Devolution without representation—III A democratic compact before a new map

Pakistan cannot make devolution credible by multiplying provinces, districts or councils while the institutions that convert votes into authority remain distrusted. The concluding task is to turn scattered electoral safeguards into one enforceable democratic compact.

The first part of this series argued that Pakistan is trying to redistribute power without first asking who will legitimately receive it. The second part moved one stage backward and examined the political parties that control access to elected office. The conclusion now follows that electoral reform cannot remain a collection of technical amendments. It must become a constitutional and institutional compact preceding any serious redesign of the State.

This does not mean that debate on new provinces, autonomous administrative units or empowered local governments should stop. It means that the democratic machinery through which those institutions acquire authority must be repaired at the same time, and preferably before new boundaries are drawn.

The constitutional starting point already exists. Article 218(3) of the Constitution requires the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to organise elections honestly, justly and fairly and to guard against corrupt practices. Article 140A requires devolution to elected representatives. Article 17 recognises political parties while requiring them to account for their sources of funds. Read together, these provisions point towards a simple principle: public power must travel through institutions that are themselves democratic, transparent and trusted.

The first element of the compact must be functional independence of the ECP. Pakistan already has a permanent constitutional Commission. The problem is not absence of formal status; it is the persistent gap between legal independence and public confidence. International IDEA makes precisely this distinction: an election management body must be independent not only in law but in its governance, resources, operations and relations with other state institutions.

South Africa offers a useful constitutional benchmark. Its Constitution declares the Electoral Commission independent and impartial, obliges every organ of state to assist and protect that independence and expressly prohibits interference. The text is worth studying because it treats electoral independence as a duty binding the entire State, not merely as a privilege of one institution.

Pakistan should move in the same direction. The ECP should have predictable financial autonomy, control over its professional staff, transparent criteria for election officials and clear protection against executive pressure. Appointment procedures for the Chief Election Commissioner and members should minimise partisan bargaining and maximise public scrutiny. Independence must be visible as well as legal.

The second element is integrity of election results. Pakistan’s 2024 general election demonstrated that polling-day orderliness is not enough. The Commonwealth Observer Group later recorded that restrictions, the cellular shutdown and weaknesses in the results process affected transparency and credibility. Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) found that copies of Form-45 were not consistently provided or displayed and that observers were often denied access to constituency-level tabulation.

The lesson is straightforward. Every polling-station result should enter a publicly verifiable chain. Form-45 should be photographed, time-stamped and uploaded immediately from the polling station. Constituency consolidation should occur in the presence of candidates, agents and accredited observers. Any alteration between polling-station and consolidated results should leave an auditable digital trail. Technology should support transparency, not replace it with another black box.

The third element is timely adjudication. An election dispute decided after most of a legislative term has passed is not an effective remedy. FAFEN has recently noted that several petitions arising from the 2024 election remained pending two years later. Election tribunals need strict statutory timelines, adequate judges, public case-tracking and narrowly defined grounds for adjournment. Appeals must also be time-bound.

The fourth element is party democracy. Part II explained why a democracy cannot be built through organisations that are themselves closed, hereditary or controlled by a narrow leadership. Sections 207 and 208 of the Elections Act, 2017 already require elected councils and periodic intra-party elections. ECP’s own Annual Report 2024 showed how uneven compliance remains.

Reform now required is substantive rather than cosmetic. Membership rolls, electoral colleges and nomination procedures should be verifiable. Major internal elections should permit independent observation. Leadership contests must allow genuine competition. Candidate selection should be governed by published criteria and meaningful participation of local party organisations.

The fifth element is political finance. Money is necessary for politics, but unregulated money can purchase access, nominations and policy. International IDEA’s 2025 global study warns that political finance remains a major entry point for private influence and corruption even where formal rules exist.

