Sedition: When Dissent Becomes a Crime—I   The Colonial Legacy and the Constitutional Right to Disagree

Huzaima Bukhari
By
Huzaima Bukhari
The writer, lawyer and author, is an Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Senior Visiting Fellow of Pakistan Institute...
13 Min Read

Summary

  • The two requirements must be read together, rather than selectively invoking loyalty while overlooking constitutional limitations upon authority.
  • Indeed, when public authority is exercised contrary to constitutional requirements, demanding compliance with the Constitution may itself represent the most meaningful expression of loyalty.
  • The Court also drew upon the constitutional understanding that public officials exercise authority as trustees of the people.
AI Generated Summary

A government is not the state, criticism is not treason, and dissent is not necessarily sedition

What constitutes loyalty to one’s country? Is it unquestioning obedience to those exercising authority, enthusiastic endorsement of governmental policies, or an unwavering commitment to the principles upon which the state was founded? More importantly, who possesses the moral or legal authority to determine whether a citizen is patriotic or disloyal? These questions assume extraordinary significance in Pakistan, where allegations of sedition, anti-state conduct and disloyalty have frequently overshadowed the constitutional distinction between the state and those temporarily entrusted with governing it.

The fundamental problem begins when criticism of a government is equated with hostility towards the country. A government may be elected, removed, replaced or dismissed in accordance with constitutional processes. Policies may be questioned, institutions scrutinised and public officials held accountable. None of these activities necessarily amounts to an attack upon the state. On the contrary, they constitute the very foundations of a functioning democracy. Yet, throughout history, those wielding authority have often found it convenient to characterise opposition as disloyalty, transforming legitimate dissent into a perceived threat to national security.

The concept of sedition offers a particularly revealing example of this phenomenon.

Its legal history in the subcontinent is inseparable from British colonial rule. Thomas Babington Macaulay’s original draft Penal Code of 1837 contained a provision dealing with sedition, but it was omitted when the Indian Penal Code was enacted in 1860. The omission was subsequently rectified, from the colonial administration’s perspective, through the insertion of section 124A in 1870. Its underlying purpose was not difficult to comprehend. An occupying power, governing a population that had never voluntarily surrendered its political independence, required legal instruments to discourage resistance and suppress challenges to its authority.

The provision criminalised expressions calculated to generate hatred, contempt or disaffection towards the government established by law. Its subsequent expansion in 1898 strengthened the colonial administration’s ability to prosecute expressions of political opposition. Significantly, actual violence or armed rebellion was not necessarily required. The feelings supposedly generated towards the government could themselves form the basis of criminal liability.

What an extraordinary proposition! A government claiming authority over millions could demand not merely obedience to its laws but protection against the adverse sentiments of those it governed.

The implications became apparent during India’s struggle for independence. Bal Gangadhar Tilak faced sedition prosecutions, while Mahatma Gandhi was tried under section 124-A in 1922. Those regarded by the colonial administration as offenders against established authority subsequently came to be celebrated as champions of freedom.

The irony should not escape us. If those challenging colonial domination were considered seditious, was the struggle for independence itself an act of disloyalty? Or was the accusation merely a convenient instrument for preserving political control?

When Pakistan emerged as an independent country in August 1947, it inherited much of the colonial legal framework, including the offence of sedition. Unfortunately, the transition from colonial subjugation to constitutional self-government did not automatically produce a corresponding transformation in the philosophy of governance.

The distinction between subjects and citizens remained insufficiently appreciated.

Section 124-A of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, continued to criminalise attempts to generate hatred, contempt or disaffection towards the federal or provincial government, carrying punishments that could extend to imprisonment for life. Although its explanations purported to protect certain expressions of disapproval directed towards governmental measures, the breadth of the principal provision created considerable scope for suppressing political expression.

The difficulty lay in its underlying assumption: that the government’s standing in public opinion deserved criminal-law protection against hostile sentiments. Such a proposition may have served the purposes of imperial administration, but can it comfortably coexist with constitutional democracy?

The Constitution of Pakistan provides a fundamentally different framework.

Article 5 declares loyalty to the state to be the basic duty of every citizen. However, clause (2) of the same Article makes obedience to the Constitution and law an inviolable obligation. The two requirements must be read together, rather than selectively invoking loyalty while overlooking constitutional limitations upon authority.

This distinction is crucial. Loyalty to the state cannot reasonably mean unquestioning loyalty to a political party, government official or institution. Indeed, when public authority is exercised contrary to constitutional requirements, demanding compliance with the Constitution may itself represent the most meaningful expression of loyalty.

Article 19 guarantees freedom of speech and expression, including freedom of the press, subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law for specified constitutional purposes. Article 19A recognises citizens’ right of access to information on matters of public importance, while Article 8 renders laws inconsistent with fundamental rights void to the extent of such inconsistency. Articles 4 and 10A reinforce the requirements of legality and fair trial.

These guarantees are not decorative promises. They establish enforceable boundaries within which governmental authority must operate.

