent deliberation, meaningful oversight and the willingness to question even a government supported by the parliamentary majority.

Constitutional amendments and the erosion of institutional safeguards: The 26th Constitutional Amendment of October 2024 and the 27th Amendment of November 2025 have intensified debate about the balance of power between parliament, the executive and the judiciary. Both introduced significant changes to judicial appointments, institutional structures and constitutional jurisdiction. The concern is not that parliament lacks the authority to amend the Constitution. Article 239 expressly provides for constitutional amendments, subject to prescribed procedures and voting requirements. Rather, the question is whether changes of such magnitude receive sufficient deliberation, consultation and scrutiny.

Constitutional amendments reshape the framework within which state power is exercised and constrained. When members approve complex amendments without adequate time to examine their provisions and consequences, parliamentary deliberation risks becoming a procedural formality. A parliamentary majority should not become a mechanism for weakening the institutional safeguards that sustain representative government, judicial independence and the separation of powers.

Weakening the judiciary and parliament itself: An independent judiciary interprets the Constitution, protects fundamental rights, adjudicates institutional disputes and reviews the legality of governmental action. Changes to judicial appointments and constitutional jurisdiction can affect its relationship with the political branches and its capacity to exercise independent oversight.

The paradox is that parliament may strengthen the immediate position of the government while weakening the safeguards that protect both citizens and the legislature against excessive concentrations of power. Judicial independence is therefore not merely a concern for judges; it is also a protection for parliament. By diminishing independent constitutional checks, the legislature may eventually find it more difficult to resist executive overreach or defend its own institutional prerogatives.

Emergency and governor’s rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: The approval of emergency-related measures and governor’s rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in October 2026 illustrates the relationship between parliamentary authority, federalism and democratic accountability. The federal government has cited the deteriorating security situation and alleged shortcomings in provincial cooperation with counterterrorism operations, while the opposition has challenged the intervention. Such a decision requires more than a numerical majority. Parliament must examine the supporting evidence, consider the provincial government’s position and assess whether the intervention satisfies the relevant constitutional requirements and is necessary and proportionate.

Articles 232 and 234 establish distinct emergency-related frameworks. Their requirements must not be conflated, and any intervention must comply with the applicable constitutional safeguards. Emergency powers intended for exceptional circumstances should not become instruments for displacing representative provincial government or consolidating federal authority.

Parliament’s responsibility is therefore not simply to approve such measures, but to scrutinise them independently and transparently. Failure to do so risks weakening provincial autonomy and establishing precedents that could threaten other elected governments.

The absence of effective parliamentary oversight of national security: Pakistan’s continuing struggle against terrorism demonstrates the need for comprehensive national security policymaking. Security operations alone cannot resolve challenges involving political alienation, institutional weaknesses, socioeconomic grievances and governance failures.

Parliament should scrutinise counterterrorism objectives, expenditure, effectiveness and institutional accountability, including coordination between federal and provincial authorities. The situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa raises questions about security coordination, while Balochistan presents longstanding challenges involving separatist militancy and political alienation.

If provincial governments are held responsible for security failures, the federal government and other institutions responsible for national security must also face meaningful scrutiny. Accountability cannot be selective. Although operational confidentiality may be necessary, it should not become a justification for excluding elected representatives from strategic oversight.

Limited scrutiny of foreign policy and defence commitments: Foreign policy and defence agreements can carry substantial strategic, financial and diplomatic consequences. Parliament therefore has a legitimate interest in examining significant international commitments, including their legal status, objectives and implications. The reported Makkah Joint Defence Agreement illustrates the importance of such scrutiny. Whether parliamentary ratification is legally required depends on the agreement’s terms and the applicable constitutional framework. Nevertheless, commitments with significant implications for national security warrant informed parliamentary examination. Turkey has presented the agreement in its Parliament for ratification.

When the executive formulates consequential policies without meaningful legislative engagement and subsequently expects parliament to endorse them, the legislature loses its opportunity to influence decisions before they become difficult to reverse. Parliamentary oversight should complement, rather than replace, the executive’s diplomatic responsibilities.

Administrative restructuring and provincial autonomy: Proposals to reorganise administrative units or fundamentally restructure governance raise questions about political representation, resource allocation, provincial autonomy and the distribution of power. Such changes cannot be treated merely as administrative exercises because they may affect the federation’s constitutional balance and the position of provincial assemblies.

Parliament must examine their constitutional implications and ensure meaningful consultation with affected provinces and their elected representatives. A parliamentary majority does not eliminate the need for consultation, particularly where proposals could alter the federation’s political equilibrium. Proceeding without adequate debate risks weakening both federalism and parliament’s representative legitimacy.

Fundamental rights and democratic accountability: Parliament must protect the fundamental rights that make democratic representation meaningful. Legislation regulating digital communication, freedom of expression and civil liberties must satisfy constitutional requirements, including scrutiny of legality, necessity and proportionality. Where legislation unduly restricts public expression, weakens judicial oversight or limits citizens’ ability to criticise public authorities, it may diminish the accountability essential to democratic government.

Parliament weakens its own foundations when it supports measures that constrain public debate or undermine institutional checks. Its representative legitimacy depends partly on protecting citizens’ ability to question those who govern in their name.

Democratic legitimacy and public confidence: Parliamentary legitimacy depends not only on elections, seats and numerical majorities, but also on public confidence that representatives exercise independent judgment and remain accountable to their constituents. Where electoral legitimacy is contested, constitutional amendments are rushed, or opposition participation is inadequate, parliament has a heightened responsibility to demonstrate transparency and independence. This does not mean every disputed election or controversial law automatically invalidates parliament. It means that numerical strength alone cannot resolve concerns about representation and legitimacy.

Meaningful opposition participation, effective parliamentary committees, transparent procedures and genuine scrutiny of executive decisions are essential to sustaining public confidence.

Parliamentary sovereignty versus constitutional supremacy: A fundamental distinction must be maintained between classical Westminster parliamentary sovereignty and Pakistan’s system of constitutional supremacy. Parliament possesses extensive legislative and amendment powers, but its authority derives from the Constitution and must be exercised within its prescribed framework. Parliamentary sovereignty in Pakistan is therefore best understood as the independent exercise of constitutionally conferred responsibilities, not an unlimited power to override constitutional restraints. A parliamentary majority cannot dispense with constitutional requirements merely by virtue of its numerical strength, nor should executive convenience determine legislative outcomes.

Parliament’s strength lies in its capacity to scrutinise the executive, protect representative government and uphold the constitutional framework within which all state institutions operate.

Parliamentary self-disempowerment: The underlying problem is that parliament may be using its own constitutional powers in ways that diminish its future capacity to exercise them independently.

This process unfolds in three stages: parliament first exercises its formal authority by passing legislation and constitutional amendments; those decisions may then weaken judicial independence, diminish oversight or facilitate excessive concentrations of power; eventually, parliament may retain its formal powers while losing the practical independence required to challenge the government.

The danger is not necessarily parliament’s immediate abolition, but the gradual hollowing out of its institutional functions while its outward appearance remains intact.

Conclusion – Restoring parliament’s constitutional independence: Pakistan’s parliamentary crisis is fundamentally a crisis of constitutional responsibility. Parliament is empowered to legislate, amend the Constitution, scrutinise public policy and hold the executive accountable. Yet these powers lose their democratic significance when exercised without adequate deliberation, independent judgment or regard for institutional checks and balances.

The 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments, the controversy surrounding emergency-related measures in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, inadequate scrutiny of national security and foreign policy, and concerns over fundamental rights raise a common question: is parliament functioning as an independent constitutional institution or increasingly as a mechanism for endorsing decisions made by the executive and other centres of power?

The solution is not to diminish parliamentary authority, but to restore the conditions necessary for its meaningful exercise. Constitutional amendments require adequate scrutiny; parliamentary committees must examine government policy effectively; national security and foreign policy should receive appropriate legislative oversight; opposition members must participate meaningfully; and fundamental rights and provincial autonomy must remain central to decision-making.

Ultimately, the test of parliamentary sovereignty is not how many laws parliament passes or how large a majority approves them, but whether elected representatives can independently scrutinise, challenge and, where necessary, reject measures that threaten constitutional government. A parliament that weakens the institutions designed to restrain concentrated power risks undermining its own authority. It may continue to convene, legislate and command numerical majorities while gradually losing the institutional independence that gives those powers democratic meaning.

Pakistan’s constitutional democracy requires a parliament that treats its authority as a public trust, exercises its powers responsibly and refuses to confuse political compliance with democratic representation. The greatest danger to parliamentary sovereignty may therefore be not its formal abolition, but its gradual erosion through decisions taken within parliament itself.