Pakistan should require timely public disclosure of major donations and campaign expenditure in searchable form. Party accounts filed with the ECP should be cross-checkable, under law, against tax and banking information. Third-party campaign spending, digital advertising and coordinated expenditure should not remain outside regulation. Any future public funding of parties must be conditional upon transparent finance and genuine internal democracy.

The sixth element is restoration of financial transparency of elected representatives. Sections 137 and 138 of the Elections Act, 2017 require annual statements of assets and liabilities and provide for their publication. The direction of policy should be greater verification and easier public access, not additional barriers.

This problem is no longer abstract. FAFEN reported in January 2026 that it had still not received complete nomination papers for almost half of the candidates returned in the 2024 general election despite repeated requests. Nomination papers contain information directly relevant to public scrutiny, including tax details, pending criminal cases and asset declarations.

If citizens are expected to trust elected authority, information necessary to assess those exercising it cannot be treated as a favour granted by officials. Article 19A should operate as the default rule: disclosure first, narrowly justified restriction only where a genuine legal interest requires it.

The seventh element is guaranteed local democracy. A constitutional promise of devolution is hollow if provincial or federal executives can repeatedly postpone local elections by altering laws, boundaries or institutional structures whenever polling approaches.

Local-government terms should be fixed. Successor elections should occur before expiry wherever practicable. If dissolution is unavoidable, polls should follow within a short constitutional period. Changes to local-government laws, boundaries or electoral arrangements made after an election schedule begins should apply to the next cycle, not the current one.

The eighth element is representation itself. Pakistan should not assume that first-past-the-post, reserved seats and the present nomination system are beyond review. A national electoral-reform commission should examine whether the current system adequately converts votes into representation, whether women and minorities exercise meaningful political choice, whether reserved-seat lists are sufficiently democratic, and whether alternative or mixed systems could reduce wasted votes without destroying constituency accountability.

This inquiry must be empirical, not fashionable. Comparative models are useful only when adapted to Pakistan’s constitutional, social and federal realities. Germany’s requirement that parties themselves conform to democratic principles is relevant. South Africa’s protection of its election commission is relevant. India’s experience under former Chief Election Commissioner S.Y. Quraishi is relevant. None should be copied mechanically.

The final element is political consent. Electoral reform imposed by a temporary parliamentary majority will fail the very test it seeks to satisfy. The process must include government and opposition parties, smaller parties, provincial representatives, civil society, election administrators, constitutional experts, women, minorities, persons with disabilities and credible observer organisations.

The objective should be a published Electoral Reform Compact followed by legislation, institutional restructuring and an implementation timetable that begins before the next general-election cycle. Every proposed change should answer three questions: does it expand genuine political competition, does it increase verifiability, and does it reduce the capacity of any state or private actor to predetermine an electoral outcome?

Only after that foundation is secured does the debate over provinces and devolution become meaningful. A new province cannot compensate for an untrusted mandate. A metropolitan government cannot be democratic if its election can be postponed indefinitely.

A district council cannot represent citizens if nominations are controlled by oligarchic parties. An autonomous administrative unit is not self-government if the people living there cannot confidently determine who governs it.

Pakistan’s problem has never been a shortage of offices. It has been the weakness of the chain connecting citizens to authority. That chain begins with the voter, passes through democratic parties and an independent election commission, continues through transparent counting and prompt dispute resolution, and ends with representatives answerable to those who elected them. Reform that breaks any link will fail.

The present debate should t be reordered. First repair representation. Then constitutionalise meaningful devolution. Thereafter examine, through consent and evidence, whether territorial reorganisation is necessary. Without that sequence, Pakistan risks constructing new political units upon the same disputed democratic foundations. With it, devolution can finally mean what the Constitution intends: power travelling downward because sovereignty travels upward from the people.

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Huzaima Bukhari, lawyer and author, has been Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Senior Visiting Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE). She also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 2003.

Dr. Ikramul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court, Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), holds an LLD in tax laws. He was full-time journalist from 1979 to 1984 with Viewpoint and Dawn. He also served Civil Services of Pakistan from 1984 to 1996.