Sedition: Who Really Betrays the State?—II  Power, Patriotism and the Betrayal of Constitutional Trust

Huzaima Bukhari
By
Huzaima Bukhari
The writer, lawyer and author, is an Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Senior Visiting Fellow of Pakistan Institute...
8 Min Read

Summary

  • Those who exercise constitutional authority are not exempt from this obligation.
  • Not every constitutional violation, administrative impropriety or abuse of authority constitutes high treason.
  • Similarly, public officials who exceed their legal authority, suppress fundamental rights, manipulate administrative procedures or employ state machinery for improper purposes may incur legal, disciplinary or constitutional accountability according to the nature of their conduct.
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A nation is not weakened by citizens who question the exercise of power. It is weakened when those exercising power begin to believe that they are the nation

Who owns a country? Its rulers, its institutions, its political elite, or the millions of people whose collective existence gives it meaning? The question may appear elementary, yet the manner in which allegations of disloyalty are sometimes levelled against citizens suggests that its answer remains disturbingly elusive. In Pakistan, where expressions such as anti-state, anti-national and traitor can be employed with astonishing ease, it is worth examining whether those entrusted with protecting the country’s constitutional foundations always appreciate the responsibilities accompanying their authority.

In the first part of this discussion, we examined the colonial origins of sedition and the constitutional difficulties inherent in treating criticism of a government as an offence against the state. The more unsettling question now arises: if undermining the country’s constitutional order is a serious wrong, why should scrutiny be directed predominantly towards those who question authority rather than also towards those who misuse it?

Pakistan is home to more than 250 million people. It is their birthplace, their inheritance, their identity and, for the overwhelming majority, the only homeland they have ever known. They may disagree passionately about politics, governance, economic policies, provincial rights or institutional responsibilities. Such differences are natural in a diverse society. They cannot collectively transform a population into enemies of its own country.

Of course, individuals may engage in activities genuinely prejudicial to national security. There can be no blanket presumption of innocence from legal accountability merely because someone invokes patriotism. However, criminal responsibility must arise from identifiable conduct, evidence and applicable law, not from disagreement with those presently exercising power.

Unfortunately, the terminology of disloyalty lends itself to convenient manipulation. A politician criticising the government may be branded anti-state. A journalist exposing administrative wrongdoing may be accused of damaging national institutions. A citizen questioning official expenditure may be portrayed as undermining public confidence. Even lawful demands for accountability can be presented as attacks upon the country’s reputation.

The question is, whose reputation is being protected: that of Pakistan or that of individuals occupying public office?

The distinction is fundamental.

The Constitution does not establish a hierarchy of patriotism under which certain officeholders possess an exclusive right to define loyalty while ordinary citizens must continually demonstrate their innocence. Article 5 imposes a duty of loyalty to the state, but it simultaneously makes obedience to the Constitution and law an inviolable obligation. Those who exercise constitutional authority are not exempt from this obligation. If anything, the responsibilities of their offices make adherence to constitutional limitations particularly consequential.

Indeed, the Preamble to the Constitution describes public authority as a sacred trust. Such trust is neither hereditary property nor an unrestricted licence to govern according to personal preferences. It is authority exercised within a constitutional framework for the benefit of the people.

This principle has received judicial recognition. In Haroon Farooq v Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2024 Lahore 637), the Lahore High Court, while examining the constitutionality of the colonial sedition provision, relied upon the fiduciary character of public office. The judgment emphasised that governmental functionaries exercise authority entrusted to them by the people and remain answerable to those from whom that authority originates.

The implication is profound. If public officials are trustees, citizens are not merely passive recipients of administrative commands. They are entitled to scrutinise how the trust is being discharged.

Consider a simple example. Suppose an honest public servant discovers financial irregularities involving public resources and reports them through lawful channels. The disclosure embarrasses powerful officials and raises questions about institutional integrity. Has that officer damaged the country by revealing wrongdoing, or have those responsible for the wrongdoing damaged it by betraying public confidence?

Likewise, when journalists investigate corruption, lawyers challenge unlawful executive action, or citizens demand transparency, their conduct should be assessed against the law rather than the discomfort it causes those in authority. There is a dangerous inversion of values when exposing misconduct attracts greater hostility than the misconduct itself.

This brings us to another essential constitutional distinction. Article 6 identifies particular acts involving the abrogation, subversion, suspension or holding in abeyance of the Constitution, or attempts or conspiracies to do so through the means specified in that Article, as high treason. Its scope is carefully defined. Not every constitutional violation, administrative impropriety or abuse of authority constitutes high treason.

Nevertheless, the constitutional philosophy underlying Article 6 is unmistakable: the constitutional order cannot lawfully be displaced merely because those occupying powerful positions consider themselves entitled to do so.

Similarly, public officials who exceed their legal authority, suppress fundamental rights, manipulate administrative procedures or employ state machinery for improper purposes may incur legal, disciplinary or constitutional accountability according to the nature of their conduct. The existence of institutional power does not confer immunity from scrutiny.

Why, then, does the language of national loyalty so often appear more useful for silencing questions than for answering them?

Perhaps the problem lies in a deeply entrenched perception that institutions and their temporary occupants are indistinguishable. Criticism of a particular decision is interpreted as hostility towards the institution itself. Questioning an officeholder becomes an affront to the office. Demanding accountability is portrayed as an attempt to weaken national authority.

Nothing could be further from the principles of responsible governance.

Institutions derive strength from their constitutional legitimacy, professional competence, transparency and public confidence. They do not become stronger merely because criticism is discouraged. On the contrary, an institution incapable of correcting its mistakes risks transforming legitimate public confidence into enforced silence.

And silence should never be mistaken for loyalty.

History repeatedly demonstrates that societies may outwardly appear obedient while inwardly accumulating resentment, distrust and alienation. When people conclude that constitutional protections are available selectively, their faith in public institutions inevitably suffers. The resulting damage cannot always be measured through economic indicators or administrative reports. It manifests itself in declining civic participation, disillusionment with lawful remedies and the gradual erosion of national solidarity.

This is precisely why arbitrary accusations of disloyalty are so dangerous.

The mere initiation of criminal proceedings can inflict lasting injury, even where allegations ultimately prove baseless. Arrest, interrogation, legal expenses, reputational damage and prolonged uncertainty can become punishments in themselves. A person eventually acquitted may never fully recover the professional opportunities, emotional tranquillity or social standing lost during the proceedings.

A criminal justice system that permits accusations to become instruments of intimidation risks abandoning its most fundamental purpose: impartial administration of justice. The solution cannot be to deny the existence

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The writer, lawyer and author, is an Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Senior Visiting Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE)
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