The Constitution undoubtedly recognises legitimate concerns involving national security, public order and the integrity of Pakistan. Freedom of expression is not absolute, nor does it confer immunity upon individuals who incite violence, participate in armed rebellion or engage in other criminal activities. However, restrictions must satisfy constitutional and legal requirements. Mere governmental displeasure cannot substitute for a legally recognisable offence.

An important judicial development occurred on 30 March 2023 when Justice Shahid Karim of the Lahore High Court, deciding Haroon Farooq v Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2024 Lahore 637), declared section 124-A unconstitutional.

The judgment examined the colonial origins of sedition, its incompatibility with democratic accountability and its implications for freedom of expression. Most significantly, it distinguished loyalty to the state from loyalty to the government of the day. Political opponents, the Court recognised, cannot be expected to share the ideological convictions or policies of those occupying governmental office.

The Court also drew upon the constitutional understanding that public officials exercise authority as trustees of the people. Such authority cannot legitimately be employed to silence those to whom its holders are ultimately accountable. Concluding that section 124-A violated Articles 19 and 19A, the Court declared the provision void in its entirety.

The significance of this pronouncement extends far beyond the wording of a single criminal provision. It challenges the notion that those exercising power may demand public affection as a condition of citizenship.

Even apart from its constitutional infirmities, prosecutions for offences against the state require adherence to prescribed legal procedures. Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, restricts courts from taking cognizance of specified offences without an appropriately authorised governmental complaint. The Islamabad High Court, in Ali Raza v Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2017 Islamabad 64), examined safeguards against improperly initiated sedition proceedings.

Such procedural requirements are not technical inconveniences. They exist to prevent the criminal justice system from becoming an instrument of personal animosity, political retaliation or arbitrary accusation. Comparative experience further demonstrates the importance of distinguishing genuine threats from political dissent.

The United Kingdom abolished the common-law offences of sedition and seditious libel in England, Wales and Northern Ireland through section 73 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Interestingly, the country from which the subcontinent inherited its colonial sedition provision had itself abandoned these offences.

India adopted a different course. The old section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code ceased to operate prospectively with the commencement of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita on 1 July 2024. However, section 152 of the new legislation introduced an offence concerning acts endangering India’s sovereignty, unity and integrity. Its breadth continues to raise legitimate questions about the boundary between national security and freedom of expression.

In the United States, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), established a particularly protective constitutional standard. Advocacy of unlawful action cannot ordinarily be punished merely because its ideas are objectionable; the stringent test concerns intentional incitement likely to produce imminent lawless action.

These approaches are not identical, nor can their legal principles be mechanically transplanted into Pakistan’s constitutional framework. Nevertheless, they illustrate a common dilemma confronting democracies: how to protect the state against genuine threats without converting political disagreement into criminal conduct.

The essential distinction is between expression and demonstrable unlawful activity. Criticising a government, exposing corruption, demanding institutional reform or advocating changes through lawful constitutional means cannot automatically be equated with sedition. Conversely, organising violent rebellion, waging war against the state or knowingly facilitating terrorism may attract serious criminal liability under applicable laws.

Indeed, Article 6 of Pakistan’s Constitution separately addresses high treason through the abrogation, subversion, suspension or holding in abeyance of the Constitution by force, show of force or other unconstitutional means. It would be legally indefensible to confuse such conduct with peaceful criticism of a government.

This brings us to the most fundamental question of all.

Pakistan is home to more than 250 million people. They belong to different provinces, speak different languages, follow different political philosophies and hold diverse opinions about how their country should be governed. These differences do not diminish their entitlement to citizenship or establish any presumption of disloyalty.

A country is not the private estate of its rulers, and patriotism is not a certificate to be distributed by those occupying public office. The people are not tenants permitted to reside in their homeland at the pleasure of the government. They constitute the enduring human foundation of the state itself.

Certainly, individuals may betray their country through identifiable unlawful acts but an entire political constituency, community or body of dissenting citizens cannot be condemned as anti-national simply because they reject a particular governmental narrative.

The freedom to disagree is not an indulgence granted by benevolent rulers. It is a constitutional right and an essential instrument through which citizens participate in determining their country’s future.

A society in which people may praise authority but fear questioning it is not demonstrating remarkable national unity. It may merely be revealing the consequences of intimidation.

The real challenge, therefore, is not to devise ever-expanding definitions of disloyalty but to cultivate institutions sufficiently confident in their constitutional legitimacy to withstand criticism.

A state secure in its constitutional foundations does not need to manufacture enemies out of its own citizens. Yet an even more disturbing question remains unanswered. If disloyalty means conduct that undermines the country’s constitutional order, weakens its institutions and damages the collective interests of its people, should scrutiny be confined to those who criticise authority? Or must it also extend to those who exercise authority in violation of their constitutional obligations?

That question takes us beyond the colonial legacy of sedition and into the far more uncomfortable territory of institutional accountability.

We welcome your contributions! Submit your blogs, opinion pieces, press releases, news story pitches, and news features to opinion@minutemirror.com.pk and minutemirrormail@gmail.com
Share This Article
The writer, lawyer and author, is an Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Senior Visiting Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE)
Leave a Comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *